


Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercises



March 19, 1999

EXERCISE
POLICY AND GUIDANCE
FOR THE
CHEMICAL STOCKPILE EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

MARCH 19, 1999

U.S. Department of the Army
Office of the Assistant Secretary
(Installations, Logistics and Environment)
and
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Chemical and Radiological Preparedness Division

RECORD OF CHANGES

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AYE	Alternate Year Exercise
CAIRA	Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance
CA	Cooperative Agreement (FEMA)
CPG	Civil Preparedness Guide
COSIN	Control Staff Instructions
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CSDP	Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
CSEPP	Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
DA	Department of the Army
DAC	Defense Ammunition Center
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
EOC	Emergency Operating or Operations Center
EXPLAN	Exercise Plan
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FME	Federally Managed Exercise
IRF	Initial Response Force
IRZ	Immediate Response Zone
IPT	Integrated Process Team
JIC	Joint Information Center
JIS	Joint Information System
MCE	Maximum Credible Event
MERS	Mobile Emergency Response Support
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAM	Pamphlet
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPA	Performance Partnership Agreement
POR	Point of Review
Pub. L.	Public Law
SBCCOM	Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command
RIA	Requiring Immediate Action
SIMCELL	Simulation Cell
XPA	Extent-of-Play

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 PURPOSE OF DOCUMENT

This document provides program guidance and supporting information for implementation of the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) exercise program and applies to both Federally Managed and Alternate Year Exercises unless otherwise specifically addressed. It replaces the exercise program document, *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise (Program Guidance Document)* (ORNL 1994), known as the "Blue Book." This document includes the following information in appendices: Outline of Exercise Report (Appendix A), CSEPP Exercise Public Affairs Plan (Appendix B), CSEPP Exercise Objectives and Points of Review (Appendix C), and CSEPP Extent of Play Agreement (Appendix D).

This document has undergone several iterations, reflecting the evolution of the CSEPP exercise program. Planners and responders are encouraged to submit comments for consideration to any future revisions to CSEPP Exercise Coordinator, Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), Attn: SSBOE-CS, Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland 21010-5423 and/or to the CSEPP Exercise Coordinator, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Exercise Division, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472.

1.2 THE CSEPP EXERCISE PROGRAM

A Federally managed exercise program involving Federal, State, and local agencies, and Army installations has been developed as part of the increased emphasis on emergency preparedness under the CSEP Program. The CSEP Program will result in improved preparedness at the eight U. S. Army installations storing the unitary chemical stockpile and their surrounding civilian communities and is part of the preparation for the disposal of the Department of the Army's (DA) unitary chemical stockpile under the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP). The CSEPP exercises, conducted by the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), will be used by program managers to evaluate the emergency response plans and capabilities of the installations and their surrounding communities. The eight stockpile locations are Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, Anniston Army Depot in Alabama, Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky, Newport Chemical Depot in Indiana, Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, Pueblo Chemical Depot in Colorado, Deseret Chemical Depot in Utah, and Umatilla Chemical Depot in Oregon.

Under CSEPP, Federally managed exercises (referred to as CSEPP exercises in this document) for the installation and off-post responders began in 1991. These exercises demonstrate the ability of the appropriate military and civilian communities to respond to a chemical event. Representatives from DA, FEMA, other Federal agencies, State and local governments, the Army installations, and civilian volunteer agencies participate in these exercises.

The purpose of this document is to ensure consistency in planning and conducting the exercises and in evaluating the performance of the emergency responders (often referred to as "players") in exercises. A standard set of exercise objectives is used as the basis for planning and evaluating each exercise. Some location-specific adaptations may be necessary to accommodate the varied response structures.

In addition to satisfying CSEPP exercise criteria, these exercises will satisfy Army regulatory requirements for exercises and the State and local governments' exercise requirements under the FEMA Performance Partnership Agreement/Cooperative Agreement (PPA/CA), which funds CSEPP and other emergency management activities.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 EXERCISE REQUIREMENT

The Army has been delegated the President's broad response authority with respect to releases or threatened releases of chemical weapons from any facility under the jurisdiction or control of the Secretary of Defense under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), Section 104 (42 United States Code). The Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1986 (Pub. L. 99-145) directs the chemical demilitarization program to provide maximum protection for the public, post personnel, and the environment. To achieve this directive, funds have been allocated to improve on-post emergency preparedness and to assist State and local governments in developing their emergency response capabilities.

DA and FEMA signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on August 3, 1988 (DA/FEMA 1988), outlining the responsibilities of each organization in the CSDP. On October 8, 1997 (DA/FEMA 1997), DA and FEMA signed a new MOU establishing a framework of cooperation between the two agencies, identifying their respective roles, responsibilities and joint efforts for emergency response preparedness involving the storage and ultimate disposal of the United States stockpile of chemical warfare weapons. In the MOU, DA and FEMA agreed to cooperate "in assessing and improving the effectiveness of Federal, state and local response systems and procedures through the design, conduct and evaluation of exercises" (DA/FEMA 1997). Exercises are an important element in evaluating the implementation of the emergency response plans and assessing the adequacy of the plans and procedures, the capabilities of response organizations, the availability of equipment, and the coordination among the response elements. Exercises also identify needed improvements and possible funding requirements.

The exercise program provides information for FEMA's assessment of the emergency preparedness of communities around the installations and is the basis for FEMA's recommendations to the Army about its effectiveness. The six FEMA regional offices serving the locations at which the chemical stockpile is stored will review the off-post planning as well as the capability to implement those plans. The off-post planning will be reviewed against the guidance and standards contained in *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program* (FEMA 1996), as amended.

2.2 ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPS INVOLVED IN THE CSEPP EXERCISE PROGRAM

2.2.1 Department of the Army

The Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM) has the Army responsibility for appointing the Army Exercise Co-Director who conducts, evaluates, and reports on exercises, and tracks Army exercise Findings. Each SBCCOM Activity commander appoints an exercise coordinator who plans the exercise. The DA, jointly with FEMA headquarters representatives, monitors the CSEPP exercise program and reviews it annually. The lead oversight office for the

Department of the Army is the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations, Logistics and Environment).

2.2.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA administers the CSEP Program off-post, primarily through its offices in the regions containing chemical stockpile storage locations. The regional office CSEP Program Manager appoints the FEMA Exercise Co-Director and takes the FEMA lead in planning, conducting, evaluating, reporting, and tracking identified Findings in all the CSEPP exercises. FEMA headquarters, jointly with Army representatives, have oversight of the CSEPP exercise program and reviews it annually. The lead oversight office for FEMA is the Office of the Associate Director for Preparedness, Training and Exercises.

2.2.3 Recommending Bodies

There are several groups that develop recommendations for the CSEPP Exercise Program. They are the National Integrated Process Team (IPT), FEMA/Army Exercise Co-Directors, the Site Specific and Functional Area (i.e., Exercise) IPTs, and the State Exercise and Training Officers (ETOs). The National Level IPT is established on an "as needed" basis to allow national decision-makers a forum to discuss issues that affect national CSEPP policy. The Exercise and Site Specific IPTs, like the National IPT, are formed on an "as needed" basis to allow Federal, State and local stakeholders to make recommendations and develop proposed solutions on functional issues that affect the exercise program. The Site Specific IPTs can make recommendations to the Exercise IPT on exercise issues involving the exercise program at their site through the appropriate representative to the Exercise IPT. The State Exercise and Training Officers (ETO) (meeting), co-chaired by representatives of DA and FEMA, provides input into the development of the exercise program. Membership includes representatives from FEMA headquarters and regions, SBCCOM, the Army installations, the Defense Ammunition Center, and the CSEPP States.

The ETOs and Exercise IPT's role is to be expert on the subject matter and to provide recommendations to National leadership regarding program policy, guidance, and standards regarding the exercise program.

2.2.4 State and Local Organizations and Army Installations

The State and local organizations and Army installations provide input into the CSEPP exercise program through their representatives on the ETO and Exercise IPT. They play roles in implementing the plans and in planning, participating in, and evaluating CSEPP exercises and taking appropriate corrective actions on identified Findings. Each State has CSEPP funded staff.

There may be participation by agencies using civilian volunteers in the exercises. Limited compensation is being made available to civilian volunteer emergency responders at federally-managed CSEPP exercises. This compensation applies only to volunteers who are in jurisdictions in the path of the plume and jurisdictions providing direct support to those jurisdictions. Examples of direct support include operation of congregate care centers/reception centers, hospitals, and traffic/access control points. The compensation will be provided by State Emergency Management Offices through the CSEPP Cooperative Agreements (CA). Funding

allocations will be considered on a case-by-case basis and will require reasonable and prudent justification in the CAs.

This compensation is limited to volunteer emergency responders and is not available for paid staff. It is also limited to incidentals such as meals and transportation, although the choice of whether to provide these items to the volunteers or have their costs reimbursed shall be left to the States. It does not include salaries and benefits (DA/FEMA 1995a).

2.2.5 The CSEPP Exercise Planning Team

The exercise planning team is responsible for planning each CSEPP [both the Federally Managed Exercises (FME) and Alternate Year Exercises (AYE)] exercise. The exercise planning team membership is tailored to the needs of the community and will include, but is not limited to, the Exercise Co-Directors (FEMA or State and Army), an installation representative appointed by the Depot or Chemical Activity Commander, as appropriate, the State CSEPP exercise/training officer or other State representative, emergency management representatives and/or CSEPP planners from the affected communities, and the American Red Cross (if appropriate).

2.2.6 Other Organizations

Other organizations, such as Federal Departments or agencies, or the Red Cross, may be included in exercise planning and the response as appropriate.

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3. POLICY FOR THE CSEPP EXERCISE PROGRAM

This section provides a policy overview of the CSEPP exercise program. More detailed information, which can be used by the exercise planners, is given in Sect. 4.

3.1 PURPOSE OF CSEPP EXERCISES

The purpose of CSEPP exercises is to provide an assessment of the level of preparedness at and around each chemical stockpile installation to protect the general public, the work force, and the environment. The exercises provide a basis upon which to build and strengthen the response capabilities both on- and off-post. Therefore, during a CSEPP Exercise, response issues should be the primary emphasis of each community. Once response issues have been addressed, the community can address other issues.

3.2 TYPES OF CSEPP EXERCISES

Within the CSEPP Exercise Program, there are two types of exercises, based on scheduling. They are the "Federally Managed Exercise" (FME) and the "Alternate Year Exercise" (AYE). They are discussed below.

In addition to these Federally managed CSEPP exercises, installations and off-post responders may conduct additional exercises, including tabletop exercises, they consider appropriate. This document may also be useful as an outline for planning, conducting, and evaluating these other exercises.

3.2.1 Federally Managed Exercise (Full Capability)

A Federally Managed Exercise is a mandatory federally evaluated readiness assessment of a community's full capabilities to respond to a chemical stockpile accident. The exercise is driven by an Extent of Play Agreement (XPA), a scenario, and related events that allow for realistic participant response. The negotiated Extent of Play for the FME will be developed which ensures that the community, as a whole, will demonstrate all CSEPP Objectives (Appendix C).

The community exercise planning team, under the lead of the Army and FEMA Co-Directors, will be responsible for overseeing exercise planning and conduct.

The Army and FEMA Co-Directors will be responsible for exercise evaluation and the generation of the exercise report.

States and counties may demonstrate objectives for CSEPP exercise credit at other times (i.e., during quarterly CAIRAs, Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) exercises, actual events, or other exercises) in accordance with established FEMA policy and as approved by the FEMA Exercise Co-Director. This will be documented in the annual CSEPP Exercise Report.

A FME tests the entire emergency response effort and evaluates the interaction of all components. The FME involves mobilization of emergency service and response agencies, activation of communications centers and emergency facilities such as EOCs and command posts, and field play. Each jurisdiction's Extent of Play will reflect their involvement in the exercise

scenario. Thus, each jurisdiction will demonstrate for evaluation all actions (objectives) in order to support the scenario. The window for completion of a CSEPP FME from start to finish is 48 consecutive hours. Play may be continuous or intermittent during the 48-hour window. The specific details of which facilities and elements of the emergency service communities participate and the times of play within the 48-hour window are established in the extent of play agreement. The exercise will be scheduled for a minimum of 4.5 hours and will continue until all participating organizations have had an opportunity to demonstrate their agreed-upon objectives

For the exercise program, the "community" is defined as the geographic area made up of the installation, State, and the jurisdictions (counties, municipalities or any part(s) thereof) which could be affected by a CAIRA event at the CSEPP installation.

The intent of the language is to allow for demonstration of all applicable objectives if a scenario affects even a portion of a jurisdiction. Within this context, the jurisdiction will demonstrate, and be evaluated, on **all** objectives consistent with the exercise scenario. Each jurisdiction's "Extent of Play" will reflect their involvement in the exercise scenario. Thus, each jurisdiction will demonstrate, for evaluation, all actions (objectives) in order to support the scenario.

Consistent with the exercise objectives, jurisdictions (or any part(s) thereof), which are affected by the exercise scenario will demonstrate, for evaluation, all activities they would conduct to protect the public health and safety, and the environment should a CAIRA event actually occur.

3.2.2 Alternate Year Exercise (AYE)

All CSEPP jurisdictions will participate in the Alternate Year Exercise.

An exercise to be used by a community to:

- Train,
- Evaluate EOPs/SOPs,
- Evaluate procedures for new equipment or resources,
- Validate corrections to outstanding Findings, and/or
- Address other issues.

Army installations will exercise "full-up" every year. Scheduling will be conducted to accommodate the Army's Initial Response Force Exercise (IRFX) cycle. "Full-up" means that all objectives will be demonstrated and evaluated on-post (Appendix C). Observations associated with the IRFX requirements will be integrated into the CSEPP Exercise Report to avoid dual reporting.

A community may request varying levels of federal support and/or management for their Alternate Year Exercise, as determined by the community exercise planning team. Depending upon the level of federal support requested, either the State ETO or a FEMA region representative will be designated the off-post Exercise Co-Director.

The Exercise Support Contract is a Federal contract, which requires Federal oversight. For both the Federally Managed and Alternate Year Exercises, the FEMA Region representative on the Exercise Planning Team is responsible for consolidating contractor support needs (Army and off-post), forwarding these to FEMA Headquarters, and for providing technical direction to the contractor. A (Exercise Support) Task Order will be issued for each Exercise by FEMA Headquarters.

The level of support desired must be identified no later than March of the preceding fiscal year. The community members will prepare a budget to support the respective community's components of the Alternate Year Exercise. As some of the funds, which would have been used for a full federal exercise, may be used to fund the Alternate Year Exercise, it is important to consider the following:

- In order to avoid duplication of effort, State Co-Directors will work with the Army Co-Director, installation exercise coordinator, and the FEMA Regional person (on the Exercise Planning team) to determine:
 - Who will supply ADP equipment, meeting rooms, copying machines, and communication equipment, including telephones, fax machines, etc., at the exercise site.
 - What exercise documents (e.g., EXPLANs, COSINS, communication directories, exercise reports, various exercise forms, etc.) are required for the exercise and who will produce and distribute them.
 - Work with the Army to determine off-post requirements in the SIMCELL, coordination requirements, and to provide personnel for the SIMCELL.

Authorized AYE expenses include:

- Printing, postage, telephone calls, transportation requirements in addition to those normally budgeted for in the exercise annual budget;
- Travel funds for exercise planning and execution;
- Per diem for exercise evaluators/controllers for the exercise.

Expenses not authorized include:

- Separate exercise support contracts,
- Expenses for Visitors and Observers;
- Separate exercise support contracts;
- Overtime for State/county personnel.

Each CSEPP State/county has authorized CSEPP personnel and it is envisioned that they will do the bulk of the planning and execution work not tasked to the FEMA exercise support contractor. Reimbursement for volunteers is limited to meals and transportation costs and does not cover salaries and benefits.

State Co-Directors may find it advantageous to let its FEMA Region request most of the work (through FEMA contractor) and have the State choose the direction of the exercise.

Community budget requests must be submitted no later than the deadline set for Cooperative Agreement (CA) budget submissions for the fiscal year.

The community exercise planning team, under the lead of the Army installation exercise coordinator and the State ETO or FEMA Co-Director, as appropriate, will be responsible for exercise planning and conduct.

The Army Co-Director and State ETO or FEMA Co-Director, as appropriate, will be responsible for exercise evaluation and the issuance of an exercise report.

The Army installation will integrate Army and MACOM exercise requirements as described in AR 50-6. The exercise will be scheduled for a minimum of 4.5 hours and will continue until all participating organizations have had an opportunity to demonstrate their agreed-upon objectives.

3.3 THE EXERCISE PROCESS

3.3.1 General

CSEPP Exercises are conducted on a biennial cycle. During one year of the cycle, each CSEPP jurisdiction will participate in a Federally Managed Exercise with Army and FEMA Co-Directors; in the other year, the local community can participate in an Alternate Year Exercise, or elect to have a FME in lieu of an AYE. At the preference of the local exercise planning team, the Alternate Year Exercise can be run by the Army and State Co-Directors or by Army and FEMA Co-Directors. The provision of the AYE in alternating years is intended to give communities an opportunity to use the resources of the CSEPP Exercise Program to design and conduct their own exercises-to meet their own special needs. Exercise planning teams should plan ahead for AYE's by determining as early as possible when they prefer a locally run exercise (State ETO Co-Director) so that the exercise resources needed can be included in the state's CSEPP budget. (See para 3.2.2 for federal support for an AYE.) For a State/Army AYE, FEMA will support the State ETO by coordinating modules of federal support as requested.

3.3.2 Planning the Exercise

Exercise planning teams will be formed of representatives from all participating jurisdictions for each exercise. As previously noted, the team will be co-chaired by an Army and FEMA or State representative depending upon the type of exercise. (Army and State for locally run AYE). This team will provide the necessary level of expertise on local plans and procedures to ensure the exercise is properly designed and best satisfies the goals of the program and the needs of the jurisdictions.

Since AYE's are intended to allow maximum flexibility for design and control of exercises, the remaining pertain to FMEs, except where specifically noted.

A typical planning timeline is furnished in Figure 4.1. Army exercise planners should also refer to their separately published exercise planning guides "Roles and duties of the exercise planning coordinator."

The Exercise Co-Directors, with the planning team, plan the exercise. This process involves all the participating organizations. Planning the exercise is more than planning the scenario; the preparations include the full range of activities - control, evaluation, scenario, logistics, public affairs, visitors' program, etc. As mentioned previously, the scope of the FME involves all participating jurisdictions; each jurisdiction's participation is dictated by the scenario such that the community, as a whole, demonstrates all exercise objectives listed in Appendix C. The planning team, therefore, should identify scenario parameters that will be realistic, and that will cause the community, as a whole, to demonstrate the full range of emergency functions as depicted by the 15 exercise objectives, e.g., the installation demonstrates all objectives consistent with Initial Response Force (IRF) level exercise; downwind jurisdictions demonstrate objectives

related to protective actions; upwind jurisdictions demonstrate objectives related to evacuee care or mutual aid; and all jurisdictions demonstrate joint command and control, public affairs (JIC/JIS), emergency information, and communication related objectives. For FMEs, the Exercise Co-Directors will ensure that the initiating event is technically (Maximum Credible Event)(MCE) feasible and that it drives off-post response (DA/FEMA 1993a).

A proactive public information program will be conducted in connection with CSEPP exercises (DA/FEMA 1993b). The CSEPP Exercise Public Affairs Plan is included as Appendix B to this document.

3.3.3 Demonstration of Objectives

Standard objectives are used in planning and evaluating each CSEPP FME. A series of questions, or Points of Review (PORs), has been prepared for each objective to aid in collecting the data needed to determine if each objective was successfully demonstrated in an exercise. The Evaluator should observe the activities and not use the PORs as a checklist during the exercise. The PORs can be "filled out" after the exercise to assure the PORs are completed in accordance with references. The exercises are objective based and PORs are tied directly to cogent parts of the *Planning Guidance* (FEMA 1996) and *CAIRA Operations* (DA 1991). The objectives and PORs are listed in Appendix C. Note: The Objectives published as Appendix C, dated June 29, 1994, to the CSEPP Exercise Document of February 23, 1994, as amended, will be used until superseded.

Individual planning team members are responsible for seeing that activities are realistic in relation to their jurisdiction's plans, procedures, and infrastructure, and for coordinating exercise demonstration within their jurisdiction.

The CSEPP community will be required to demonstrate all applicable CSEPP exercise objectives during the Federally Managed Exercise. The Federally Managed Exercise requirement for demonstration of all CSEPP exercise objectives applies to the community as a whole, not to individual jurisdictions. However, each jurisdiction will demonstrate for evaluation all actions (objectives) in order to support the scenario. The Army will track demonstration of the objectives for the Army installation, while the FEMA regional office will do the tracking for the off-post organizations. Objectives that were not satisfactorily demonstrated in one exercise will be evaluated in the next scheduled exercise unless it is determined that a special exercise or drill is needed before that time.

The Alternate Year Exercises afford greater flexibility in exercising the training aspects of responders by the off-post CSEPP communities. The Alternate Year Exercise enables the community to incorporate local innovations or exercise design features targeted to their needs. During AYE, the community may use CSEPP exercise objectives or may develop and use their own objectives.

3.3.4 Conducting the Exercise

The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible for the conduct of an exercise. Exercise control will be accomplished through a control structure consisting of a Simulation Cell (SIMCELL) (Note: Also known as a Control Cell in some communities) and field controllers. Controllers are responsible for executing exercise control for specific activities or at particular locations. The exercise co-directors may choose to end an exercise when each organization has

had a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate its objectives and after 4.5 hours of community play. Exercise play may be stopped, by players at any location, for a real-world event or if safety is being compromised. This action will be immediately reported to the exercise co-directors through a controller.

3.3.5 Evaluation of Exercise

3.3.5.1 Federally Managed Exercises (FME)

All Federally managed CSEPP exercises will be evaluated. A combination of self-assessment by the players and observation by the evaluators will be used in assessing the exercises. Evaluation consists of determining the level of existing response capabilities. This evaluation involves comparing performance against the exercise objectives which are based upon the criteria in the *Planning Guidance* (FEMA 1996) and *CAIRA Operations* (DA 1991), the organizations' response plans and procedures, and good response practices. After the exercise, the players, evaluators, and controllers will meet in a series of structured meetings to determine what actually happened during the exercise and solidify Findings.

During exercise play, as response tasks are being demonstrated, evaluators observe player actions and collect other data required to identify strengths and areas needing improvement. The Army coordinates the evaluation of all objectives demonstrated by Army response elements. FEMA coordinates the evaluation of off-post response elements. The Army and FEMA will jointly evaluate the coordination between the two groups of responders and the response interfaces. The Army may provide evaluators for some off-post activities in which they have expertise. Other Federal, state and local agencies may also provide evaluators for activities on- or off-post where they have the needed expertise, such as medical treatment of contaminated persons.

Following each CSEPP Exercise, the Exercise Co-Directors will, based on the input from the evaluators and players, determine whether each objective was successfully demonstrated. The appropriate Exercise Co-Director will also look at the information and classify strengths and those areas needing improvement within the objectives agreed upon in the extent of play agreement. The following classifications are used:

- **Strengths.** Emergency responses and actions that clearly exceed applicable written requirements or, in the judgement of the evaluator, display unusual initiative or commendable performance.
- **Findings.** Emergency responses and actions that deviate from applicable laws, regulations, policies, standards, plans, or other written requirements. Deviation from the requirement does not always mean that the emergency response or action is a "negative"; **the response or action may be appropriate while the inappropriateness of the requirement is the Finding.**

Findings that relate directly to public health and safety may be classified by the Exercise Co-Directors as Requiring Immediate Action (RIA) (some describe these as "show-stoppers"). A designated RIA requires that the Army and/or FEMA Exercise Co-Directors initiate immediate discussions with the on-post and/or off-post jurisdictions to determine the nature and timing of corrective actions.

- **Observations.** Emergency responses and actions, not covered by written requirements, that in the judgement of the evaluator could be improved.

The exercise report will include the Strengths, Findings, and Observations, with recommendations for improvement for the Findings and Observations and with action plans for the Findings.

3.3.5.2 Alternate Year Exercises (AYE)

Installation response activities during every AYE will be evaluated. Therefore, paragraph 3.3.5.1 applies to the installation for all exercises. For the off post community, the exercise planning team may tailor the evaluation of the exercise to their needs. However, if the community elects to have an FME in lieu of an AYE, paragraph 3.3.5.1 applies to the off post in its entirety.

3.3.5.3 Lessons Learned Forms

Lessons Learned forms will be provided to all exercise participants. The participants may comment, if they wish, on the conduct of the exercise, the jurisdiction's exercise play, or both. The completed copies of forms will be furnished to the Exercise Co-Directors, FEMA /Army Program Managers, and the organization from which the comment originated. The forms may be used to help informally assess the exercise, improve future performance, and support the formal observations.

3.3.6 Exercise Reports

The results of the evaluation of each CSEPP exercise will be summarized in an exercise report.

Exercise reports provide timely feedback that allow continued improvement of emergency preparedness at the State and local levels and by the Army installation. The Exercise Co-Directors will supervise the preparation of a joint formal report, including three sections or tabs covering the response. The Army section, Tab A, deals with the military response; the civilian section, Tab C, covers the off-post response; the other section, Tab B, addresses areas of coordination and interface. The final report will also include Action Plans (in the form of tables), prepared by the installation and each jurisdiction and agreed to by the Exercise Co-Directors, for the correction of Findings.

For Alternate Year Exercises, the Army Co-Director and State ETO or FEMA Co-Director, as appropriate, will be responsible for exercise evaluation and the issuance of an exercise report. Reporting requirements (i.e., format, time constraints, etc.) for Alternate Year Exercises are the same as Federally Managed Exercises.

A draft report, including Strengths of the response and recommendations for corrective actions on the identified Findings and Observations, will be given to the installations and State and local jurisdictions 15 calendar days after the end of the exercise. **Draft reports are not intended for release to the general public because they may contain unresolved Findings. They should be considered working documents and held in strict confidence by participating organizations.**

Action Plans addressing the correction of Findings (only) are due from the installation, State, and local jurisdictions 30 calendar days after the end of the exercise. The Action Plans will address all Findings identified during exercise play and be coordinated with the appropriate Exercise Co-Director. The installation and jurisdictions are not required to develop corrective

plans, comments, and schedules for Observations. The Action Plan should list in table format the Findings, corrective actions and comments on the Findings, the title of person or office with responsibility for corrective action, and projected completion dates (see Appendix A, Fig. A-1 for format.) If the installation/jurisdiction does not agree with a Finding or recommendation for the correction of the Finding, the action plan will include comments on the non-concurrence. The Exercise Co-Directors will work with the installation/jurisdiction to resolve differences and develop acceptable corrective actions. The local jurisdictions should submit their Action Plans through their State office. If the installation and jurisdictions do not submit their Action Plans and their comments or concurrence by 30 calendar days after the end of the exercise, the jurisdiction or installation will be assumed to have agreed with the draft report, and an Action Plan will be negotiated with them by the Exercise Co-Directors.

The final report will be issued 45 calendar days after the end of the exercise. The final report will include the Final Action Plans with agreed upon corrective actions, prepared by the installation and state and local jurisdictions participating in the exercise. The Exercise Co-Directors will include these plans in an appendix to the final report. For Findings requiring action for correction by a non-participating agency, the report will be forwarded to the cognizant CSEPP Exercise Co-Director for appropriate tasking or resolution. Exercise final reports are available on request from the Army and the appropriate FEMA regional office.

The format for the exercise report is described in Appendix A. The report introduction contains descriptive material on the exercise that provides a basis for understanding the report. Much of this portion of the report can be prepared before the exercise or the material may be available from the EXPLAN, allowing the Exercise Co-Directors to concentrate on drafting exercise results during the limited time to complete their report after the exercise.

Any disagreements that cannot be resolved by the Exercise Co-Directors will go to the CSEPP national leadership for resolution.

3.3.7 Reviews of Exercise Program and Effectiveness of Emergency Preparedness

3.3.7.1 Quarterly Progress Reviews

Quarterly Progress Reviews will be held in each CSEPP community, ideally in conjunction with an exercise planning team meeting. A joint review panel consisting of representatives from the Army and the FEMA Region (usually the Exercise Co-Directors), the installation, State and local organizations, and the Army major subordinate commands will track the progress of the Findings identified in the exercise report for improvement or change. **The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible to see that the quarterly reviews are done in a timely basis. FEMA Headquarters and the Army chain of command will monitor the Quarterly Progress Reviews; this may be done by telephone (conference call). The panel will submit an updated copy of the installation's and jurisdictions' action plans (in table form) showing the current status of corrective actions on Findings, the resolution of differences, and the status of any unresolved differences to FEMA Headquarters and the Army chain of command in March each year.** The FEMA Regions will include this information in their In Process Reviews (IPRs) with FEMA Headquarters.

3.3.7.2 Joint Army/FEMA Annual Review

As part of the Joint Army/FEMA Annual Review, an assessment of the prior year exercises will be made. This annual assessment, using updated action plans from the Quarterly Progress Reviews, will assist in meeting the mandate for an emergency preparedness assessment and identify program strengths and areas needing revision. This review, information for which will be submitted to the Army and FEMA in March of each year, will be considered when reviewing the CAs and preparing the budget.

3.4 EXERCISE SCHEDULE

The Exercise Schedule maintains the requirement that all CSEPP jurisdictions exercise annually. Under this concept, a Federally Managed Exercise, which demonstrates a community's full capability, will be scheduled every other year. During the alternate year, the scope of the exercise may range from a community managed and evaluated exercise to a federally managed and evaluated exercise, as determined by the community exercise planning team (FEMA Regions, State(s), Counties, Installations, and Army Headquarters Site Representative) within the indicated provisions. Therefore, this concept allows a community to choose, during the alternate year, an exercise tailored to their needs or a Federally Managed Exercise; in effect they may choose a Federally Managed Exercise every year. The required Federally Managed Exercise will be scheduled for four of the eight CSEPP communities per fiscal year, while the other communities conduct an Alternate Year Exercise (AYE) (DA/FEMA 1998).

Exercises to address corrective actions will be added if required. However, corrective actions which do not "Require Immediate Action" to protect public health and safety will normally be demonstrated during the next scheduled annual exercise.

DA/FEMA has approved a schedule, by year, for the CSEPP FMEs (DA/FEMA 1998). The exercise planning team should determine the exercise date for their AYE two years in advance and submit their requested exercise dates to the Army and FEMA exercise coordinators for final approval. The availability of key players or their designated alternates, State and local activities, other exercises, audits, inspections, and reviews scheduled at the installations, and other local, State, and FEMA regional exercises must be factored into the scheduling. Some exercises may be held after normal working hours or on weekends to accommodate volunteer emergency response organizations.

The communities are scheduled for Federally Managed Exercises as indicated below. A schedule of actual exercise dates for a two year period will be published annually. The schedule will be developed using the rules described below. The schedule will be published over the signatures of the FEMA HQ and Army exercise coordinators.

Scheduling rules:

- (1) The required Federally Managed Exercises have been tentatively scheduled for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 and will be carried to the end of demilitarization. In each year, the Federally Managed Exercises have priority in scheduling.

- (2) Dates for the Alternate Year Exercise (community managed) will be scheduled so as not to conflict with the required Federally Managed Exercises.
- (3) There will be a minimum of three weeks between exercises.
- (4) Communities provide a primary and two alternate dates for their Alternate Year Exercise to their State ETOS.
- (5) State ETOS, after consultation with their planning teams, will provide their exercise dates to their representative on the Exercise IPT. The Exercise IPT will develop and recommend a schedule to the Army and FEMA exercise coordinators for approval. Dates are due by March 1, two years prior to the exercise (e.g., March 1, 1999 for fiscal year 2001).
- (6) If a schedule cannot be established using dates provided by the community, the Exercise IPT will contact the appropriate communities to seek resolution of the issue. The IPT will then make their recommendation to the Army and FEMA exercise coordinators, who are responsible for making the final decision.

An exercise schedule will be developed and published each year showing Federally Managed Exercises and Alternate Year Exercises for the following two years. This is the general FME schedule the communities will follow:

FY 99, 01, 03, 05, and 07:

Blue Grass, KY, Pueblo, CO, Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD
and Umatilla, OR/WA

FY 00, 02, 04, and 06

Pine Bluff, AR, Anniston, AL, Newport, IN/IL, and Deseret, UT

3.5 PARTICIPANTS IN CSEPP EXERCISES

CSEPP exercises involve a large number of people in a variety of roles. In this document, the term participants is used to identify all people involved in CSEPP exercises, regardless of their roles. Specific groups and their roles and responsibilities are discussed in Sects. 3.5.1 through 3.5.11.

3.5.1 Exercise Co-Directors

For the FME, the Exercise Co-Directors from the Army and the FEMA region chair the exercise planning team and have final decision making authority regarding the exercise. They are responsible for the planning, conduct, evaluation, and reporting of the exercise. Contractor support is available to assist them. For an AYE, the State/States will select an Exercise Co-

Director for off post play. In the alternate year, the (State) Co-Director will make requests of the contractor through the FEMA region member on the Exercise Planning Team (see para. 3.2.2).

3.5.2 Planning Team

The planning team is responsible for planning each CSEPP (both the FME and AYE) exercise. The members of the planning team will include, but not be limited to, the Exercise Co-Directors (FEMA or State/Army, an installation representative appointed by the Depot or Chemical Activity Commander, as appropriate, the State CSEPP exercise/training officer or other State representative, emergency management representatives and/or CSEPP planners from the affected communities, and Red Cross (if appropriate). The participation of State, local, and installation representatives in the planning and evaluating process is vital to the success of the exercise. Planning team members should be knowledgeable about the entities they represent, their plans, procedures, etc. They should see that MSELs/implementers accurately reflect their jurisdiction's plans, procedures, and represent a realistic situation in a CAIRA event. Representatives to the planning team must have the authority to make decisions and to commit personnel and resources. Additional planners will be added as needed. Planning work groups may be appointed to work on specific aspects of the exercise. Planning team meetings, except those dealing with the exercise scenario, are open to those who wish to attend.

3.5.3 Trusted Agents

Trusted agents are representatives of the Army installation or State and local organizations on the exercise planning team. Trusted agents should be knowledgeable in the emergency response plans of their respective organizations. They provide crucial input during development of the extent of play agreements and in reviews of the exercise plan (EXPLAN), exercise scenario, simulations and assumptions, and Master Scenario Events List (MSEL) and implementers. Because the installation and State and local jurisdictions may have a limited staff from which to draw trusted agents, trusted agents can participate as players in the exercise. It is preferred that the trusted agent not be a key player. However, if necessary, a county coordinator or emergency manager may act as a trusted agent.

3.5.4 Players

Players respond to simulated events. They are expected to be familiar with their organizations' plans and procedures and respond in a realistic manner, as driven by the scenario and agreed to in the extent of play agreements. They must understand which organizations are participating in the exercise and understand how to use exercise communications directories. During the exercise, players demonstrate their proficiency in accomplishing tasks and responsibilities defined in their organization's applicable plans and procedures and CSEPP standards, using their current response capabilities.

3.5.5 Controllers

Controllers initiate and oversee exercise play. They depict the accident scenario or its simulated consequences to the players as realistically as possible. A specially trained cadre of CSEPP controllers will be used and should

- be knowledgeable of the exercise scenario, the EXPLAN, the control staff instructions (COSIN), the exercise objectives, and the MSEL;
- attend pre-exercise controller training and orientation sessions; and
- be familiar with the exercise control organization; the specific procedures, functions, and responsibilities of the designated controller position; the exercise player and controller rosters; and the exercise communications directories.

Controllers have a specific responsibility for safety at their exercise locations. Players may question controllers if the need arises.

Controllers may be drawn from the exercise planning team; FEMA, Army and contractor personnel; and personnel from installations, States, and communities around other installations. Under certain conditions, and with approval of the Exercise Co-Directors, a controller may also serve as an evaluator.

A simulation cell (SIMCELL) may be set up as part of the control organization. A special group of controllers make up the SIMCELL. These controllers, who are knowledgeable about the response capabilities and activities of organizations or individuals (e.g., the governor of a State, businesses in the area, FEMA headquarters, or media), respond to telephone calls from players

and inject implementing messages from the MSEL. Members of the "Mock Media" serve as Controllers acting in the role of real world media (see Section 3.5.9).

3.5.6 Evaluators

Evaluators observe, record, and report information related to the objectives demonstrated by players at the locations to which they are assigned. They report both the strengths shown during the exercise and areas that they feel need improvement or change. Evaluators do not interfere with the players or answer specific time line questions, remind or prompt players concerning actions or requirements, or criticize players either before or during the exercise. To ensure that information is collected accurately, evaluators interview participants and solicit their comments, questions, and suggestions at the conclusion of, or during lulls in, exercise activity.

A specially trained cadre of CSEPP evaluators drawn from the Army, FEMA, other Federal agencies, appropriate State and local agencies, other installations with CSEPP activities, and/or contractors knowledgeable of the CSEPP will be used. When possible, the same evaluators will evaluate several different CSEPP exercises, increasing the consistency of the evaluation at different locations. As part of the CA negotiation process, full-time (i.e., 100%) CSEPP funded employees should participate in other CSEPP exercises as part of the evaluation team. The Exercise Co-Director(s) can issue Invitational Travel Orders to members of the evaluation team. Evaluators will attend pre-exercise training and orientation sessions. Evaluators should become familiar with:

- the player organization's applicable plans and procedures;
- applicable planning guidance;
- the organization's response capabilities;
- the exercise scenario, EXPLAN, COSIN, and MSEL;
- the assigned exercise objectives and PORs;
- the exercise control organization;
- the player organization; and
- administration support facilities.

With approval of the Exercise Co-Directors, an evaluator may also serve as a controller.

3.5.7 Public Affairs Personnel

Public affairs personnel represent State and local organizations and the installation. Additional public affairs professionals may be brought in from other installations and possibly from Federal agencies to assist during the exercise itself. The public affairs representatives participate in the exercise planning, especially in the development of the exercise-specific public affairs plan. During the exercise itself, the public affairs officer may perform the roles of special staff, player, or controller as follows:

- **An exercise public affairs officer**, a member of the Exercise Co-Directors' special staff, who interacts with the "real world" media representatives of recognized news-gathering organizations who are covering the exercise as a news event. In addition to organizing briefings and news conferences about the exercise, public affairs personnel will escort the real

world media representatives who wish to observe players' activities during the exercise. Some exercise locations, such as chemical limited areas, may not be open to real world media.

- **A player** assigned as a Public Affairs person as the jurisdiction's plans require.

3.5.8 Special Staff

Special staff personnel are those persons supporting, and under the management of, the Exercise Co-Directors. The special staff includes, but is not limited to, personnel assisting with administration, briefings, communications support, automated data processing support, logistics, audio-visual support, site set-up, public affairs/information, and protocol. Special staff personnel are essential to the success of an exercise, but they are neither controllers nor evaluators. They usually have no interaction with players.

3.5.9 Mock Media

Mock Media are Controllers acting the role of real world media. The Mock Media work for the Exercise Co-Directors. In this role, as part of the exercise control staff, the public affairs representatives role-play reporters (for simulation purposes only) from local and national television networks, radio stations, newspapers, and magazines. These simulated media representatives interact with player organizations only during the exercise itself. Controllers may be assigned to the SIMCELL to make exercise inputs to the participating communities and interface with the Mock Media (see Section 3.5.5 on the role of "Controllers").

3.5.10 Observers

Exercise Observers may be guests of either a playing jurisdiction or the Exercise Co-Directors. Observers are permitted access to exercise locations, with certain exceptions such as chemical limited areas. Generally, observers fall into one of two categories. First, there are those persons from other jurisdictions who observe responder actions as a means of improving their own organization's response plans and capabilities. Normally this type of observer will stay at one location to gain insight into selected aspects of emergency response. Second, there are those persons who have a vested or special interest in the CSEPP exercise program (e.g., Army and FEMA Headquarters Exercise Coordinators). Normally, these Observers will visit multiple locations to assess the exercise.

3.5.11 Visitors and Real World Media

Visitors are invited by FEMA, State and local jurisdictions and the installation. Their attendance is coordinated with the Exercise Co-Directors. Depending on the number of visitors, a visitors' program will be developed and fully coordinated through the planning team with all impacted organizations. Visitors generally visit several exercise locations with an assigned guide or escort. Visitors will not play an active role in the exercise. Visitors may pose questions only to their guide. Visitors are "invisible" to players.

Real world media may attend the exercise. Invitations to and arrangements for escorts for real world media should be made before the exercise. An appropriate program should be planned

for media representatives. The group will be considered "invisible" for exercise play purposes. Players and Mock Media should not interact with real world media during the exercise.

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4. GUIDANCE ON PLANNING, CONDUCTING, EVALUATING, AND REPORTING EXERCISES

The following information should be considered in developing the exercises. Each exercise location is unique and requires some flexibility in the exercise process. The process and planning steps required for both the FME and AYE are very similar. A suggested schedule (Fig. 4-1), giving approximate times for activities in the exercise process, is included to assist the planning team.

4.1 DEFINITIONS OF PHASES IN EXERCISE DEVELOPMENT

A number of activities must take place during the planning, conduct, evaluation, and reporting of CSEPP exercises. These activities have been grouped into phases:

- **Pre-exercise phase.** Planning and preparation activities that take place before the arrival of exercise participants (including controllers, evaluators, and administrative support personnel) at the exercise location.
- **Exercise phase.** Activities at the exercise location from arrival of the exercise participants through the conclusion of the exercise, including controller, evaluator, and player orientations and training, and the conduct of the exercise.
- **Post-exercise phase.** Activities after the conclusion of the exercise, including post-exercise meetings at the exercise location, through completion and distribution of the final report.

4.2 PRE-EXERCISE PHASE ACTIVITIES

4.2.1 Initiate Planning

The exercise process for a specific CSEPP exercise begins with the first meeting of the exercise planning team. The Exercise Co-Directors convene and co-chair the exercise planning team meetings. The team has preliminary discussions on which organizations will participate, possible activities to be incorporated into the exercise, and the constraints to any organization's participation. Before the MSEL is written, the Exercise Co-Directors, State CSEPP ETO, local CSEPP Coordinator/Trusted Agent and exercise support contractor should meet with each jurisdiction to discuss capabilities, CSEPP plan requirements, and local "anomalies" as related to the overall exercise scenario. This is intended to ensure that the MSEL implementers not only fit the scenario, but also reflect the "ground truth" of the jurisdiction participating in the exercise and how they would "really" respond. The date for exercises should be set 2 years in advance.

4.2.2 Determine Resources Needed to Support the Exercise

The Exercise Co-Directors are responsible for identifying the resources required to conduct and support all phases of the exercise. Once the date(s) of the exercise and the extent of play for participating jurisdictions are established, the Exercise Co-Directors will define their requirements for personnel, equipment, and facilities. These requirements are relayed to their organizations, which will arrange for the identified resources to be provided by either the exercise support contractor or by cognizant government agencies or military commands. The Army will coordinate with the installation and make arrangements for higher level Army resource support; the CSEPP exercise coordinator at FEMA headquarters will coordinate and confirm the contractor, FEMA, and other government agency resource support.

Contractor support is available. The Exercise Co-Directors will jointly prepare the "CSEPP Exercise Co-Director Tasking Form" and submit it through the FEMA Headquarters CSEPP exercise coordinator (project officer) to initiate contractor support. Once the Task Order has been issued, the Exercise Co-Directors have tasking responsibilities and control over contract activities within the bounds of the task order.

See subparagraph 3.2.2 on Contractor Support for both FMEs and AYES.

The essential resources required to conduct and support a CSEPP exercise include personnel (controllers, evaluators, and special staff); office equipment (desktop computers, printers, copiers, and facsimile machines); communications (telephones and radios); and facilities (exercise control headquarters, meeting rooms, and administrative space).

Exercise Co-Directors should also submit their requirements for Mock Media, moulage, and medical evaluators in sufficient time so that those assets can be arranged.

The following considerations are important when arranging exercise support:

- Sufficient time must be allocated and budgeted to permit controllers and evaluators to participate in pre-exercise orientation and training sessions at the exercise location.
- It is particularly important that key evaluators be permitted to remain at the exercise location after the exercise in order to complete their written evaluation reports to the satisfaction of the Exercise Co-Directors. (FEMA Employees should review FEMA overtime/compensatory time off policy, published separately).
- Special staff personnel must include public affairs/information specialists to assist the Exercise Co-Directors in dealing with the real world media before, during, and after the exercise.
- Installations must be provided, at an agreed upon time before the exercise, a list of on-post participants giving name, security information, and requirements for access to limited/exclusion area.
- Computer resources must include software packages that will facilitate production of pre-exercise orientation materials, during-exercise scenario tracking, and post-exercise report preparation.
- Telephones, radios, and other communications, to be used in support of the exercise must be installed or available in sufficient time to be thoroughly tested before the exercise. Arrangements should be made to retain telephone and facsimile capability at the exercise location for as long as necessary (a minimum of 2 days) after the end of the exercise.

No Later Than X Days Before/After Exercise	Activity
720	Establish exercise date.
320	Develop contracts task listing.
270	Hold initial meeting of exercise planning team.
180	Propose on-post and off-post objectives and extent of play agreements. Develop evaluator and controller organizations.
150	Finalize extent of play agreements and objectives.
120	Complete outline of scenario. Develop public affairs plan. Recruit evaluators and controllers.
90	Complete and distribute Exercise Plan (EXPLAN). Complete scenario, develop Master Scenario Events List (MSEL), and implementers.
60	Complete MSEL and implement revisions.
45	Complete Control Staff Instructions (COSIN). Develop schedule for exercise week. Finalize logistical arrangements.
30	Distribute evaluator packages.
1-5	Meet with controllers and evaluators at the exercise location to finalize assignments, provide additional training, and give instructions. Conduct pre-exercise player briefings.
Exercise Day(s) (ED)	Conduct exercise. Clarify observations. Hold players' self-assessment meetings.
ED + 0-5	Conduct post-exercise evaluator and controller debriefing, briefings of individual player organizations, and joint players/Exercise Co-Directors review meeting. Evaluators complete written evaluations.
ED + 15	Draft exercise report given to all jurisdictions for comment.
ED + 30	Comments on draft report and plan, including timetable for completion of corrective action recommendations, sent to Exercise Co-Directors.
ED + 45	Final report completed and sent to jurisdictions.
Quarterly	Quarterly Progress Review by joint review panel.
Annually	Joint FEMA-Army headquarters exercise program assessment.

Fig. 4-1. Suggested schedule of exercise activities for Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercises.

- Avoid scheduling the exercise the week prior to the end of or two weeks after beginning of the Fiscal Year.
- Exercise facilities should be conveniently located and readily accessible to all exercise participants.

4.2.3 Develop the Exercise Plan

The EXPLAN provides an overview and plan for the exercise. It is distributed to participants, who may or may not be familiar with the program, and includes the purpose of the exercise, exercise objectives, and list of participating jurisdictions, as well as administrative and logistical information for the exercise.

Each EXPLAN is structured to a specific exercise. It may contain descriptive sections and supporting annexes or appendices as needed. EXPLANs for AYEs may be abbreviated to meet the needs of the exercise. The EXPLAN may contain the following information:

- The **Introduction** summarizes what CSEPP exercises have been held at the location and how this exercise fits into the overall exercise program.
 - **Purpose.** This section describes the purpose of the EXPLAN.
 - **Contents.** This section references the sections (as listed in the Table of Contents) and briefly describes the content of the annexes.
- **Background** briefly references the Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1986 (P.L. 99-145), the CSEP Program, and this document, which is used as the basis for exercise planning activities.
- **Exercise Information** gives the name, type of exercise, date, hours of play, and general information on what jurisdictions will participate and what will be exercised (EOCs, field play if involved). It also references the exercise objectives, extent of play summaries, and any special activities in connection with the exercise (e.g., combining the exercise with an Army Initial Response Force annual evaluation).
- **List of Participating Organizations** lists the expected State, local, and private (e.g., hospitals, Red Cross) organizations and departments within the organization (e.g., police department), as well as the installation groups and Army augmentation forces, that will participate in the exercise. This section may also list the locations at which the exercise will be carried out (e.g., which EOCs will be activated).
- **Exercise Simulations** lists the events, conditions, responders, and organizations that will be simulated (not real) during the exercise are agreed upon by the planning team and listed in this section. This section can cover general simulations (weather, "invisibility" of controllers, etc.); field operations; medical conditions; evacuation and sheltering; personnel (e.g., response of recalled off-duty personnel); and security. It also describes what the SIMCELL is and how it will operate.
- **Contingency Plans** what will happen in the event of an actual or potential emergency that could disrupt exercise play.
- The **Safety** section describes the general safety measures to be followed by all participants in the exercise.
- **Exercise Participants' Roles and Responsibilities** lists the following groups of exercise participants with their roles and responsibilities: players, controllers, evaluators, media (both real world and mock media), observers, visitors, special staff, and trusted agents.

- **Exercise Activities** briefly describes the activities scheduled before, during, and after the exercise. It may include sections on pre-exercise activities (e.g., orientation and training sessions), exercise play, and post-exercise activities (e.g., post-exercise meetings and reports).
- **Responsibilities for Exercise Support** outlines the responsibilities of FEMA, the Army, other Army organizations, the installation, and State and local organizations for support of and participation in the exercise.
- **Exercise Planning** lists the organizations on the planning team and summarizes the team's major tasks. It may include a milestone chart for the activities.
- **Exercise Control** summarizes the control mechanism that will be used for the exercise and describes the badging system that will be used to identify different groups of exercise participants.
- **Communications** gives instructions for identifying exercise message traffic and distinguishing it from real emergency messages ("This is an exercise.")
- **Administrative Resources** describes administrative support, resources, and procedures for getting support.
- **Security** discusses possible classification of any exercise information and applicable procedures. An annex or separate security plan may be prepared, if needed, to deal with real world security problems. The handling of non-classified, but exercise sensitive information (e.g., scenario, and MSEL) should be included in this section.
- **Report** briefly describes the post-exercise report that will be generated and fixes responsibility for its preparation.
- **Public Information** summarizes the public affairs protocol for the exercise.
- **References** lists documents cited in the EXPLAN.

The following annexes are frequently included in CSEPP EXPLANs:

- **CSEPP Exercise Objectives.** A list of the objectives that will be demonstrated in the exercise, by organization.
- **Extent of Play Summary.** This annex includes, but is not limited to, a summary of the extent of play agreements by objective for each organization, including any artificialities such as demonstrating an activity out of sequence. A summary matrix showing objectives demonstrated and applicable points of review by organization, out of sequence play, plus any limitations imposed, may be included.
- **Procedures for Observers and Visitors.** This annex provides details on the procedures and arrangements for observers and visitors.
- **Communications.** This annex provides general information applying to all participants in the exercise, additional information applying to player organizations, and a section on the SIMCELL. In addition to this information, telephone directories for use during the exercise play are compiled and distributed immediately before the exercise.
- **Public Affairs Plan.** This annex includes plans for dealing with real world media before, during, and after the exercise.
- **Administration.** This annex provides specific information on the administration of the exercise, such as location of administrative functions and specific administrative support provided.

- **Acronyms.** The annex listing acronyms may list only those acronyms used in the EXPLAN, or, if the planning team prefers, be a more complete list of terms that may be encountered during the exercise process.

Figures, such as a map of the exercise location, a graphic of the exercise management structure, or the matrix summarizing organizations demonstrating objectives, and their extent of play agreement, may also be included if the planning team desires.

4.2.4 Determine Exercise Objectives and Extent of Play

Each exercise community, when planning its participation in the CSEPP exercise, will determine how it will demonstrate all applicable objectives. Factored into this determination will be information on which objectives have been previously demonstrated and by which groups, the requirement for the community to demonstrate all applicable CSEPP objectives during FME, issues from previous exercises, and current resources. The choice of objectives and any modifications made to the usual method of their demonstration are indicated in a jurisdiction's extent-of-play agreement (XPA).

An XPA is a contract between States, counties, municipalities, installations, and other organizations participating in the CSEP Program and the CSEPP Exercise Co-Directors. XPAs are born out of a common need for communities to conduct meaningful exercises and exercise planners to have a basic outline from which to develop those exercises. The individual agreements should be the product of dialogue between an emergency manager, coordinator or training officer at the appropriate level (local to local, State to State, Region to Region or Federal to Federal) and the jurisdiction, agency, organization, corporation or installation who will be participating in the exercise. The overall extent-of-play agreement for a jurisdiction or installation is a mosaic of individual agreements with each of the player groups within that jurisdiction or installation. Embedded in extent-of-play agreements are elements that lead to scenario development, scope of the exercise, scheduling, impact of real world events, and simulation requirements. **To be effective, the extent-of-play agreement should be treated as a *de facto* contract between the exercise planning team, controllers, evaluators and participating entities.** Without that commitment, the goal of conducting and participating in a meaningful exercise will be compromised.

Individual player groups do not necessarily sign the jurisdiction's extent-of-play agreement, but they do provide essential input to it through individual agreements executed with the jurisdiction's emergency management director (or designee). Individual or group agreements identify the agency, capabilities to be demonstrated in the exercise, a point of contact, etc. The agreement development process is logically tasked to the CSEPP manager, coordinator, or training officer who combines the individual or group agreements into the overall jurisdiction or installation agreement. The individual accomplishing this task should be a member of the exercise planning team, but need not be a trusted agent.

The combined extent-of-play agreement should describe what will be demonstrated by the jurisdiction in the exercise. The description will be translated into a list of objectives indicating where and by whom those objectives will be demonstrated. The translation should be accomplished by the person tasked with preparing the jurisdiction's combined XPA. Individual agreements need to make reference to program objectives. In years when a full federally managed and evaluated exercise is to be conducted, with all exercise objectives to be

demonstrated, the jurisdiction's combined XPA needs to illustrate how that full demonstration will be accomplished. The level of detail provided in the extent-of-play agreement should be sufficient to support exercise design, without getting down to minute details of plans and response.

The purpose for developing and utilizing a comprehensive exercise extent-of-play agreement is to provide exercise play that, to the highest degree reasonably possible, closely approximates how a community would actually respond to a real event with conditions similar to that created in the exercise scenario. In doing so, opportunities may be provided to exercise both new and long established capabilities. Those opportunities may also include exercising mutual aid actions between jurisdictions and agencies that have been discussed but not tried. In short, a well thought out and comprehensive extent-of-play agreement can make the difference between an exercise that is worth doing and one that is not.

The process of developing a comprehensive extent-of-play agreement should give the community the opportunity to discuss and agree on when they want to exercise in the future. That discussion could extend to time of day, day of week, month and season. However, that discussion may take place too late to influence the date of the upcoming exercise, but it could influence scheduling of subsequent exercises. Since the XPA significantly influences scenario development, simulation requirements and exercise evaluation, the agreements must be complete in the early stage of annual exercise planning. Specifically, the XPA must be completed and signed before the scenario outline can be started.

The comprehensive extent-of-play agreement should also indicate the community's desires relative to plume direction and distance, areas to demonstrate evacuation or shelter-in-place capabilities, host communities, etc. Such planning projected over several years can result in comprehensive exercising and development of the entire community's capabilities.

Comprehensive extent-of-play agreements will identify which elements of the exercise will be demonstrated through actual play and which will need to be simulated. In the short run, the list of simulation requirements will be important from the standpoint of exercise support. In the long run, items requiring simulation during exercise play may become the focus of budget requests, either for training or resources. The template provided in Appendix D **will** be used for preparing the extent-of-play agreements.

4.2.5 Develop and Review Exercise Scenario

The exercise scenario includes the initiating event and the other key events that provide the framework for the exercise response to take place. The Exercise Co-Directors have the primary responsibility for overseeing the development of the scenario. Any sensitivities that the installation or surrounding communities may have regarding the contamination of certain areas, particular initiating events, or other restrictions should be discussed before the scenario is developed. Members of the planning team, especially from State and local organizations and the installation, provide additional input through their agreement in the choice of objectives to be demonstrated and extent of play agreements.

The initiating event and meteorological conditions chosen for the scenario must be realistic, be within the maximum credible events, and allow demonstration of the objectives chosen, within the extent of play agreements, by all the participating organizations. The requirement for a potential off-post impact may force the choice of some low-probability, high-impact event sequences.

A scenario work group may be established to provide input to and review the scenario and implementers. The work group will include the Exercise Co-Directors and selected members of the planning team as determined by the Exercise Co-Directors. The Army, in coordination with the installation, develops the initiating event and technical portion, while FEMA and State and local organizations focus on the off-post portion of the scenario. The State and local members have an important role in developing a realistic scenario with a believable MSEL and implementers.

The scenario should include the following:

- **Initiating event.** The initiating event is the accident or incident that begins exercise play.
- **Master Scenario Events List.** The MSEL consists of a listing of the events or actions which are introduced by controllers into player channels as play during the exercise as well as key expected player actions (which are clearly identified as such). The events injected by controllers are developed by the scenario work group members and are used to add realism to the play by allowing players to implement specific policies, procedures, or systems. The MSEL events ensure that the exercise allows demonstration of the objectives identified.

The events in the MSEL are listed in chronological sequence. Each entry (often called a MSEL or MSEL event), at a minimum, contains the following: the event number, inject time, from whom (e.g., media, citizen), to whom (e.g., State EOC, installation operator), and a summary of the implementer (e.g., "The *New York Times* questions the JIC about the incident").

- **MSEL Implementers.** Implementers are the actual messages or other information injected by the controllers. The implementers are in the form of messages, news reports, memoranda, letters, etc. The implementer forms should be clearly marked "EXERCISE...EXERCISE...EXERCISE" and "CONTROLLER/EVALUATOR EYES ONLY." They usually contain the same information as the MSEL, plus the responsible controller, inject means, CSEPP objective and point of review it is designed to drive, the actual message, controller notes (e.g., "inject only after JIC is activated"), anticipated player response, and an area for evaluator notes, including the actual inject time and the recipient's response.

The Exercise Co-Directors, with the scenario work group, review each MSEL event to verify its realism, applicability, and timing to avoid unwanted impacts on other areas of play. The Exercise Co-Directors, after the appropriate review of the initiating event, approve the scenario.

4.2.6 Develop Control Organization and Control Staff Instructions

The control structure for the exercise must be developed, and plans must be made for controller training and briefings. The control structure will be similar for all exercises, with some controllers assigned to specific locations and others located in the SIMCELL. Mock Media can and will move from location to location as required to support the exercise goals. After the objectives and extent of play agreements are confirmed and the scenario and Control Staff Instructions (COSIN) developed, the Exercise Co-Directors finalize the number of controllers and types of expertise needed.

The COSIN provides instructions and information required only by the exercise control staff. To avoid an artificial exercise response, the scenario should not be divulged to players in advance, with the exception of trusted agents. Release of any portion of the COSIN to players or unauthorized persons is prohibited and could compromise the exercise and adversely affect post-exercise analysis and evaluation.

Each COSIN is structured to reflect the requirements and design of a specific exercise. Repetition of information contained in the EXPLAN should be minimized. The COSIN usually contains the following:

- Basic control staff instructions [This section provides general guidance on the what, when, where, how, and who regarding exercise control. It states the purpose and use of the COSIN and defines its restricted use (controllers and evaluators only).]
- Initiating event.
- MSEL.
- MSEL implementers.
- Exercise telephone directories (controller/evaluator telephone directory, player telephone directory).
- An "Expected Key Events Calendar".

4.2.7 Develop Evaluation Organization

The Exercise Co-Directors develop the evaluation organization for each exercise. The evaluation organization is similar for all exercises. Three aspects of the exercise are evaluated: the Army response, the civilian response, and activities that link the two.

The Exercise Co-Directors, using the scenario, objectives being demonstrated, extent of play agreements, local plans, procedures and agreements (MOUs/MOAs) as a basis, identify the locations and functions to be evaluated. They then determine the number of evaluators and the expertise needed. Evaluators with specific expertise may be in short supply and should be recruited early (e.g., medical, claims, etc.).

Evaluators may be assigned to teams. Several evaluators may be assigned at locations at which the activity level is high or number of objectives to be demonstrated is large. Team leaders coordinate their evaluators' input; evaluators are responsible for completing all required forms and documents. They may be relocated to additional assignments as needed.

4.2.8 Develop Plans for Observers and Visitors

The planning team will develop plans to accommodate observers, visitors, and the media. These plans may be incorporated in the EXPLAN. Care should be taken to avoid interaction of the visitors and observers with the players during the exercise. Interaction could interfere with, and therefore affect, the response and be subject to evaluation.

4.2.8.1 Observers

Observers will follow the following procedures:

- Observers sponsored by a jurisdiction are the responsibility of that jurisdiction (e.g., for planning itineraries, transportation, etc.). The organization will provide a list of observers to the Exercise Co-Directors at least 1 week prior to the exercise.
- Observers who are sponsored by the Exercise Co-Directors and who visit multiple locations will submit their proposed agenda for approval to the Exercise Co-Directors at least 2 weeks prior to the exercise. The Exercise Co-Directors will coordinate with the planning team for these visits. Planning team members are responsible for observer approval within their organization.
- The Exercise Co-Directors will provide distinctive identification for all observers. Any special requirements of observers will be brought to the attention of the Exercise Co-Directors.

4.2.8.2 Visitors

A plan should be developed to take care of the expected visitors. Each planning team member will provide the Exercise Co-Directors with names of people whom they have invited to the exercise as visitors. Planners should arrange for knowledgeable guides and tour transportation for visitors during the course of their visit to the exercise locations. Visitors should also be provided with information on other transportation, lodging, and meals. Briefing materials, handouts, and possible special exhibits or demonstrations may also be appropriate.

4.2.9 Develop Public Affairs Plan

A detailed exercise-specific public affairs plan will be developed for each exercise. Installation, State, and local public affairs representatives must take an active role in the development of this plan. Input from the planning team will be necessary when developing schedules for media briefings, tours and other activities. The exercise-specific public affairs plan must be delivered to the Exercise Co-Directors in time for inclusion in the EXPLAN as an annex. The EXPLAN is to be completed and distributed 90 days before the exercise. Refer to The CSEPP Exercise Public Affairs Plan in Appendix B, which gives additional information on public affairs activities, Real World Media, and Mock Media that can be developed.

4.2.10 Arrange Logistics

Appropriate logistical arrangements (e.g., lodging, schedules, rooms for meetings with evaluators and controllers, installation of equipment) must be made under the direction of the Exercise Co-Directors. The timing on these will vary according to the task.

4.2.11 Prepare and Distribute Evaluator Assignment Packages

Exercise Co-Directors will ensure packets are prepared for each evaluator. Information should be included on the evaluator's assignment, the exercise, schedule, and logistics arrangements. Evaluation forms, special guidance materials, and location-specific information (including maps, portions of the applicable emergency plans and procedures, applicable portions of previous evaluation reports, and extent of play agreements) should also be provided. If evaluation assignments are not finalized until a day or so before the exercise, some of the location-specific information may be given to evaluators when they arrive for the exercise.

4.3 EXERCISE PHASE ACTIVITIES

4.3.1 Pre-Exercise Orientation and Training

There will be briefings before the exercise for players, controllers, and evaluators. Suggested topics for the briefings are discussed in Sects. 4.3.1.1 and 4.3.1.2.

4.3.1.1 Controller and Evaluator Meetings

In addition to registration, badging, and issuing of special equipment (e.g., radios, Cellular phones, masks), controllers and evaluators will require exercise and location-specific information to do their jobs well. Representatives from the installation and State and local organizations may be asked to provide some of the information. If this is the case, the representatives should be given a list of the information needed to guide them in developing their briefings. The controllers and evaluators may meet together for some of the orientation and training meetings and meet separately or in sub-groups at other times. The following topics should be considered for inclusion at these meetings:

- purpose and scope of the exercise;
- concept of operations;
- objectives to be demonstrated and extent of play agreements;
- schedule for exercise play and other exercise week activities;
- contingency plan for real world emergencies;
- safety requirements;
- exercise scenario, including initiating event and expected impact, MSELs;
- basic demography, geography, political boundaries, and emergency planning zones of area;
- location of various facilities, field activities;
- overview of installation, State, and local emergency response plans and procedures;
- control and evaluation teams' structure;
- operation of SIMCELL;
- communications, including radio and telephone protocols, use of communications directories;
- controller and evaluator assignments, reporting requirements, instructions, including release process for controllers and evaluators;

- report writing requirements, including form and content;
- real world public affairs plan, telephone numbers for CSEPP real world public affairs contacts;
- role of the Mock Media;
- summary of plan for visitors and observers; and
- protocol, including wearing of identifying badges or clothing, dress, media interaction, participant interactions, and pre-exercise site visits.

4.3.1.2 Players' Briefing

Players should be briefed either by the Exercise Co-Directors or by the controllers and evaluators who have been assigned to that location. In some cases, a member of the player's organization, who has been previously briefed, will brief members of his or her organization. The meeting should be held at a time and in a location convenient for the players. A briefing guide/check list is provided the Lead Evaluator to aid in briefing the players.

The briefing will include the following:

- purpose and scope of the exercise;
- introduction of the control/evaluation team and explanation of overall control/evaluation structure;
- time of exercise start and finish;
- safety requirements;
- real or simulated exercise weather information;
- clarification of items in emergency operations plans which are unclear or have been modified;
- review of objectives to be evaluated and confirm the extent of play agreement;
- procedures for any variations to the extent of play agreement and simulations;
- explanation of purpose of control and SIMCELL and how SIMCELL works
- distribution of EXPLAN, if not already done;
- distribution of player's communications directories and explanation of their use;
- description of badging system for controllers, evaluators, and observers, and their interactions, if any, with players;
- parking availability for Evaluators/Controllers;
- arrival times for Evaluators/Controllers at field locations (i.e., TCPs/ACPs, decon sites, shelters, reception centers, schools, medical and mass care);
- security and/or sign-in procedures;
- action plan corrections taken;
- most current SOPs/MOUs/MOAs;
- master time clock location/synchronization;
- verify phone numbers, date/time check of fax machines;
- request tour of EOC;
- verify SIMCELL phone numbers;
- location of Evaluators/Controllers during exercise;

- verify dedicated phone for use of Controller during exercise;
- public affairs plan for real world media, including exercise public affairs telephone number;
- role of the Mock Media;
- schedule for and explanation of post-exercise meetings (e.g., exit interviews/briefing, players' self-assessment, other meetings);
- arraignments for data collection for Evaluator's use in report writing;
- identifying point of contact (POC) for verifications after departing EOC/field sites;
- distribution of participant comment forms and explanation of their purpose; and
- schedule for issuing exercise report.

4.3.2 Conduct Exercise

4.3.2.1 Exercise Control

The Exercise Co-Directors have overall responsibility for the conduct of the exercise. They resolve problems that arise with controllers, players, and extent of play agreements. **The Exercise Co-Directors have the authority to begin and end the exercise.** Under the supervision of the Exercise Co-Directors, the controllers are responsible for initiating and overseeing the exercise play, and keeping exercise activities on track. They must not, however, prompt the players. Controllers relay information on breaks in the exercise play to the players and inform them when play ends.

4.3.2.2 Evaluator Activities

During the exercise, the evaluators observe the players' activities, make appropriate notes, and record the time of those events using a designated clock. During the exercise and after the exercise has ended (ENDEX), the evaluators collect copies of the records produced by exercise players. These records may include such items as sign-in sheets, player and computer logs, copies of Emergency Alerting System messages, incoming/outgoing faxes, and press releases. They should collect copies of completed Lessons Learned Forms that were previously handed out to the participants. If the exercise requires more than one shift of evaluators, each evaluation team meets at the end of each evaluator shift to discuss exercise play. For shorter exercises, the team meets at the end of the exercise. After the exercise and with the concurrence of the participating agency, the team meets with the players to have a general debrief discussing the exercise in general, their exercise play, strengths and any problem areas. At this point the team leader will inform the players that these are preliminary results and that the evaluation team will make recommendations to the exercise co-directors, who will make the final determinations for the exercise report. Each team leader then meets with their team as soon as possible to review the collected data and builds a consolidated timeline that accurately depicts the jurisdictions response times, actions taken and correlates them with the objectives/PORs along with the negotiated extent of play agreements. The team then writes a preliminary report that is presented to the designated Tab Leader and on to the Exercise Co-Directors.

4.3.3 Observers, Visitors, and Media Programs

While the exercise is being conducted, the observers, visitors, and real world media schedules will be carried out. Questions and problems involving observers, visitors, and media should be referred to the Exercise Co-Directors.

4.4 POST-EXERCISE PHASE

The exercise evaluation and development of the exercise report include self-assessment by the players and input from the evaluators who observed the exercise play at designated locations. Development of accurate, useful information requires cooperation and candor between the evaluators and players. The actual timing of certain activities depends on the exercise schedule and location of exercise play. For FMEs, the Army and FEMA Co-Directors are responsible for developing and publishing the exercise report. For AYEs, the Army and State ETO Co-Directors are responsible for developing and publishing the exercise report.

4.4.1 Clarification of Evaluators' Observations, Players' Self-Assessment, and Evaluators' Initial Comments

In order to resolve or clarify questions about the exercise play at each location, the evaluators must have an opportunity to interview or question players immediately following the exercise. The evaluators use this information for their evaluation forms. The clarification process may be combined with the players' self-assessment, since many matters may be discussed during this process, or the interviews may be done independently if the self-assessment will not take place immediately following the exercise.

The evaluators also collect the participants' comment forms immediately following the exercise. Copies of these forms will be provided to the appropriate playing jurisdictions, as well as to the Exercise Co-Directors.

The players' self-assessment is an interactive discussion to clarify the actual activities during the exercise response. As soon as possible following the conclusion of exercise play at each location, a designated member of the exercise evaluation team meets with the players and other controller(s) and evaluator(s) at that location. The exercise team member facilitates a self-assessment of the exercise play by the players. Major points from the self-assessment should be written down by an evaluator or controller and the jurisdiction.

Plans for this meeting should be made before the exercise to enable players to allot an appropriate amount of time and, if possible, to arrange for a comfortable place in which to meet. The meeting should be informal and open, with players encouraged to discuss their activities and ask questions. It should be recognized throughout, however, that the participants may know only what happened at their own location.

At the beginning of the meeting, the purpose of the self-assessment will be discussed and the players will be provided details of the initiating event, scenario, and calculated impacts of the release of chemical agent. The players are then encouraged to reconstruct their own play, discuss what went well, and identify areas needing improvement or change. Ways to improve or correct any problems should also be discussed if possible. The evaluators, in turn, provide the players with any additional general information and the evaluator's initial observations on that portion of the exercise, emphasizing constructive comments. This

information, however, should not be interpreted as evaluation Findings. The evaluator should stress that the information provided during the Player Debriefing is preliminary, that the observations will be discussed with the Exercise Co-Director, who will make final determinations as based on all exercise data collected (e.g., data from other sources supporting or contradicting the observations).

4.4.2 Post-Exercise Evaluator and Controller Debriefing

As soon as possible after the players' self-assessment meeting, the Exercise Co-Directors or their designees conduct an evaluator/controller debriefing. Evaluators and controllers meet (some may first work in teams to organize their information) and develop a chronology of key exercise events. This chronology provides a frame of reference for evaluating exercise performance. It assists in evaluating time-sensitive actions, such as alerting and notification, and assessing the coordination between different locations of play and between on-post and off-post authorities. This meeting is used to exchange information and to validate activities between evaluators and controllers who watched the same activity at different locations in order to fill in gaps in understanding. This meeting helps evaluators complete their documentation and provides preliminary identification of exercise Findings and Observations.

4.4.3 Evaluators' Written Material

After the debriefing, the evaluators begin writing their evaluations of the organizations' performance of each demonstrated objective. Much of the information for this summary will come from the completed evaluation forms, but new information may become available at the Evaluators' debriefing and subsequent meetings with the players during this process. It is the Evaluators' duty to research and assure that write-ups are accurate prior to submission to the respective Tab leader and Co-Director. Evaluators should identify potential Strengths, Findings and Observations (see Section 3.3.5.1). Suggested Findings and Observations should be described, documented, and related to a specific objective. A recommended approach for correcting the identified problem should be made in the evaluator's preliminary report, which is given to the Exercise Co-Directors.

The Exercise Co-Directors discuss the exercise results with the evaluators to ensure that the Findings and Observations noted are valid and consistent with the extent of play agreements and other factors. The Exercise Co-Directors then use this preliminary information to prepare a briefing (described below) for each playing jurisdiction. This session may take place as early as the afternoon of the day following the exercise.

By the end of this day, evaluators are expected to have identified initial Strengths, Findings and Observations, written brief descriptions, substantiated differences, and made recommendations for correction of the Findings for the exercise objectives they evaluated. However, these write-ups are normally very rough and require extensive editing, as well as substantive revision, before they are acceptable for inclusion in a formal, comprehensive, draft exercise report.

4.4.4 Briefing of Each Playing Jurisdiction

The Exercise Co-Directors and designated controllers and evaluators should discuss the preliminary Strengths, Findings, and Observations identified with each jurisdiction and the installation before the evaluators finalize their written documentation. These informal meetings provide a further opportunity for self-assessment and discussion of ways to correct problem areas.

The FEMA Exercise Co-Director or designee will brief the off-post jurisdictions; the Army Exercise Co-Director or designee will brief the on-post personnel. Off-post jurisdictions may be briefed either together or separately; planning team members should indicate their jurisdictions' preference. The off-post and on-post personnel will attend the meetings at the invitation of the key jurisdiction officials or the installation commander, respectively.

4.4.5 Joint Players'/Exercise Co-Directors' Review Meeting

Further refinement and analysis of the exercise documentation provides the Exercise Co-Directors with a rough idea of the total exercise results. The Exercise Co-Directors then hold a joint review meeting with representatives from the installation, State, and off-post communities. All key players and key evaluators attend the meeting. The intent of this meeting is to provide the players their first opportunity in a joint forum to discuss and clarify the preliminary Strengths, Findings, and Observations identified during the exercise, particularly those dealing with interfaces between and coordination among the groups. This meeting also provides an opportunity for group discussion of recommendations for resolving the Findings. After completion of this review, agreed changes will be made in the draft report.

4.4.6 Preparation of Exercise Report

The primary purpose of the CSEPP exercise report is to document the results of the exercise in a timely manner. The reports provide a means for tracking improvements in performance and progress in overcoming shortcomings noted in prior exercises. The format for and guidelines concerning content of the exercise report are found in Appendix A. The Exercise Co-Directors have the flexibility to include additional information that will be of use to the installation and jurisdictions in the report.

Forty-five calendar days after the exercise ends, the final report will be in the hands of the installation and participating jurisdictions. The details of the schedule for the report, and the responsibilities of the Exercise Co-Directors and participating agencies and organizations for review and comment are given in Sect. 3.3.6. Preparation of the report requires that the Exercise Co-Directors supervise the review, analysis, coordination, and refinement necessary to put the report in a form acceptable for review by the participating jurisdictions. Also, the report requires consideration by the agencies and organizations of the recommendations as they develop their action plan to correct identified Findings. The Action Plan will become part of the final report. The draft reports will be sent directly to the participating jurisdictions. Because the report may contain unresolved Findings, it should be considered a working document and held in strict confidence by participating organizations. Action Plans and comments from local jurisdictions should be routed through the State before being sent to the Exercise Co-Directors for incorporation in the final report.

The Exercise Co-Directors have approval authority for all final reports. The distribution list for reports will be determined by the exercise planning teams on a case-by-case basis.

4.4.7 Track Correction of Exercise Findings

All exercise Findings will be assigned an identifying number (see Appendix A) and be listed in the exercise report. The installation and civilian agencies will implement the corrective actions. The Army will track all Findings identified in Tab A (the installation's response). The FEMA regional office will track all the Findings listed in Tab C (the off-post response). Both the Army and FEMA will track the interface and coordination Findings listed in Tab B. The Exercise Co-Directors, with the exercise planning team, will track actions taken to resolve the Findings and they will be reviewed in the Quarterly Progress Reviews.

When planning is begun for the next exercise, the Exercise Co-Directors should ensure that demonstration of those Findings remaining open from a previous exercise are included in the objectives being evaluated and in the extent of play agreements.

4.4.8 Track Demonstration of Objectives

The Army and the FEMA regions will establish procedures to track the demonstration of the exercise objectives to ensure that all applicable objectives are demonstrated by each of communities during their FME. The following guidelines should apply:

- Establish the list of objectives that each jurisdiction will be expected to demonstrate . For any given organization, this will depend on the breakdown of responsibilities between State and local governments, the local emergency plans, and the particular location involved.
- A cumulative record should be kept for each jurisdiction showing, for each exercise, which objectives were slated for demonstration and which were demonstrated successfully. It should be noted that while the "community" as a whole demonstrates all applicable objectives during an exercise, a cumulative record of demonstrated objectives will provide a historical record for future review.

**Extent of Play Agreement
for
_____ Exercise
to be conducted on _____**

1. PURPOSE

This extent of play agreement identifies the conditions that will be used to develop, conduct, control, and evaluate the _____ exercise as agreed to by the Exercise Co-Directors and _____ (agency/organization).

2. STANDARDS AND REFERENCES

(Provide a list with effective dates of all applicable plans, procedures, checklists, and other documentation that will govern the actions and operations of the agency/organization in response to a chemical accident/incident occurring at the chemical agent storage facility. If plans are not current, or do not exist, describe the activities that will be carried out.)

3. SPECIAL EXERCISE PARAMETERS

- a. Time and duration of play: _____
- b. [Indicate whether or not a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be activated for exercise play. If a JIC will be established, state its location and provide a statement whether or not the jurisdiction will participate in JIC activities during the exercise.]
- c. (Provide any additional information that will apply across-the-board relative to the jurisdiction's participation in the exercise, e.g., communications media to be used or not used, guidelines to be followed relative to available telephone/facsimile numbers, artificialities or simulations that will be necessary, etc.)

4. JOINT INFORMATION CENTER/JOINT INFORMATION SYSTEM (JIC/JIS)

(Indicate which organizations will participate in the JIC and where the JIC will be located. Attach a separate Extent of Play for the JIC. Include which Evaluation Elements will be demonstrated by the JIC.)

5. EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS

[Provide a list of agencies and/or individuals that will participate in the exercise and their respective locations. In the case of an Emergency Operating Center (EOC), specify those agencies/individuals that will be represented in the EOC.]

6. EVALUATION OF OBJECTIVES

[List the CSEPP exercise objectives and the other objectives that the agency or organization proposes to demonstrate during the exercise. For each objective and its associated points of review (PORs), as applicable, indicate whether the demonstration is for formal evaluation or not. Identify for specific objectives/PORs any deviations from current plans or procedures that will apply during the exercise. Provide any other explanatory information that clarifies the jurisdiction's intentions relative to the demonstration of individual objectives or PORs.]

7. EXERCISE PLAN

(The information about exercise standards and references, exercise parameters, exercise participants, and evaluation of objectives in the agreement, along with the enclosed tables, will be included in the EXPLAN for the information of all participants. The notes that follow the tables expand on the table entries, but the notes need not be included in the EXPLAN.)

8. CONCURRENCES

(This section will contain the signature block for each of the participating jurisdictions and Co-Directors.) Example:

The following agree to support the _____ CSEPP Exercise 1999 as described herein.

Army Co-Director

FEMA Co-Director

County

Fig. 4.2. Sample Extent of Play Agreement.

5. REFERENCES

- DA (U.S. Department of the Army) 1991. *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, PAM 50-6, Washington, DC (May 17).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1988. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of the Army," Washington, DC (August 3).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1993a. "Review of CSEPP Exercise Initiating Events", CSEPP Policy Paper No. 8, U.S. Department of the Army/Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC (April 23).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1993b. "Public Information in Connection with CSEPP Exercises," CSEPP Policy Paper No. 9, Program, Washington, DC (April 23).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1995a. "Compensation for Volunteer CSEPP Exercise Participants," CSEPP Policy Paper No. 11R, Washington, DC (November 7).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1995b. "Elimination of Dual Exercise Types", CSEPP Policy Paper No. 13, Washington, DC (November 7).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1997a. "Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of the Army and the Federal Emergency Management Agency," Washington, DC (October 8).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1997b. "Designation of Public Affairs as Core Objective", CSEPP Policy Paper No. 14, Washington, DC (December 31).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1998a. "CSEPP Exercise Modified Schedule", CSEPP Policy Paper No. 16, Washington, DC (April 8).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1998b. "Addendum to Policy Paper 16", Washington, DC (November 25).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1996. *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, Washington, DC (May 17).
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PL 96-510 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, as amended (CERCLA), Section 104, 42 USC 9604, Washington, D.C.

PL 99-145 Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1986, 50 USC 1521, Washington, DC.

PL 104-201 Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1997, Section 1076, requiring establishment of site-specific IPTs as a management tool for CSEPP.

APPENDIX A
OUTLINE OF EXERCISE REPORT

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APPENDIX A

OUTLINE OF EXERCISE REPORT

This appendix is provided as guidance for preparing the final exercise reports for Federally Managed/Alternate Year CSEPP exercises. The format and guidelines for the scope and content are to be used in each CSEPP exercise report. Exercise Co-Directors must include the basic contents, but they may modify the format and include additional information that will be of use to the installations and jurisdictions involved.

A.1 REPORT CONTENTS

- Cover sheet
- Table of contents
- Acronyms and abbreviations
- Introduction
 - Exercise overview
 - Scenario description
 - Key events time line
 - List of strengths, findings, and observations identified in the exercise
- Tab A. On-Post Activities
- Tab B. Joint Activities
- Tab C. Off-Post Activities
- Appendix 1. Action Plans (in table format), organized by jurisdiction

A.2 REPORT FORMAT

The following sections describe the format for each of the above items.

A.2.1 Cover Sheet

The cover sheet should include:

- the title of the exercise, including type of exercise;
- the date of the exercise;
- the date of the report; and
- indication that the report is "draft" if applicable.

A.2.2 Table of Contents

The table of contents should show the title and page number for each section in the body of the report and also contain a list of figures and page number for each.

A.2.3 Acronyms and Abbreviations

This list should include all acronyms and abbreviations used in the report.

A.2.4 Introduction

The introduction should provide (in less than 10 pages):

- an exercise overview that provides a brief description of who (i.e., the major response organizations and jurisdictions participating), what, when, and where concerning the conduct of the exercise;
- a brief outline of the exercise scenario, including the time and location of the initiating event;
- a time line of key events as they actually occurred during exercise play;
- a summary chart of jurisdictions and objectives that were agreed upon and actually demonstrated;
- a brief list of Strengths, Findings, and Observations by jurisdiction, noted during exercise play. The initial date is noted and remains until the Finding is cleared. The fact that the Objective was not demonstrated in the subsequent years will also be noted, i.e., 1995, 1996, 1997, etc. Note: An identifying number will be assigned to each Finding by the Exercise Co-Directors. The number will be used to identify the Finding throughout the report in the introduction, tabs, and action plans. The Finding would be numbered as follows: XX94B8.1. The "XX" is a two-letter identification of the installation/jurisdiction to which the Finding applies; "94" is the two-digit calendar year of the exercise. "B" is the tab designation (A, B, C), in which the finding is reported; "8" is the number of the objective to which the Finding relates; and ".1" is the sequence number for Findings under the objective; and
- a paragraph stating that if there are questions regarding this report, they should be addressed to the Exercise Co-Directors (include names, addresses, and phone numbers).

A.2.5 Tabs A (On-Post), B (Joint), and C (Off-Post), Listed Sequentially

Tab A will include only the installation's response. Tabs B and C should be organized by the jurisdiction or response organization. The discussion under each organization will be organized by exercise objective. Under each objective, which was agreed upon for demonstration by the jurisdiction, list any Strengths, Findings, and/or Observations identified. For each Strength, Finding, and Observation cited, provide a brief description. Continue with a brief discussion to substantiate what occurred for Findings and Observations, followed by an appropriate recommendation. A recommendation must include what should be done to correct the situation. In Tab B Findings for each installation/jurisdiction, the Exercise Co-Directors should cross reference the Finding numbers for all Findings in the community (installation/jurisdictions) that have the same Finding and must be considered in resolving the Finding.

No discussion is needed for objectives in which no Strengths, Findings, or Observations were identified.

A.2.6 Appendix 1. Action Plans (in table format), Organized by Jurisdiction

Appendix 1 contains a Table of Contents listing the name and page number of each installation/jurisdiction's action plan followed by the action plans (in table format) developed by the installation and State and local jurisdictions. Each action plan lists all Findings for that installation/jurisdiction by short title, the corrective action for each Finding, any comments the installation/jurisdiction wishes to make on the Finding or the corrective action, the title of the

person or office within the organization responsible for correction, and a projected completion date (see Fig. A-1). Each action plan should be dated. All Tab B Findings will cross reference the relevant Finding numbers in other installation/jurisdiction action plans which must be considered in resolving the Finding. This compilation of plans will serve as the basic tracking document for discussion at the Quarterly Progress Reviews and annual joint Army/FEMA review.

ACTION PLAN FOR (state or local jurisdiction name)
[community and year of exercise]
[date of action plan]

FINDING NUMBER	SHORT TITLE	RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRECTION	COMPLETION DATE
XX94C2.1	Call Down Roster CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: Create a new call-down roster for alerting Emergency Operating Center workers. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Facilities <input type="checkbox"/> Plan(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Staffing <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Procedures	County Emergency Management Director	30 May 94
XX94C4.1	Fax Machine CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: Install new fax machine. <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Facilities <input type="checkbox"/> Plan(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Staffing <input type="checkbox"/> Procedures	County EOC Operations	30 Sep 94
XX94B8.1	Press Release Coordination CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: Develop news release protocols with the installation (YY94B8.1), county A (AA94B8.1), county B (BB94B8.2) and state of XYZ (XY94B8.1) PIOs. <input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Facilities <input type="checkbox"/> Plan(s) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Staffing <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Procedures	County Public Information Officer (PIO)	30 Nov 94

ACTION PLAN FOR (name of installation)
[community and year of exercise]
[date of action plan]

FINDING NUMBER	SHORT TITLE	RESPONSIBLE FO CORRECTION	COMPLETION DATE
YY94A2.1	Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: Additional training sessions will be conducted weekly to ensure that the PAR can be made within the time standards. Different scenarios will be played and the time will be documented for each training session.	Installation Surety Officer	31 Jul 94
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Facilities <input type="checkbox"/> Plan(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Staffing <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Procedures		
YY94B8.1	Press Release Coordination CORRECTIVE ACTION/COMMENT: Develop news release protocols with County X (XX94B8.1), County A (AA94B8.1), County B (BB94B8.2), and state of XY2 (XY94B8.1). convene meeting of those county and state PAOs to discuss.	Installation Public Affairs Officer (PAO)	30 Nov 94
	<input type="checkbox"/> Training <input type="checkbox"/> Facilities <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Plan(s) <input type="checkbox"/> Other <input type="checkbox"/> Equipment <input type="checkbox"/> Staffing <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Procedures		

Fig. A-1. Example of action plans for an off-post jurisdiction and an installation.
(In the examples, the numbers assigned to the objectives in the Finding do not necessarily agree with the short title or appropriate corrective action. The numbering system for the objectives is being revised.)

APPENDIX B
CSEPP EXERCISE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN

This page not used.

APPENDIX B

CSEPP EXERCISE PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN For Media Interest in Exercise

1. Purpose

To provide guidance and procedures for media and public information activities participation during CSEPP-related exercises. The exercise setting is particularly conducive for testing the feasibility of emergency public information systems, rumor control and media liaison as well as handling media interest in the exercise event itself. Every effort should be made to interest the media in the exercise and allow their access to exercise play to the maximum extent possible.

2. Goal

To instill confidence in the public and the media that Federal, state and local governments have an organized means of responding to and recovering from a chemical agent accident and that the public, the media and government can contribute to the protection of lives and property in such an event.

3. Objectives

In support of the above goal, public affairs activities in CSEPP-related exercises should include the following objectives:

- a. Demonstrate that plans and procedures exist which can be relied upon to respond to a chemical agent emergency.
- b. Demonstrate the ability to disseminate information to the public in the event of a chemical agent emergency.
- c. Demonstrate that a high degree of cooperation exists among all responding organizations and in the dissemination of life-saving information to the public through the news media and other channels.
- d. Inform the public in Immediate Response Zone (IRZ) and Protective Action Zone (PAZ) communities about government and volunteer response capabilities in the event of a chemical agent release.
- e. Motivate the public, public officials, community organizations, business and industry leaders to take an interest in emergency preparedness as it relates to a chemical agent release and to learn proper responses in such an event.
- f. Increase the awareness of the public living in the vicinity of the eight chemical weapons stockpiles of the risk posed by the stockpile and the range of emergency systems in place to deal with an accident involving the stockpile.
- g. Provide the participating organizations and volunteers with public recognition for their serious commitment to multi-hazard preparedness of local, State, Federal and volunteer agencies.
- h. Sensitize the media, local officials and general public to the critical role of the news media in a community's disaster response and recovery plan.
- i. Increase the awareness of those who will respond to the crisis of the relationship between public affairs activities and mission success.

- j. Provide an opportunity to assess the quality of the communications response plan.

4. Strategy

- a. Public affairs policy and procedures should be consistent with overall exercise objectives, emphasizing the value of the exercise process rather than a specific goal for the exercise. All exercise public affairs activities should be closely coordinated with the Exercise Co-Director(s) and included as a part of the exercise plan. Any variations to that plan should be approved by Exercise Co-Director(s).
- b. The host jurisdiction is responsible for the lead on real world media coordination. In the case of co-hosts, a joint decision should be made as to who will take the lead.
- c. Goals and objectives will be met through a combination of multi-media public affairs activities aimed at various target groups. These activities may include news releases, formal briefings, displays and guided tours. Appendix A lists a variety of potential activities which may be adapted to each exercise event.
- d. Specific strategy and timing for each activity will depend upon a variety of local conditions, (i.e. number and level of media and public interest and number of visitors, etc.) Appendix B provides suggested timelines for publicity activities.
- e. All contact with news media should be through public affairs officers dedicated to that purpose. In addition, all exercise staffs, players, controllers and evaluators should be briefed on the role of public affairs and that all media queries should be directed to the appropriate PAO. PAO telephone numbers should be provided to all persons involved in the exercise.

5. Guidelines for response to media interest

It is expected there may be a moderate level of interest in the exercise from local and regional media, with perhaps some attention from national-level media. This interest should be viewed as an opportunity for agencies at the local, State and Federal level to demonstrate their level of cooperation, planning and preparedness activities to deal with a major emergency involving stored chemicals at one of the Army's stockpile sites of chemical agents.

All media briefings and tours should include the admonition that the media should not question players, controllers or evaluators or interrupt exercise play in any way. All direct interaction with the media should be through public affairs officers. Any variations in this procedure must be approved in advance by the Exercise Co-Director(s).

As with any exercise, the purpose is to test communications and response capabilities and to determine where improvements in coordination and capability are necessary. This overall broad purpose should be emphasized with the media and encourage them not to view the exercise as a "exam" with a specific grade. In its simplest form, "If opportunities for improvement are found, the exercise will be a success."

All organizations should be prepared to respond to media interest in the exercise and make provisions to meet the needs of the media OUTSIDE of exercise play. This requires providing staff, materials and facilities to deal with media interest without affecting exercise play and with only minimal involvement of exercise

participants, including public affairs exercise players involved in the exercise

(See Appendix A).

In coordination with exercise organizations and with approval of the Exercise Co-Director(s), the media should be allowed controlled access to the exercise environment for photographic purposes and to determine for themselves the extent of realism being demonstrated. This may be accomplished through escorted tours of the exercise area or an area set aside which allow media to view the exercise but limits their interaction with exercise participants. **In any event, before any media are taken to any on-post site, they must be cleared by post security, via the chemical activity/depot PAO, prior to the day of the exercise.** Areas to be considered for visits or tours could include:

- Joint Information Center (JIC)
- County Emergency Operating Center (EOC)
- Installation Command Post (CP)
- Chemical Agent Storage Area, including scenario site(s)/setting(s)
- Exercise SIMCELL/Control Cell

An integral part of any exercise will be a test of the Joint Information Center (JIC) to handle media interest in a coordinated and controlled manner in a real event. The activities at the JIC will, of course, be of interest to the news media. However, every possible effort should be made to handle "real-world" media outside the context of the JIC. **For the purposes of this plan, the term Media Center will be used when dealing with real world media interest in the exercise.** The JIC will refer only to exercise activity.

Experience has shown that the news media covering the exercise would add little, in terms of reality, if they participated in the exercise activities in the Joint Information Center, i.e. asked questions during briefings, etc. Because of the possible confusion on the part of the exercise players, and need for separation of activities, the real media should not be allowed to ask questions of exercise briefers or players. They could, at the discretion of public affairs staff, be allowed to view the "news conferences" without participating.

Responding organizations with limited resources may agree to consolidate public affairs resources at a Media Center and benefit from consolidated support from public affairs representatives from a number of agencies. Media Center staff and each organization, to the extent of their involvement, should be prepared with the following:

- a. **Staff:** Every effort should be made to gauge the potential level of media interest and allocate personnel and resources necessary to meet the needs of the media.
- b. **Materials:** Each organization should be prepared with sufficient materials and capability to communicate the level of coordination, planning and response capability of their organization necessary to prepare for and carry out such an event. Such capability may include but not be limited to: guides for tours, news releases, media advisories, fact sheets, etc. See Appendix C to this plan for suggested media kit materials.
- c. **Facilities:** Plans should be made for a media briefing area of sufficient size to brief news media, answer questions and conduct interviews. This location should be functionally separate from the JIC, and in close proximity to the exercise location. This will allow for briefings and interviews without interrupting exercise play but also allow for media to be escorted to the exercise facility or to a viewing point.

6. Organization

- a. A team of information providers (i.e., public information officers and other designated spokespersons) should be identified prior to the exercise. Ideally, the composition of the core team should be representative of the level of involvement of participating organizations.
- b. The public affairs representatives will be expected to share exercise-related information, ensuring that any information ultimately disseminated to the public, is thoroughly coordinated.
- c. The team will work out of a Media Center, situated and equipped in such a manner to assist with the needs of the media and visitors. These needs will include minimal drinking water and rest room facilities (at a minimum, a tent with a water jug and latrine).
- d. All organizations should be prepared to respond to media interest in the exercise and make provisions to meet the needs of the media OUTSIDE of exercise play. It is of vital importance that a clear distinction must be made regarding those dedicated to exercise play activity in the JIC and those dedicated to real-world media in the Exercise Media Center. This will require sufficient staff, materials, and facilities to deal with media interest without disrupting exercise play.

7. Responsibilities

- a. The primary responsibility for public affairs support for the exercise event resides with the local CSEPP Organization, including the local Army Chemical Activity where the chemical agents are stored. However, the exercise response relies upon a cooperative effort from all organizations which are represented within the exercise itself.
- b. The host jurisdiction will be responsible for the lead on real world media coordination. In the case of co-hosts, a joint decision should be made as to who will take the lead.
- c. Recognizing that only a limited public affairs capability may exist at the local level, it is expected that additional support will come from the State Emergency Services Office. In addition, to the extent that they play in the exercise, supplemental support could be expected from other organizations from State, Federal and volunteer agencies. See Appendix A for suggested activities.
- d. Specific Responsibilities.
 - (1) **Local CSEPP organization:** In coordination with the Army, other Federal, State and volunteer responding organizations, plan and organize a capability to respond to exercise interest by the public, media and distinguished visitors. Plan and organize support from other local level organizations as needed to augment public affairs exercise support for the exercise. Request support, as necessary, from available public affairs resources.

- (2) **Army Installation:** In cooperation with other responding organizations, provide public affairs support to respond to exercise interest by the media. Enlist additional public affairs support as necessary from installation or other Federal resources.
- (3) **State Emergency Services Office:** Provide public affairs support from the State Emergency Services Office and other State Agency resources to the extent necessary to meet the public affairs needs of the public, media and visitors.
- (4) **FEMA Regional Office:** Provide public affairs support and technical assistance from the FEMA Regional office or other regional Federal agencies.
- (5) **Federal Emergency Management Agency Headquarters:** Provide public affairs support in the form of technical assistance in plan development, utilization of existing resources and location of supplemental resources to local and state response organizations.
- (6) **Office of Program Manager, Chemical Demilitarization/CSEPP Core Team:** Provide public affairs support to the local Installation in the development of plans and during the exercise phase as necessary.

8. Media Materials

A news release should be prepared by the host jurisdiction announcing the time, date, location, purpose and general scope of the exercise. The release should also include supplementary detail on the exercise, planning, exercise preparations, participants, and facilities of interest. The release will be coordinated among other participating organizations prior to being issued. Agreement should be reached on who issues the initial release. It should be distributed to the news media at a date and time to be agreed upon prior to the exercise and be available for handout, along with other materials, during the exercise. In addition, copies of the basic news release should be available for distribution to other groups such as Congress, constituent groups, and the scientific community.

9. Develop Public Affairs Plan

A detailed exercise-specific public affairs plan will be developed for each exercise. Installation, State, and local public affairs representatives must take an active role in the development of this plan. Input from the planning team will be necessary when developing schedules for media briefings, tours and other activities. The exercise-specific public affairs plan must be delivered to the Exercise Co-Directors in time for inclusion in the EXPLAN as an annex. The EXPLAN is to be completed and distributed 90 days before the exercise.

- a. **Develop a Real World Media Plan:** The Army and FEMA/State, as appropriate, Co-Directors will develop, coordinate, allot sufficient resources, and oversee the execution of a Real World Media plan. The Co-Directors will provide Public Affairs escorts to conduct a media tour to specified exercise locations. Media tour escorts will conduct media tour (if one is required), provide general information concerning the exercise and activities being viewed, and ensure minimal disruption to exercise activities during the tour. The escort will coordinate with applicable supervisors in advance of the exercise for any specific procedures or restrictions to be followed while the tour is at specific locations. This may include provisions for

making a spokesperson available at specific locations. The Real World Media, if present at the exercise, will not be mixed with the Mock Media.

- b. Mock Media Responsibilities: In a CSEPP exercise, Mock Media (controller(s)/actor(s) is/are provided by the Co-Directors to exercise the player's public affairs organizations and chain of command in accordance with promulgated plans, procedures, and in accordance with the agreed upon extent of play. Public Affairs is an integral part of CSEPP and consequently it is examined to some extent at all associated exercises to ensure that the combined system is capable of providing timely, accurate, coordinated information to the media under accident conditions. Therefore, the Mock Media will challenge the exercise players to demonstrate the following:

- Plans and procedures exist which would work in a real accident;
- Public affairs organizations are in place to gather timely accurate information about the accident and response;
- Public affairs organizations can and do coordinate the information among themselves; and
- Public affairs organizations disseminate the information to the news media and respond to media questions and stories in a timely manner.

As stated above, if the Real World Media is present at the exercise, it will not be mixed with the Mock Media.

Attachment B-1

Potential Exercise Activities

PRE-EXERCISE:

MEDIA INVOLVEMENT IN PLANNING: The news media should be involved during the planning stage of CSEPP, in particular those broadcast stations which are a part of the Emergency Alerting System (EAS). This will offer opportunities to discuss the various exercises and enlist their support during the play of the exercises. Carry out exercise calls to the media with simulated EAS messages. This call should be an actual call with **careful** caveats as to its test or exercise status, and should be made **only if extensive coordination has been done**. This will encourage media interest in the exercise as a news event.

VISITOR BRIEFING FOR MEDIA: Depending upon the number of media, consider a personal visit or a briefing before the exercise to explain how the exercise will be conducted, number and level of agencies, etc.

INVITATIONS TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS: Personal letters to public officials at all levels who may have any involvement in emergency preparedness. Offer briefings, tours, etc. Every effort should be made to keep public officials tours and media tours separate.

MEDIA ADVISORY: An advisory with background materials designed to heighten the interest of the media, rather than answer all questions. Invite to cover exercise, set briefing and tour times which are specifically tailored for the media. (See Invitations to Public Officials above.)

NEWS RELEASE: Send out news release and follow-up media advisory a week before exercise. Follow-up with phone calls two days later and encourage support. If media is not available for exercise or does not show interest, offer to provide information directly to that media.

PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING: Depending upon the level of interest, consider a detailed briefing the day before or the morning of the exercise. The day before will allow public officials involved in the exercise to participate more fully in the briefing. This should be designed to answer any possible question with briefing charts, handouts, fact sheets, etc.

DURING EXERCISE:

TOURS, BRIEFINGS: Have a well-organized tour and briefing program with skilled briefers and tour guides. Tour critical areas (as appropriate) such as EOC, JIC, Army EOC, etc. Consider any "site" which is visually interesting. These activities should be well coordinated with exercise planners and players, well in advance during the planning stage.

POST-EXERCISE:

POST-EXERCISE BRIEFING OR MEDIA/PUBLIC BRIEFING: Consider this to offer an opportunity for the public and the media to hear the results of the exercise and question participants.

Attachment B-2

Public Affairs Support to Chemical Agent Exercise

Suggested Timelines for publicity for Real-world media

Time prior to Exercise

2 MOS.	Meet with public affairs representatives of agencies for coordination of actions and information. Discuss exercise scenario, media briefings, media access.
1 MO.	Determine need and order materials for media kits.
2 WKS	<p>Meet with exercise planners and arrange for interview subjects, technical experts</p> <p>Finalize a coordinated news release and media advisory. Media advisory should explain the purpose of the exercise and encourage their assistance in heightening public awareness</p> <p>Send out letters inviting public officials at all levels to a personal visit or briefing before the exercise</p> <p>Arrange for briefers, tour guides, etc.</p>
1 WK	<p>Reproduce materials for media kits</p> <p>Mail news release and media advisory</p>
2 DAYS	<p>Contact local "Daybook" editors, assignment or managing editors and provide information for media use in scheduling.</p> <p>Finalize arrangements for public affairs management at media center and tour escorts, if necessary.</p> <p>Assemble media kits and briefing materials</p>
1 DAY	<p>As appropriate, contact news media and encourage their coverage of the exercise and schedule media briefings</p> <p>Set up media center</p>
DAY OF EXERCISE	Staff media center, distribute media kits, arrange interviews, and escort media through EOC, JIC, tour sites, etc.

Attachment B-3

Chemical Agent Exercise Media materials

1. A comprehensive packet of media materials in a folder which includes:

- A basic news release explaining the exercise play, date, timing and extent of exercise play. This news release should be coordinated with all participating organizations.
- Background materials on the organizations involved in the exercise.
- Charts, graphs and visual displays, as appropriate, showing lines of communication, map of exercise area, etc.
 - Background materials on the stored chemical agents
 - Layout plan for EOC, JIC, etc.
 - Samples of appropriate publications/brochures
 - Time-line for exercise scenario

2. Media briefing area or Tour Stops:

- Charts, maps, etc. necessary to brief media
- Background (large map) for media interviews
- Arrange for technical experts to brief media
- Consider badging of media, if appropriate

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APPENDIX C

CSEPP EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND POINTS OF REVIEW

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CHEMICAL STOCKPILE
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM EXERCISES
EXERCISE OBJECTIVES, EVALUATION ELEMENTS
AND
POINTS OF REVIEW

APPENDIX C

Prepared for
The U.S. Department of the Army
Office of the Assistant Secretary
(Installations, Logistics and Environment)
and
The Federal Emergency Management Agency
Preparedness, Training and Exercises Directorate

Prepared by
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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACP	Access Control Point
AMC	Army Materiel Command
ANAD	Anniston Army Depot
ANL	Argonne National Laboratory
AOC	Army Operations Center
APG	Aberdeen Proving Ground
ARC	American Red Cross
BDO	Battle Dress Overgarment
BGAD	Blue Grass Army Depot
CAI	Chemical Accident/Incident
CAIRA	Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance
CENL	Chemical Event Notification Level
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CSDP	Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program
CSEPP	Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program
CPG	Civil Preparedness Guide
DA	Department of the Army
DCD	Deseret Chemical Depot
DHHS	U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
DoD	U.S. Department of Defense
EAS	Emergency Alert System
EEM	Exercise Evaluation Methodology
EMS	Emergency Medical Services
EOC	Emergency Operating/Operations Center
EOD	Explosives Ordnance Disposal
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
EPZ	Emergency Planning Zone
ETE	Evacuation Time Estimate
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
HM-EEM	Hazardous Materials Exercise Evaluation Methodology
ICS	Incident Command System
IP	Implementing Procedure
IRF	Initial Response Force
IRZ	Immediate Response Zone
JIC	Joint Information Center

MCE	Maximum Credible Event
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRT	Medical Response Team
NCP	National Contingency Plan
NDA	National Defense Area
NDMS	National Defense Medical System
NECD	Newport Chemical Depot
NRT	National Response Team
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
OSC	On-Scene Coordinator
OSHA	U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PA	Public Alerting (System)
PAD	Protective Action Decision
PAO	Public Affairs Officer
PAR	Protective Action Recommendation
PAZ	Protective Action Zone
PBA	Pine Bluff Arsenal
PIO	Public Information Officer
PL	Public Law
POC	Point of Contact
POR	Point of Review
PPE	Personnel Protective Equipment
PUCD	Pueblo Chemical Depot
PZ	Precautionary Zone
RACES	Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service
REP	Radiological Emergency Preparedness
RIA	Requiring Immediate Action
RRT	Regional Response Team
SARA	Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
SCBA	Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus
SE	Schneider Engineers (now SE Technologies, Inc.)
SOP	Standard/Standing Operating Procedure
SRF	Service Response Force
SRFC	Service Response Force Commander
TCP	Traffic Control Point
TDD	Teletype Device for the Deaf
TEAD	Tooele Army Depot
UMCD	Umatilla Chemical Depot
USANCA	U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Note: The explanatory material for each evaluation element includes definitions of key terms associated with that evaluation element, under the heading "Clarification of Terms." This glossary is a compendium of the definitions found in the evaluation elements.

Some terms defined in this glossary are included as subparts of a more general heading; for example, "Enhanced Shelter" is found under the general heading of "Sheltering." The general headings that include subparts are: Chemical Event Notification Levels, Emergency Planning Zones, and Sheltering.

<i>Access Control:</i>	All activities accomplished for the purpose of controlling entry of persons into a restricted area (i.e., preventing the public from entering accident site, sheltered or evacuated areas and permitting emergency workers with essential missions to enter the area).
<i>Activation:</i>	A process by which a facility is brought up to emergency mode from a normal mode of operation. Activation is complete when the facility is usable for emergency response operations.
<i>Alerting of Personnel:</i>	Personnel are notified through transmission of a signal or message via telephone, radio, or other means of a possible chemical accident/incident that requires that they report or may have to report for emergency duty.
<i>Antidote:</i>	A remedy to counteract the effects of agent. The Mark I Nerve Agent Antidote Kit contains an injectable drug to counteract the effects of nerve agent exposure. Injections may be repeated at 5- to 20-minute intervals until three injections are given without the advice of a physician.
<i>Backup Communications System:</i>	The communication system used when the primary system is incapable of handling traffic or is inoperative.
<i>Buddy-Aid:</i>	The administration of chemical agent antidote to a person exhibiting symptoms of severe chemical agent poisoning who is unable to perform self-aid.
<i>Chemical Agent Casualty:</i>	A person who has been affected sufficiently by a chemical agent to prevent or seriously degrade the ability to function normally.
<i>Chemical Event Notification Levels:</i>	
<i>Non-Surety Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that may be perceived as a chemical surety emergency or that may be of general public interest, but which pose no chemical surety hazard. This includes non-surety material emergencies.
<i>Limited Area Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release outside engineering controls or approved chemical storage facilities with chemical effects expected to be confined to the chemical limited area. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit does not extend beyond the chemical limited area where the event occurred.
<i>Post Only Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release with chemical effects beyond the chemical limited area. Releases are not expected to present a danger to the off-post public. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit extends beyond the chemical limited area but does not extend beyond the installation boundary.
<i>Community</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release with

<i>Emergency:</i>	chemical effects beyond the installation boundary. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit extends beyond the installation boundary.
<i>Chemical Surety Material:</i>	Chemical agents and their associated weapon systems, or storage and shipping containers.
<i>Chemical-Unique Materials:</i>	Those specific materials and equipment which would be required primarily in response to a chemical accident/incident, such as antidotes to chemical agents and decontamination chemicals.
<i>Command and Control:</i>	Management of emergency functions through leadership and use of authority (synonymous with Direction and Control).
<i>Communication System:</i>	The assemblage of personnel and equipment, including, but not limited to, radio, telephone, and facsimile communication machines.
<i>Congregate care Facility:</i>	A facility for providing emergency lodging and care for people made temporarily homeless by an emergency.
<i>Contaminated Persons:</i>	Persons who have chemical agent on themselves or their clothing.
<i>Contamination:</i>	Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any other material that constitutes a source of potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.
<i>Coordination:</i>	Active involvement of staff and response agencies in decision making to integrate available resources and implement the CSEPP response plans.
<i>Decontamination:</i>	The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.
<i>Detection:</i>	Discovery of the presence of a chemical agent.
<i>Disabled Persons:</i>	Individuals who, due to a physical or mental impairment, may require assistance with protective actions. For example, residents who are blind, non-ambulatory, frail, or dependent on life-support systems may require assistance from others (and special equipment) in order to evacuate.
<i>Emergency Facility:</i>	Any building, center, room or set of rooms or mobile units that have been designed and equipped to support emergency operations (e.g., Emergency Operating/Operations Center (EOC)).
<i>Emergency Information:</i>	Material designed to improve knowledge or understanding of an emergency.
<i>Emergency Instructions:</i>	Instructions for protective actions that should be taken in an emergency.

<i>Emergency Operating/Operations Center:</i>	A facility where responsible officials gather during an emergency to direct and coordinate emergency operations, to communicate with other jurisdictions and with field emergency forces, and to formulate protective action decisions.
<i>Emergency Planning Zones:</i>	
<i>Immediate Response Zone (IRZ):</i>	The planning zone immediately surrounding each Army installation. Generally it extends to about 10 km (6 miles) from the installation's chemical storage area. At some installations, it extends to about 15 km (9 miles).
<i>Protective Action Zone (PAZ):</i>	The second planning zone beyond the immediate response zone. Generally it extends to about 21 miles from the installation's chemical storage area, and at some installations it extends further.
<i>Precautionary Zone (PZ):</i>	The outermost zone extending beyond the protective action zone. Theoretically it has no limits. Practically, its furthest point is that beyond which emergency planning for the CSEPP would not be required under most conditions.
<i>Emergency Workers:</i>	Personnel performing essential missions within the area potentially affected by the chemical agent to protect the health and safety of the public. The term is applicable to first responders to the chemical event site and others engaged in activities such as manning traffic control along evacuation routes, performing emergency medical services and decontamination, driving evacuation and medical response vehicles, and performing fire and rescue activities, including route alerting.
<i>Essential Functions:</i>	Response activities crucial in a chemical event. They include communications, direction and control of operations, hazard assessment, reception and care of evacuees, and public information.
<i>Evacuation:</i>	A protective action that involves leaving an area of risk until the area is safe for return.
<i>Evacuees:</i>	All persons leaving the installation, and/or the IRZ/PAZ due to the chemical accident/incident.
<i>Facility:</i>	Any building, center, room, set of rooms or mobile unit(s) that are designated to support emergency response operations.
<i>Fully Operational Organization:</i>	An organization that has completed the mobilization process required by scenario events and the organization's emergency plans and procedures for specific duty stations.

<i>Fully participating organization:</i>	Organization that will fully activate and mobilize all emergency response personnel as needed during the exercise.
<i>Incident Command System:</i>	A system of command, which may be used in the off-post communities, that provides for the effective and efficient management of personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications during a response. It may require an incident command post close to the operational scene which must remain in constant coordination with the local EOC, where overall disaster or emergency management decisions are made.
<i>Ingestion Hazard Projections:</i>	Projections of hazard to the public from ingesting chemical agents released as the result of a chemical event in the absence of protective actions which occur over a period of time.
<i>Initial Response Force (IRF):</i>	An emergency actions organization tasked to provide first response to a CAI at an installation assigned a chemical surety mission. Under the command of the installation commander, the IRF is composed of command and control elements and emergency teams capable of providing emergency medical service and initiating those actions necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate hazards to public health and safety or to the environment. Depending on the severity of the CAI, the IRF is capable of initiating environmental restoration activities for completion under the installation restoration program.
<i>Institution:</i>	A facility such as a nursing home, hospital, or prison, where the residents may require special assistance or security in order to implement protective actions.
<i>Institutionalized Persons:</i>	Individuals who reside in institutions such as nursing homes or prisons and may need to depend on others for assistance with protective actions. Institutionalized persons may or may not have special needs.
<i>Joint Information Center (JIC):</i>	A facility staffed by spokespersons from the Army, federal, state, and local jurisdictions, as well as volunteer agencies, for the purpose of providing a single, designated focal point for contact with the media and to facilitate exchange and coordination of information among spokespersons from different organizations. It provides a location for public information specialists to collaborate on and coordinate the gathering, analysis, production and release of public information.
<i>Key Response Staff:</i>	Those emergency personnel necessary to carry out essential functions in a chemical event.

<i>Medical Response Team:</i>	Refers to both on and off-post response teams. On-post the Medical Response Team (MRT) is led by a physician or physician's assistant and provides: emergency medical triage, treatment, stabilization, and evacuation of victims from the chemical event site to a medical treatment facility. Off-post the medical response team is most likely to be the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) team who will provide the same services.
<i>Mobilize:</i>	Messages have been transmitted to emergency personnel to inform them of an emergency situation and to direct them to report to their designated emergency response duty stations. Mobilization and alerting of personnel may occur simultaneously.
<i>Monitoring:</i>	Checking for the presence and levels of the chemical agent.
<i>Mutual Aid:</i>	An agreement between jurisdictions and/or private entities to provide additional aid or resources to control and mitigate a chemical event.
<i>National Defense Area:</i>	An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information, or protecting DOD equipment or material.
<i>Notification:</i>	Notification refers to providing emergency instructions and information to the public. This should follow the alert. In some systems, the alert and notification functions are inseparable; for example in route alerting, hearing the instructional message over the vehicle's PA system is what alerts the public to the emergency.
<i>On-Scene Coordinator:</i>	The federal official designated under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to coordinate and direct federal response forces and removals of hazardous materials. For Department of the Army facilities, the Initial Response Force Commander is the initial OSC, appointment of a Service Response Force Commander/On-Scene Coordinator (SRFC/OSC) may subsequently occur.
<i>Outside Support Agencies:</i>	Federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and any other governmental, quasi-governmental, or private agencies that provide assistance in the event of a chemical event (e.g., American National Red Cross, Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services, laboratories).
<i>Partially Participating Organization:</i>	Organization that will activate and mobilize emergency response personnel during the exercise as specified in the extent of play agreement.
<i>Person with Injuries or Medical Problems:</i>	Person with injuries and/or acute internal conditions, such as a heart attack, not due to exposure to chemical agent.

<i>Personal Protective Equipment:</i>	Chemical protective clothing and respiratory protection to enable responders to conduct activities while protecting themselves from contamination. This equipment should protect the skin, eyes, and respiratory tract of the responders.
<i>Population at Risk:</i>	The population potentially affected by concentrations of chemical agent. The population at risk is calculated by determining the population within the radial distance estimated to be affected by agent from a release.
<i>Primary Communications System:</i>	The communication system designated to carry the bulk of traffic.
<i>Protective Action:</i>	An action or measure taken to avoid or reduce exposure to a hazard.
<i>Protective Action Decision Making:</i>	The process of selecting one or more actions to protect a population at risk.
<i>Protective Action Recommendation (PAR):</i>	A recommendation provided to decision maker(s) regarding those actions that should be implemented in order to protect a population at risk.
<i>Public Alerting:</i>	The system for obtaining the attention of the public about a chemical event that may require that they take protective action. Sirens are the most commonly used public alert devices, but they frequently are supplemented by tone alert radios, visual warning devices for the hearing-impaired, and telephone-based alert/notification systems.
<i>Public Information Officer/ Public Affairs Officer (PIO/PAO):</i>	An emergency response staff member with the responsibility to develop and/or deliver emergency public information for media distribution. A PIO/PAO may also be a spokesperson, or may only develop materials to be delivered by someone else.
<i>Push Packages:</i>	Contingency stocks of PPE and other emergency supplies, maintained at a designated location, for use during a chemical accident/incident at that installation, which may be made available for a chemical accident/incident at other installations.
<i>Reception Center:</i>	Facility where registration, and possibly screening and decontamination of evacuees takes place.
<i>Reentry:</i>	Entry of personnel into an affected area following a chemical accident/incident. Reentry can be restricted (e.g., entry of monitoring crews) or unrestricted (unlimited public access).
<i>Resource Provider:</i>	Organization supplying resources such as buses, drivers, and other personnel to assist with protection of special populations or school children.
<i>Restricted Area:</i>	Area subject to protective actions, into which access will be controlled.
<i>Rumor:</i>	Information unconfirmed by an official source.

<i>Sampling:</i>	Taking actual physical samples of materials, such as air or soil samples, to be analyzed for chemical agents.
<i>School children:</i>	Children in public and private schools and day care centers.
<i>Screening:</i>	The process of determining whether persons, vehicles, and other belongings are potentially contaminated.
<i>Screening Areas:</i>	Areas where screening for exposure to chemical agent of evacuees takes place. Registration may also be done in this location.
<i>Self-Aid:</i>	The administration of a chemical agent antidote to oneself upon experiencing early symptoms of chemical agent poisoning.
<i>Service Response Force (SRF):</i>	A DA-level emergency response organization, commanded by a general officer, capable of performing and sustaining the CAIRA mission. The SRF is composed of the IRF and follow-on forces consisting of a staff and specialized teams from various agencies and organizations involved in the response to and recovery from a CAI.
<i>Sheltering (Shelter-in-Place):</i>	
<i>Normal Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that involves taking cover in a building, closing all doors and windows, and turning off ventilation systems. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
<i>Expedient Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that, after going into the room selected as a shelter, the inhabitants take measures to reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent enters the room. Such measures would include taping around doors and windows and covering vents and electrical outlets. Effectiveness is improved by using an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
<i>Enhanced Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that it involves taking shelter in a structure to which weatherization techniques have been applied before the emergency to permanently reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent seeps into it. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

<i>Pressurized Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that the infiltration of contaminated air from outside the shelter is effectively prohibited by drawing outside air into the shelter through a filter that removes chemical agent. This filtered air creates a positive pressure in the shelter so that clean air is leaking out instead of contaminated air leaking in.
<i>Spokesperson:</i>	An emergency response staff member with the responsibility for delivering emergency public information to the media.
<i>Stay time:</i>	Allowable time for an emergency worker to be dressed out in personal protective equipment.
<i>Traffic Control:</i>	All activities accomplished for the purpose of facilitating evacuation in vehicles along specific routes.
<i>Transit-Dependent Persons:</i>	Individuals who do not have their own transportation and must depend on others for transport in the event of an evacuation. Examples of transit-dependent individuals range from those who do not drive due to disability (e.g. blindness) to those who normally rely on public transportation or are simply stuck at home while a family member is out with the car. They may or may not be disabled.
<i>Triage:</i>	The process of sorting or selection of patients to determine priority of care to be rendered to each.
<i>Two-Person Concept:</i>	A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to chemical surety material by requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized personnel capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed. Each person must be familiar with applicable safety and security requirements.
<i>Vapor or Aerosol Hazard Projections:</i>	Projections of hazard to the public from exposure to the vapor or aerosol from a chemical event in the absence of protective actions, which occur over a period of time.
<i>Warning Point:</i>	A twenty-four hour designated location where emergency notification(s) would be received.

1. BACKGROUND

Three sets of exercise evaluation guidance and forms have previously been used in the CSEPP Exercise Program. The first set was the draft prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), *CSEPP Exercise Objectives and Evaluation Elements*, dated April 1991. The second version, was the *CSEPP Exercise Objectives and Points of Review* dated January 1992 (also compiled by ORNL). The third version was prepared by Argonne National Laboratory, *Exercise Objectives, Evaluation Elements and Points of Review*, Appendix C dated June 1994. This appendix supersedes the previous versions.

This appendix is based on the format and approach of the April 1991 draft version of the exercise objectives and evaluation elements, with consideration given to the points of review in the 1992 objectives and updating the information to be consistent with current guidance. Additionally, field experience gained since the exercise program began has been taken into account, and an attempt to limit the points of review to essential and observable data only has been made.

2. ORGANIZATION OF APPENDIX C

This appendix contains a guide to using the evaluation materials (Section 4), a list of the standard exercise objectives and evaluation elements (Section 5), and a description of the objectives and associated evaluation elements, and the evaluation forms themselves (Section 6). References are listed below in Section 3. A Glossary of Terms and a List of Acronyms also are included at the beginning of the Appendix.

3. DOCUMENTS USED AND CITED

The development of the exercise objectives, associated evaluation elements in each objective, and the evaluation material in this appendix is based on the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program* (DA/FEMA 1993, document dated November 25, 1992, approved May 17, 1996, and including approved Appendices A "Planning Standards for Command and Control", B "Planning Standards for EOC Location, Design, and Equipment", C "Communications Support Network: System Design Criteria and Evaluation Guide", D "Planning Standards for Protective Action Decision Making", E "Planning Standards for Protective Actions and Responses", F "Public Alert and Notification Systems: System Design Criteria and Evaluation Guide", G "Planning Standards for Traffic and Access Control", J "Planning Standards for Public Education and Information", K "Planning Standards for Evacuee Support", and L "Planning Standards for Decontamination"). Information was also drawn from other sources, including the following documents: *Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations* (DA 1991), *Developing a Hazardous Materials Exercise Program A Handbook for State and Local Officials* (NRT 1990), *Hazardous Materials Exercise Evaluation Methodology (HM-EEM) and Manual* (FEMA 1992), *Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise Manual* (FEMA 1991), and *Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM)* (FEMA 1991).

Complete references for these and other documents that were consulted (and are not cited in the principal exercise guidance document) are given below.

ARC (American Red Cross) 1987. *Mass Care Preparedness and Operations*, Disaster Services Regulations and Procedures, ARC 3031, Washington, DC (April).

DA (U.S. Department of the Army) 1991. *Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance*

- (CAIRA) Operations, DA Pam. 50-6, Washington, DC (May).
- DA/FEMA (U.S. Department of the Army and Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1992. *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, Washington, DC (November 25).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1984. *Emergency Operating Centers Handbook*, CPG 1-20, Washington, DC (May).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1984. *Objectives for Local Emergency Management*, CPG 1-5, Washington, DC (July).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1987. *Sheltering and Care Operations*, CPG 2-8, Washington, DC (October).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1990. *Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans*, CPG 1-8, Washington, DC (September).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1991. *Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Exercise Manual*, FEMA-REP-14, Washington, DC (September).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1991. *Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation Methodology (EEM)*, FEMA-REP-15, Washington, DC (September).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1992. *Hazardous Materials Exercise Evaluation Methodology (HM-EEM) and Manual*, Washington, DC (February).
- FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1992. *A Guide for the Review of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans*, CPG 1-8A, Washington, DC (October).
- ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory) 1991. *Draft Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercise Objectives and Evaluation Elements*, Oak Ridge, TN (April).
- NRT (National Response Team) 1987. *Hazardous Materials Emergency Planning Guide*, NRT-1, Washington, DC (March).
- NRT (National Response Team) 1988. *Criteria for Review of Hazardous Materials Emergency Plans*, NRT-1A, Washington, DC (May).
- NRT (National Response Team) 1990. *Developing a Hazardous Materials Exercise Program: A Handbook for State and Local Officials*, NRT-2, Washington, DC (September).

4. GUIDE TO USING THE EXERCISE EVALUATION MATERIALS

The exercise evaluation materials, which are found in Section 6, are in two parts. The first part explains what the evaluation elements are for each objective, including a description of the intent, the expected demonstration, a clarification of terms, and where the element will be demonstrated. The second part is the evaluation forms themselves. This section explains the purpose of the materials and how to complete the evaluation forms.

4.1 Purpose of Evaluation Materials

The evaluation of CSEPP exercises is based on a set of standard objectives and specific evaluation elements associated with each objective. The CSEPP evaluation materials are structured to enable evaluators to gather information on the performance of participating organizations for each applicable evaluation element demonstrated at a particular location. For each evaluation element, there is an element-specific form with points of review. The points of review provide a base of information from which to evaluate performance. The results of this evaluation are recorded on a separate form, the Evaluation Worksheet. The Evaluation Worksheet is used to record exercise **Strengths, Findings, and Observations** as defined in the principal document, *Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program Exercises*, ORNL, February 2, 1999.

The exercise report will include the Strengths, Findings, and Observations with recommendations for improvement for the findings and observations and with action plans for the Findings.

4.2 Instructions for Completing Evaluation Forms

An evaluation form containing "points of review" has been provided for each evaluation element. The points of review are short questions or prompts that require the evaluator to provide specific data and information on the performance of the organization during the exercise. The forms for all the evaluation elements are found following the explanation for each objective.

The points of review are generally based on one or more of the planning considerations in the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program* (DA/FEMA 1993) and the *Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations* (DA 1991) and are so referenced on the evaluation forms. The forms also contain references to other sources such as FEMA's *Guide for the Development of State and Local Emergency Operations Plans*, CPG 1-8 (FEMA 1992). Evaluators should be familiar with these documents and the underlying guidance for each point of review. They should consult these resources whenever appropriate in order to complete a thorough and accurate evaluation.

For questions on the evaluation forms that can be answered by selecting between "YES," "NO," "N/A," or "N/O," evaluators are to choose the appropriate response based on the following intended meanings and usages:

- "YES" indicates a positive response based on actual observation, or on discussion with a player or controller;

- "NO" indicates a negative response based on actual observation, or on discussion with a player or controller;
 - "N/A" stands for "not applicable" and should be used to designate that the indicated activity or function was not required to be demonstrated by an organization (either because the organization is not responsible for the activity or function under its emergency plan and procedures, or because scenario events did not require the organization to demonstrate the activity or function); and
 - "N/O" stands for "not observed." It means that the evaluator did not obtain the information necessary to answer the question.
- The Co-chairs of the exercise planning team should, to the extent possible, designate all "N/A" responses on evaluation forms for each objective prior to the exercise based on specific activities and functions not being required as specified in the extent of play agreement.

Notes to the evaluators on the forms are in italics to distinguish them from the points of review.

If the evaluator did not observe specific aspects of an organization's performance, he/she may ask questions of exercise participants (players and controllers) during or after the exercise while taking care not to prompt or interrupt play.

Organizations are expected to demonstrate their emergency response capabilities during exercises to the best of their ability and in accordance with their emergency plans and procedures. Most of the evaluation element forms conclude with a question about whether the organization's performance was consistent with the organization's current plans and procedures. Any inconsistencies observed are to be assessed regarding whether they impeded or improved organizational performance and documentation provided, if possible.

Additionally, most of the evaluation element forms conclude with a question about whether procedures or processes observed were particularly effective. The evaluator should note any exceptional procedures which may be worthy of recommendation to others.

4.3 Instructions for Completing Evaluation Worksheets

Evaluation worksheets are used as needed to document the evaluator's conclusions, based on the information in the points of review. Specifically, the evaluation worksheets are used to:

- Point out areas where an element was demonstrated well or where aspects of the response were noteworthy (i.e., "Strengths");
- Identify problems in performance of the responding organizations, including those that have a potential impact on the protection of public health and safety (i.e., "Findings");

- Identify specific measures that could improve an organization's level of preparedness (i.e., "Observations"); and
- Indicate whether previous Findings at the evaluator's location have been corrected.

The worksheet provides space for the evaluator to describe the Strength, Finding, Observation, or correction of a previous Finding. For Findings, the evaluator also must provide a reference to the applicable regulation or guidance document. The worksheet also provides space for the evaluator to make a recommendation for correction of Findings or Observations.

The evaluator should describe and document Findings (problems) and indicate his/her opinion as to the severity of the Finding (i.e., is it an RIA or not?). However, the final recommendation for classification of Findings is the responsibility of the Exercise Co-Directors who also will consider information received from other evaluators.

4.4 Use of the Completed Evaluation Forms

Evaluators should submit their completed evaluation forms (PORs), evaluation worksheets, and correction of previous Findings forms to a designated person, usually a team leader, shortly after termination of the exercise. The designated person should review the completed forms to make sure that the evaluator has provided all appropriate data and information, based on the evaluator's assignments.

Each evaluator observes only a small part of the total exercise performance; therefore the Exercise Co-Directors will compile the information and recommendations from all evaluators in order to assess the integrated response and to get a broader perspective of the activities. The Exercise Co-Directors use this information to determine if there are any exercise problems that should be classified as RIAs.

5. LIST OF EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATION ELEMENTS

The 15 standard exercise objectives and associated evaluation elements to be used in CSEPP exercises are listed below. These objectives focus on fundamental emergency preparedness capabilities necessary for an integrated response to emergencies involving all chemical agents and on additional emergency preparedness capabilities necessary for a full response to emergencies involving chemical agents.

EXERCISE OBJECTIVES TITLE AND EVALUATION ELEMENTS

OBJ. 1 INITIAL ALERT AND ACTIVATION

Evaluation Element 1.1: Initial Characterization and Notification of a Chemical Accident/Incident
Evaluation Element 1.2: Alert and Mobilization of Emergency Personnel
Evaluation Element 1.3: Facility Activation

OBJ. 2 HAZARD ASSESSMENT

Evaluation Element 2.1: Classification of Chemical Event Notification Levels
Evaluation Element 2.2: Agent Detection, Monitoring, and Sampling
Evaluation Element 2.3: Continuing Chemical Event Hazard Assessment

OBJ. 3 PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISION MAKING

Evaluation Element 3.1: Recommendation of Appropriate Protective Actions
Evaluation Element 3.2: Protective Action Decision Making

OBJ. 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL

Evaluation Element 4.1: Command and Control
Evaluation Element 4.2: Supplementary Assistance

OBJ. 5 PUBLIC NOTIFICATION, INSTRUCTIONS, AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Evaluation Element 5.1: Alert and Notification of the Public
Evaluation Element 5.2: Public Instructions and Emergency Information

OBJ. 6 COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND DISPLAYS

Evaluation Element 6.1: Communications Systems
Evaluation Element 6.2: Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

OBJ. 7 PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION FOR SPECIAL POPULATIONS AND FACILITIES

Evaluation Element 7.1: Protective Action Implementation for Special Populations
Evaluation Element 7.2: Protective Action Implementation for Schools

OBJ. 8 TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL

Evaluation Element 8.1: Traffic and Access Control

OBJ. 9 PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Evaluation Element 9.1: Emergency Public Information - Media
Evaluation Element 9.2: Public Inquiries

OBJ. 10 MEDICAL SERVICES - FIRST RESPONSE

Evaluation Element 10.1: Administration of Self Aid, Buddy Aid, and Initial Treatment in a Potentially Contaminated Environment

OBJ. 11 MEDICAL SERVICES - TRANSPORTATION

Evaluation Element 11.1: Transportation of Injured, Potentially Contaminated Individuals to Medical Treatment Facilities

OBJ. 12 MEDICAL SERVICES - MEDICAL FACILITIES

Evaluation Element 12.1: Adequacy of Medical Facility and Health Care Personnel in Handling Potentially Contaminated Individuals

Evaluation Element 12.2: Casualty Tracking System

Evaluation Element 12.3: Handling Contaminated Human Remains

OBJ. 13 FIELD RESPONSE

Evaluation Element 13.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Evaluation Element 13.2: Emergency Worker Decontamination

Evaluation Element 13.3: Security and Accountability

Evaluation Element 13.4: Resupply of Chemical-Unique Materials

OBJ. 14 SCREENING, DECONTAMINATION, REGISTRATION, AND CONGREGATE CARE OF EVACUEES

Evaluation Element 14.1: Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination

Evaluation Element 14.2: Decontamination of Evacuees

Evaluation Element 14.3: Evacuee Registration

Evaluation Element 14.4: Congregate Care

OBJ. 15 24-HOUR OPERATIONS

Evaluation Element 15.1: Ability to Maintain 24-Hour Operations

6. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EVALUATION ELEMENTS

This section contains a detailed description of each of the 15 exercise objectives and their evaluation elements. The write-up for each evaluation element lists the objective under which it falls, the intent of the evaluation element, how the evaluation element is to be demonstrated, clarification of terms used, and the possible location(s) at which the evaluation element could be demonstrated. These locations may vary somewhat depending on the installation, state and local plans, and the extent of play agreement.

The evaluation forms (points of review) follow each evaluation element. The points of review on the evaluation form for each evaluation element should be reviewed in conjunction with the explanatory materials in order to understand the scope of the activities to be demonstrated.

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 1: INITIAL ALERT AND ACTIVATION

Demonstrate the ability to initially characterize a chemical accident/incident, notify, alert and mobilize officials and emergency personnel of the CAI, and activate emergency response facilities.

Evaluation Element 1.1: Initial Characterization and Notification of a Chemical Accident/Incident

Demonstrate the ability to make a timely initial characterization of a chemical accident/incident, and notify appropriate officials.

Intent

Information regarding a chemical accident/incident must be communicated to local officials in an accurate, complete and timely manner to allow them to make appropriate response decisions. This evaluation element provides the framework for the evaluation of the Army's ability to initially notify all on- and off-post locations and to provide an initial characterization of a chemical accident/incident, including identification of the chemical agent involved and an estimate of the amount of agent released.

Internal and external communication is critical, and protocols must be agreed upon for communicating, receiving and acknowledging the information. The contents of the notification messages are addressed in Objective 5 (Public Notification, Instructions and Emergency Information).

This evaluation element also provides a framework for the evaluation of the organizations' abilities in implementing appropriate emergency response measures which are effective for containment and control of the chemical accident/incident. Because of the variety of the storage configurations of agents and munitions, it is possible that the required activities will be agent- and/or munition-specific.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Initial notification may consist of the following: 1) a notification to on- and/or off-post authorities of a situation which may progress into a chemical accident/incident; 2) a notification which contains detailed information about a chemical accident/incident which has occurred; 3) a notification to off-post authorities which provides the justification for the "automatic" protective action decision making response. Initial notification may occur at different jurisdictions within a variable time frame depending upon the exercise scenario and the extent of play agreement.

Characterization activities will be demonstrated at the site of the chemical accident/incident. The demonstration should include reporting of the accident/incident; determination, from available information and if conditions allow, of the type and extent of the hazard present; and development of a plan to contain and control the chemical agent at the site. Implementation of the plan and execution of the emergency procedures to limit the spread of contamination, and the identification of the restricted or hazard area will be evaluated under Objective 13 (Field Response), Evaluation Element 13.3 "Agent Containment".

Activities to demonstrate this evaluation element should be carried out according to the organization's plans and procedures and using the equipment and procedures which would be used

in an actual emergency. The extent of play should provide a detailed description of the activities to be demonstrated. Exercise of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario that involves a chemical accident/incident which has the potential for an off-post response.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this evaluation element, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 6.0 and 8.4, and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, sections 3-5.c.(3)(4), 7-3.b.(1)(2), and Appendices E, F and J.

Clarification of Terms

Warning Point: A twenty-four hour designated location where emergency notification(s) would be received.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Warning Point(s)
Field Location(s)
(chemical accident/incident sites)

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Warning Point(s)
Field Location(s)
(chemical accident/incident sites)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 1.1: Initial Characterization and Notification of a Chemical Accident/Incident

Demonstrate the ability to make a timely initial characterization of a chemical accident/incident, and notify appropriate officials.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Characterization - evaluate at chemical accident/incident site.

1. Where did the chemical accident/incident occur?

2. Identify the individual(s) who reported the accident.
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(a)]

3. When was the chemical accident/incident reported? _____

Record the arrival time(s) of the response team(s). _____

4. How was the hazard determined? [Pl. Guid. 6.1; CAIRA 3-5.c.(3), 7-3.a., 7-3.b., 13-2.a., 13-2.c.]

Check those that apply.

_____ Visual inspection?

_____ Chemical agent detection equipment? (*List equipment used*)

_____ Interview of workers at scene?

_____ Review of daily operation's plans?

_____ Other?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. (continued)

What information was gathered about the hazard by the initial response team(s)?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3), (8), Table 3-2, 7-3.b., 13-2.a., 13-2.c.]

_____ Type of agent released? _____

_____ Estimated amount of chemical agent released? _____

_____ Number and type of munitions and/or bulk containers involved? _____

_____ Extent of damage? _____

5. What did the response team(s) report from the field?

[CAIRA 3-4.c.(3), 3-5.c.(3)(a), 5-4.a., 7-3.b.(2)] *(Check those that apply)*

_____ Type of chemical agent released?

_____ Estimated quantity of chemical agent released?

_____ Type and number of munitions or bulk containers involved?

_____ Casualties?

_____ Fire?

_____ Explosion?

_____ Location of accident?

_____ Time of accident/incident?

_____ Local meteorology?

_____ Other?

6. To whom was the information reported? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(a)]

How was the information transmitted?

When was the information transmitted?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. (continued)

Was the information transmitted accurate?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, discuss:

7. Was additional assistance requested? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(c)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, identify the assistance requested and to whom the request was directed.

8. If munitions were involved, were Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel notified? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(8), 7-1, 7-2.a., 7-3]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, complete the following:

Notification time?

Estimated time of arrival?

Actual arrival time?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Was a plan of action developed for containment and control of the chemical agent at the accident/incident site? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(8), 7-3.a.(5), 7-3.c.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Describe the plan of action briefly:

Notification – evaluate at location receiving information regarding the chemical accident/incident.

10. Which organization provided this location with initial notification of the accident/incident? [Pl. Guid. 8.4.1 (pt. 4-1 and 4-2); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

11. How was the information provided?
[Pl. Guid. 8.4.1 (pt. 4-3 and 4-7); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(a); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

12. At what time did this initial notification occur?
[Pl. Guid. 8.4.1 (pt. 4-1); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(a); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

Was this within the specified time frame (i.e., 5 to 10 minutes depending on the installation)?

[Pl. Guid. 8.4.1 (pt. 4-1)]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

13. Which organizations/individuals received this notification? When?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.4.1 (pt. 4-1); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(a); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

TIME

ORGANIZATIONS/INDIVIDUALS

14. What information was included in the notification (e.g., name of communicator, brief description of accident/incident)? (*Attach a hard copy of the notification*) [Pl. Guid. 6.2; CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(a); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

15. Did the information exchanged follow pre-agreed procedures?
 [Pl. Guid. 6.2, 8.4, 8.4.1 (pt. 4-4); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(a); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

16. Were there provisions for regular and specific updates from the installation to off-post officials? [Pl. Guid. 6.2.3]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe:

How often were updates made? (*Attach a copy of updates.*)

17. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

18. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 1.2: Alert and Mobilization of Emergency Personnel

Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize personnel for emergency response to a chemical accident/incident.

Intent

Because of the potentially fast pace of a chemical accident/incident, the ability to quickly alert, notify and mobilize personnel is critical. This is a two-step process: (1) alerting emergency personnel of the emergency and (2) mobilizing them. These two actions may occur simultaneously in a fast-breaking accident. Duty stations to which personnel may be mobilized during an exercise include fixed facilities (e.g., emergency operations centers), staging areas, and field assignment locations (e.g., traffic and access control points).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

All activities associated with this evaluation element are to be demonstrated using the equipment and procedures that would be used in an actual emergency and in accordance with the response organization's plan. Proper demonstration entails notifying and mobilizing personnel initially positioned at their normal non-emergency stations or off-duty locations. Pre-positioning of response personnel for an exercise must be approved by the appropriate Army or FEMA Exercise Co-Directors. Fully participating organizations are to notify all first shift emergency personnel. Partially participating organizations are to notify all participating personnel.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this evaluation element refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 8.2 and 8.4.1 and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Section 3-5.c.(1)(b).

Clarification of Terms

Alerting of Personnel:

Personnel are notified through transmission of a signal or message via telephone, radio, or other means of a possible chemical accident/incident that requires that they report or may have to report for emergency duty.

Fully participating organization:

Organization that will fully activate and mobilize all emergency response personnel as needed during the exercise.

Mobilize:

Messages have been transmitted to emergency personnel to inform them of an emergency situation and to direct them to report to their designated emergency response duty stations. Mobilization and alerting of personnel may occur simultaneously.

Partially

Organization that will activate and mobilize emergency

*participating
organization:*

response personnel during the exercise as specified in the extent of play agreement.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field/Forward Command Post
Decontamination Area(s)/Station(s)
Reception Center/Assembly Area
Medical Facility
Public Affairs Office
Traffic/Access Control Point(s)
Field Operations
Joint Information Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Warning Point(s)
Field/Forward Command Post
Decontamination Area(s)/Station(s)
Reception Center(s)
Congregate Care Center(s)
Medical Facility
Traffic/Access Control Point(s)
Field Operations
Joint Information Center

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 1.2: Alert and Mobilization of Emergency Personnel

Demonstrate the ability to alert and mobilize personnel for emergency response to a chemical accident/incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Did this location alert response personnel?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12, 2-13), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6); App. A (pt. A-5 and A-10); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

2. At what time did the alert and mobilization processes start and end at this location?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12 and 2-13), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

ALERT: Time Started: _____ Time Ended: _____

MOBILIZATION: Time Started: _____ Time Ended: _____

3. What methods were used to contact and alert staff at this location?

(Check methods used.) [Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12 and 2-13), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

_____ Telephone Calls

_____ Automatic Dialing System

_____ Pagers

_____ Other method (specify) _____

4. If telephone calls were made to staff, did the organization use a roster of personnel?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12 and 2-13), 8.4.1. (pt. 4-6); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Did this location mobilize emergency response personnel?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12 and 2-13), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

6. List, by position filled, all staff mobilized at this location, or attach a copy of the sign-in log with indications of positions filled.

[Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12 and 2-13), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

7. Were any emergency response personnel pre-positioned at this location?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2 (pt. 2-12 and 2-13), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, was this in accordance with the exercise extent of play agreement?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, which staff were pre-positioned and what was the impact?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

9. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 1.3: Facility Activation

Demonstrate the ability to activate and staff facilities promptly for emergency operations.

Intent

To conduct effective response operations, the timely activation of suitable operating facilities is a necessity. This evaluation element focuses on the process by which an on- or off-post facility is brought into an emergency mode of operations. The initial notification of personnel is covered under Evaluation Element 1.2 "Alert and Mobilization of Emergency Personnel".

This evaluation element is applicable to emergency operating/operations centers (EOCs) and other facilities such as field command posts at which emergency activities are carried out. It does not include Joint Information Centers, medical facilities or reception and congregate care centers, which are considered under Objective 9 (Public Affairs), Objective 12 (Medical Services-Medical Facilities) and Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration, and Congregate Care of the Public), respectively.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Under this evaluation element, responsible organizations are to demonstrate the timely activation of facilities so that mobilized personnel may begin operations as they would in an actual emergency. The organizations are to demonstrate that the equipment and displays at each EOC or other facility are ready for use when operations begin. Activities associated with this evaluation element should be carried out as specified in the plan unless deviation from the plan is provided for in the extent of play agreement.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this evaluation element, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 8.2.1, 8.4.1 and Appendix A, and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations* DA Pam. 50-6 1991, Section 3-5.c.

Clarification of Terms

Activation:

A process by which a facility is brought up to emergency mode from a normal mode of operation. Activation is complete when the facility is usable for emergency response operations.

<i>Facility:</i>	Any building, center, room, set of rooms or mobile unit(s) that are designated to support emergency response operations.
<i>Fully Operational Organization:</i>	An organization that has completed the mobilization process required by scenario events and the organization's emergency plans and procedures for specific duty stations.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Command Post
Forward Command Post

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Field Command Post

OBJECTIVE 2: HAZARD ASSESSMENT

Demonstrate the ability to assess the hazard from a chemical agent accident/incident.

Evaluation Element 2.1: Classification of Chemical Event Notification Levels

Demonstrate the ability to assess and classify a chemical accident/incident. The four levels used in a chemical accident/incident are Non-Surety Emergency, Limited Area Emergency, Post Only Emergency, and Community Emergency.

Intent

Hazard assessment is primarily an Army installation responsibility and involves determining the type and nature of a chemical accident/incident and its potential or actual impact. The classification system, as defined in *Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations* DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991 and *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, can improve communication and coordination in all parts of the response. Agreed-upon emergency condition levels allow the rapid implementation of a planned and structured response keyed to the status of the emergency and serve as a scale for protective action decisions.

Prompt, appropriate classification of a chemical accident/incident is critical because of the fast-acting and highly toxic nature of chemical weapons agent. The initial classification will be determined by installation personnel who must translate the available information on the accident/incident to chemical event notification levels. Once the installation makes the classification, it must communicate that information to local officials (addressed in Objective 1 (Initial Alert and Activation)) in an accurate, complete, and timely manner.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

This evaluation element will be demonstrated using the equipment and procedures that would be used in an actual emergency in accordance with the organizations' plans and procedures.

Exercise of this evaluation element is compatible with any emergency scenario that becomes a chemical accident/incident.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background of this objective, refer to the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Non-Surety Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that may be perceived as a chemical surety emergency or that may be of general public interest, but which pose no chemical surety hazard. This includes non-surety material emergencies.
<i>Limited Area Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release outside engineering controls or approved chemical storage facilities with chemical effects expected to be confined to the chemical limited area. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit does not extend beyond the chemical limited area where the event occurred.
<i>Post Only Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release with chemical effects beyond the chemical limited area. Releases are not expected to present a danger to the off-post public. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit extends beyond the chemical limited area but does not extend beyond the installation boundary.
<i>Community Emergency</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release with chemical effects beyond the installation boundary. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit extends beyond the installation boundary.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Command Post

OFF-POST

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 2.1: Classification of Chemical Event Notification Levels

Demonstrate the ability to assess and classify a chemical accident/incident. The four levels used in a chemical accident/incident are Non-Surety Emergency, Limited Area Emergency, Post Only Emergency, and Community Emergency.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Check and briefly describe the information included in the initial report from the field. [CAIRA 3, 3-5.c.(3)(a)] *(Note to evaluator: obtain and attach a copy of the EOC's initial report.)*

_____ Location of event? _____
 _____ Time event occurred? _____
 _____ Person making call? _____
 _____ Time of call? _____
 _____ Number of injured? _____
 _____ Description of event? _____
 _____ Type, quantity of munition, agent involved? _____
 _____ Other: _____

2. Did the installation make an initial hazard projection following receipt of initial data from the accident site? [CAIRA 3-5.c.3.(b), Table 3-2]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the method(s) used to make the hazard projection:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Did this location have to contact the accident site for more information in order to make the initial emergency classification? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the information requested and provided:

4. Was the accident/incident classified using the chemical event notification levels, i.e., Non-Surety Emergency, Limited Area Emergency, Post Only Emergency, Community Emergency? [CAIRA 3-4.b.(2), Table 3-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, who made the classification?

5. At what time were the chemical event notification levels determined? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)]

	TIME	CHEMICAL EVENT CLASSIFICATION
INITIAL		
SUBSEQUENT	_____	_____
SUBSEQUENT	_____	_____
SUBSEQUENT	_____	_____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. (continued)

At what time were the off-post jurisdictions notified by the chemical event notification level?

CENL	TIME	LOCATIONS NOTIFIED (List all that apply)
Non-Surety Emergency	_____	_____
Limited Area Emergency	_____	_____
Post Only Emergency	_____	_____
Community Emergency	_____	_____

6. Did the installation determine the appropriate chemical event notification levels?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O

If NO, describe problems that occurred in classifying the level in your evaluation worksheets.

7. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 1.3: Facility Activation

Demonstrate the ability to activate and staff facilities promptly for emergency operations.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. At what chemical event notification level was activation of this facility initiated?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-7), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6), App. A (pt. A-10.a., b.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-8]

2. At what time did the activation of the facility begin and end?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-6), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6), App. A (pt. A-10.a., b.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-8]

Begin _____ End _____

Describe the actions taken to activate this facility:

[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-7), App. A (pt. A-10.a., b.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-8]

3. Were there any delays in activating this facility?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-6), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6), App. A (pt. A-10.a., b.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-8]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

If YES, explain the reason for the delay, if known.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. At what time was this facility declared fully operational?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-7), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6), App. A (pt. A-10.a., b.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-8]

Time _____

Chemical Event Notification Level _____

5. Were there sufficient staff to effectively carry out necessary emergency response activities at this facility? [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-6), 8.4.1 (pt. 4-6), App. A (pt. A-2, A-4, A-5, A-9, A-10); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-8]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

If NO, describe any staffing problems and their effect on the emergency response.

6. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES _____ NO _____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 2: HAZARD ASSESSMENT

Demonstrate the ability to assess the hazard from a chemical agent accident/incident.

Evaluation Element 2.1: Classification of Chemical Event Notification Levels

Demonstrate the ability to assess and classify a chemical accident/incident. The four levels used in a chemical accident/incident are Non-Surety Emergency, Limited Area Emergency, Post Only Emergency, and Community Emergency.

Intent

Hazard assessment is primarily an Army installation responsibility and involves determining the type and nature of a chemical accident/incident and its potential or actual impact. The classification system, as defined in *Chemical Accident/Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations* DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991 and *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, can improve communication and coordination in all parts of the response. Agreed-upon emergency condition levels allow the rapid implementation of a planned and structured response keyed to the status of the emergency and serve as a scale for protective action decisions.

Prompt, appropriate classification of a chemical accident/incident is critical because of the fast-acting and highly toxic nature of chemical weapons agent. The initial classification will be determined by installation personnel who must translate the available information on the accident/incident to chemical event notification levels. Once the installation makes the classification, it must communicate that information to local officials (addressed in Objective 1 (Initial Alert and Activation)) in an accurate, complete, and timely manner.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

This evaluation element will be demonstrated using the equipment and procedures that would be used in an actual emergency in accordance with the organizations' plans and procedures.

Exercise of this evaluation element is compatible with any emergency scenario that becomes a chemical accident/incident.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background of this objective, refer to the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Non-Surety Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that may be perceived as a chemical surety emergency or that may be of general public interest, but which pose no chemical surety hazard. This includes non-surety material emergencies.
<i>Limited Area Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release outside engineering controls or approved chemical storage facilities with chemical effects expected to be confined to the chemical limited area. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit does not extend beyond the chemical limited area where the event occurred.
<i>Post Only Emergency:</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release with chemical effects beyond the chemical limited area. Releases are not expected to present a danger to the off-post public. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit extends beyond the chemical limited area but does not extend beyond the installation boundary.
<i>Community Emergency</i>	Events are likely to occur or have occurred that involve agent release with chemical effects beyond the installation boundary. This level will be declared when the area within the predicted chemical agent no-effects dosage limit extends beyond the installation boundary.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Command Post

OFF-POST

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 2.1: Classification of Chemical Event Notification Levels

Demonstrate the ability to assess and classify a chemical accident/incident. The four levels used in a chemical accident/incident are Non-Surety Emergency, Limited Area Emergency, Post Only Emergency, and Community Emergency.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Check and briefly describe the information included in the initial report from the field. [CAIRA 3, 3-5.c.(3)(a)] *(Note to evaluator: obtain and attach a copy of the EOC's initial report.)*

_____ Location of event? _____
 _____ Time event occurred? _____
 _____ Person making call? _____
 _____ Time of call? _____
 _____ Number of injured? _____
 _____ Description of event? _____
 _____ Type, quantity of munition, agent involved? _____
 _____ Other: _____

2. Did the installation make an initial hazard projection following receipt of initial data from the accident site? [CAIRA 3-5.c.3.(b), Table 3-2]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the method(s) used to make the hazard projection:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Did this location have to contact the accident site for more information in order to make the initial emergency classification? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O

If YES, describe the information requested and provided:

4. Was the accident/incident classified using the chemical event notification levels, i.e., Non-Surety Emergency, Limited Area Emergency, Post Only Emergency, Community Emergency? [CAIRA 3-4.b.(2), Table 3-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, who made the classification?

5. At what time were the chemical event notification levels determined? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)]

	TIME	CHEMICAL EVENT CLASSIFICATION
INITIAL		
SUBSEQUENT	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUBSEQUENT	<hr/>	<hr/>
SUBSEQUENT	<hr/>	<hr/>

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. (continued)

At what time were the off-post jurisdictions notified by the chemical event notification level?

CENL	TIME	LOCATIONS NOTIFIED (List all that apply)
Non-Surety Emergency	_____	_____
Limited Area Emergency	_____	_____
Post Only Emergency	_____	_____
Community Emergency	_____	_____

6. Did the installation determine the appropriate chemical event notification levels?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O

If NO, describe problems that occurred in classifying the level in your evaluation worksheets.

7. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 2.2: Agent Detection, Monitoring, and Sampling

Demonstrate the availability and correct use of appropriate equipment, sampling protocols, and field and laboratory procedures for determining the presence and concentrations of chemical agents in or on all relevant media, including environmental media and equipment.

Intent

Agent detection and monitoring after a chemical accident/incident are important aspects of the response. The Army will conduct agent detection and monitoring on-post; off-post activities may be expected to be largely an extension of on-post activities. It will be necessary to detect the agent on equipment and other materials, take environmental samples in the areas of possible contamination, and analyze them. Army protocols for monitoring, laboratory analysis, and record-keeping are generally described in the CAIRA plans. If not handled properly, these samples (depending on agent type and concentration) could act as sources of contamination in transport vehicles, testing laboratories, etc. Laboratories to be used must be certified to accept that type of agent-contaminated sample.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element will be done on-post and off-post by using the equipment that would be used in an actual emergency. Sampling techniques will be demonstrated for environmental monitoring. State and/or local personnel may accompany Army sampling and monitoring teams under the condition that they are properly trained, qualified, and equipped. Demonstration of the monitoring, sampling, and analysis of the samples will be performed as specified in the extent of play agreement. All the procedures are to be carried out in accordance with the organizations' plans.

This evaluation element is compatible with any scenario in which there is a release of chemical agent.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background of this objective, refer to the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991 and CSEPP Policy Paper Number 2.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Detection:</i>	Discovery of the presence of a chemical agent.
<i>Monitoring:</i>	Checking for the presence and levels of the chemical agent.
<i>Sampling:</i>	Taking actual physical samples of materials, such as air or soil, to be analyzed for chemical agents.

When Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Decontamination
Reception Center
Congregate Care Center
Medical Facilities
Field Activities
Laboratories

OFF-POST¹

Decontamination
Reception Center
Congregate Care Center
Medical Facilities
Field Activities

¹ In accordance with CSEPP Policy Paper Number 2, off-post monitoring will be done by the Army. State and/or local personnel may accompany Army sampling and monitoring teams under the condition that they are properly trained, qualified and equipped.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 2.2: Agent Detection, Monitoring, and Sampling

Demonstrate the availability and correct use of appropriate equipment, sampling protocols, and field and laboratory procedures for determining the presence and concentrations of chemical agents in or on all relevant media, including environmental media and equipment.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. What organization(s) performed agent detection and monitoring?
[CAIRA 3-5.c(3)(a)]

2. Was the monitoring/sampling team briefed on the chemical accident/incident?
[CAIRA 11]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O

If YES, describe briefing:

3. Describe the coordination between the post and off-post officials that was established for off-post sampling to be performed by Army personnel. [CAIRA 11-3.b.(2), H-4.b; CSEPP PP#2]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Did the monitoring team have an equipment inventory list? [CAIRA 11-3.a.(2)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the equipment inventoried prior to departure and were missing or defective items replaced?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, list any missing items and the effect on operations:

Were the monitoring instruments calibrated and given appropriate preoperational checks? [CAIRA 11-3.a.(2)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe any problems:

5. Did the monitoring/sampling team have a map showing monitoring/sampling points? [CAIRA 11-2.d]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, why not? (*Explain*)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. (continued)

Did the monitoring/sampling teams note the time and location of their measurements?
[CAIRA 11-3.a.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

6. Were field samples appropriately bagged and labeled? [CAIRA 11-3.b.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

What measures were taken to prevent the samples or sampling activities from
contaminating other locations and facilities?

How are the monitoring records accumulated and who collects and maintains these
records? [CAIRA 11-3.b.(1)]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. What procedures were carried out for the following samples: [CAIRA 13-6, Appendix N]

Air _____

Water _____

Soil _____

If none were carried out explain why:

8. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

9. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 2.3: Continuing Chemical Event Hazard Assessment

Demonstrate the ability to project the hazards within the Immediate Response Zone (IRZ) and the Protective Action Zone (PAZ) over a period of time from a chemical accident/incident.

Intent

The installation has the responsibility and the capability to make assessments of the hazards to the public from the vapor or aerosol and/or surface contamination from a chemical accident/incident. These assessments provide the basis for the installation's protective action recommendations and the civilian authorities' protective action decisions. Hazard assessment is a continuous process; assessments are continually updated and revised as more information about the event becomes available.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The installation will demonstrate this evaluation element using the equipment and procedures called for in the organization's plans and procedures. Demonstration of the assessment of the hazards posed by a chemical agent accident/incident should present the strategies that the response organization would use to assess hazards, and in particular should include both theoretical estimates based on dose projection and field measurements. Demonstration activities should include the acquisition of initial information about the accident. The hazard assessment group should demonstrate risk assessment based on the appropriate computer modeling, using appropriate input data from the accident. Demonstration should include the dispatch of field monitoring teams with appropriate monitoring and sampling equipment, and also suitable protective gear. Monitoring and sampling should include air sampling, water sampling, soil sampling and wipe samples. The affected areas where contamination is potentially present should be clearly identified and subsequently provision made for securing these areas. Field monitoring results should be communicated to the hazard assessment group. Samples should be sent to the appropriate surety laboratories for analysis, and the results reported back to the hazard analysis group. Results of the hazard analysis should be communicated and updated in a timely manner to appropriate staff so as to provide an accurate informational basis for developing protective actions for responders and the general public. If the surrounding communities or state governments have developed assessment capabilities, they also would demonstrate this evaluation element for extended or long-term assessments, as indicated in the extent of play agreement.

Scenarios which involve potential or actual release of a chemical agent off-post are appropriate for demonstrating this evaluation element.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background of this objective, refer to the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991.

Clarification of Terms

*Ingestion Hazard
Projections:*

Projections of hazard to the public from ingesting chemical agents released as the result of a chemical event in the absence of protective actions which occur over a period of time.

*Vapor or Aerosol
Hazard
Projections:*

Projections of hazard to the public from exposure to the vapor or aerosol from a chemical event in the absence of protective actions, which occur over a period of time.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 2.3: Continuing Chemical Event Hazard Assessment

Demonstrate the ability to project the hazards within the Immediate Response Zone (IRZ) and the Protective Action Zone (PAZ) over a period of time from a chemical accident/incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. What information was received from the accident site? (*Note all that apply.*)
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11-4.a.]

	DESCRIPTION	VERIFIED?
Location of the accident?	_____	_____
Type of agent/munition	_____	_____
Weather data?	_____	_____
Source strength/release quantity?	_____	_____
Other	_____	_____

Describe problems, if any:

2. Was this location provided with appropriate information to make hazard projections?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11-4.a]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O

If NO, what additional information did it require?

Source of this information? _____

Time requested: _____ Time information received: _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

2. (continued)

How did any delay in receiving additional information affect decision making and response?

3. How was the chemical event hazard assessment performed? *(Check all that apply.)*
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b)]

- _____ Monitoring data compared with projections?
- _____ Model predictions used to direct monitoring teams?
- _____ Dimensions of the affected area confirmed by field monitoring?
- _____ Extent of liquid contamination determined?
- _____ Laboratory data used?
- _____ Changes in meteorological conditions factored into hazard projections?

Explain, if necessary.

4. Which program(s) were used in making hazard projections? *(Check all that apply.)*
[Pl.Guid. 8.4.1, 4-5; CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b)]

_____ D2PC _____ Pardos Other: _____

Was there a backup system?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

How long did it take to make hazard projections? _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Was the projected hazard plotted, displayed and updated at this location?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b)]

Plotted? YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____
 Displayed? YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____
 Updated? YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO to any of the above, describe why not:

6. Were assessment updates provided to this location/function? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11-3.a.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were they timely?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe the delays and the results of the delay:

7. Did the hazard assessment team make protective action recommendations to decision makers? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. (continued)

If YES, indicate the time at which each PAR was made, to whom it was made, and the protective action recommendation made:

TIME	RECIPIENT	PAR
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

8. Did the field monitoring teams function as directed? [CAIRA 11-3.a.(3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, please describe:

9. Were monitoring/sampling field teams dispatched based upon the organization's initial and subsequent hazard projections? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, at what time and to what locations were they sent?

TIME	LOCATION
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. (continued)

If NO, what was the basis for their dispatch? [CAIRA 11-3.a.(3)]

10. Were field teams directed to conduct monitoring or air sampling to determine the presence of chemical agent in air? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 13-6.a.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, what instrumentation or equipment and monitoring methods were used for the detection of chemical agent in air?

What results were obtained and communicated to the hazard assessment group for the presence and concentration of airborne chemical agent, and at what locations?

Was the extent of the plume of agent-contaminated air defined by air monitoring, so that monitoring data was available to the hazard assessment group regarding the boundaries of the plume?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, when were the first data received by the hazard assessment group? _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

10. (continued)

Were the lateral edges of the plume determined?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the leading edge located?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the trailing edge located?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

11. Were field teams directed to conduct sampling to determine the presence of liquid deposition of chemical agent? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11-2, 13-6.a.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were areas of liquid deposition identified?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were their boundaries determined?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

12. Were field monitoring/sampling teams directed to conduct sampling for chemical agent contamination of media other than air or liquid deposition? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11-2, 13-6.a.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, what media were sampled?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

13. In conclusion, was it possible for the hazard assessment group to determine the plume footprint location on the basis of field monitoring data?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, please describe problems with locating the plume based on field monitoring data:

14. Were samples directed to be dispatched to a laboratory for analysis?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(3)(b), 11-2, 13-6.b.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, identify the type(s) of samples that were sent and the laboratories to which they were conveyed for analysis:

15. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

16. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

OBJECTIVE 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISION MAKING

Demonstrate the ability to determine appropriate protective action recommendations (PARs) and make appropriate protective action decisions (PADs) in a chemical accident/incident.

Evaluation Element 3.1: Recommendation of Appropriate Protective Actions

Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate and timely protective action recommendations.

Intent

Protective actions are emergency measures intended to avoid or reduce exposure to chemical agents during and after a chemical accident/incident. A protective action generally includes two items of information: the action to be taken, and the area or population group to which it applies. Generally, the available options are to evacuate or to take shelter (shelter-in-place). Sheltering may involve simply seeking the best available shelter under the circumstances, or, depending on preplanning, available equipment and time, may involve other measures. Expedient measures may be taken to improve the airtightness of the available shelter, such as taping doors and windows. Alternatively, it may be possible to seek shelter in a predesignated location that has already been improved, either by conventional weatherization techniques or installation of a filtered-air pressurization system.

The area to which a protective action applies generally will include some or all of the Immediate Response Zone (IRZ) and/or the Protective Action Zone (PAZ). In some cases a protective action may be applied to only the downwind parts of these zones. In some cases, different actions (evacuation vs. shelter) may be appropriate for different areas or different segments of the population.

The protective action process generally begins with receipt of information, or observation of conditions, indicating that protective actions are (or may become) necessary. This information is then evaluated to select an appropriate protective action. Selection of protective actions may take into account the type of chemical agent involved, the quantity of chemical agent released, projected or actual exposure, meteorological conditions, the time of the release, population concentrations, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors. A protective action recommendation is then forwarded to one or more responsible officials, who make the final decision. Once a protective action decision has been made, it is implemented via public notification and other measures.

This Evaluation Element, "Recommendation of Appropriate Protective Actions", focuses on the process of determining appropriate protective actions to recommend to decision makers. The other element under this objective, "Protective Action Decision Making", focuses on the decision process itself. Implementation of protective actions is covered under other objectives, including Objective 5 (Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information), Objective 7 (Protective Action Implementation), and Objective 8 (Traffic and Access Control).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element, including what organizations perform which of the functions described above, will depend on the installation and local plans, the exercise scenario, and the extent of play agreement. The Army generally is responsible for determining protective actions to be taken on-post, while local public officials are responsible for deciding what protective actions should be taken off-post. The logical flow of events, then, would be for the Army to decide on protective actions on-post, and to furnish a recommendation on off-post protective actions to local officials. However, in most accident/incident scenarios, initial protective action decisions must be made very rapidly to be most effective. Because of this time pressure, the plans may call for initial off-post protective actions to be predetermined or selected by the Army to save time.

For example, initial protective actions may be based on the installation's daily operational report. Each day, prior to initiation of daily operations, the installation provides a report to the off-post jurisdictions on the planned operations, including a default PAR based on expected weather conditions and the maximum credible event (MCE) associated with the planned operations. The installation and the off-post jurisdictions may have a standing agreement that the off-post jurisdiction will implement this default PAR immediately upon notification of a chemical accident/incident.

Alternatively, off-post jurisdictions may have a Memorandum of Agreement with the Army to delegate initial protective action decision making to the installation, so that a designated on-post official (e.g., the Post Commander) will make initial protective action decisions for off-post communities as well as the installation, and the off-post communities will simply implement them.

In some circumstances there may be more time available for determining appropriate protective actions. That may be the case, for example, if the initiating event evolves slowly. Alternatively, there may be a quick initial set of protective actions, but then as conditions change (e.g., a wind shift occurs, or is anticipated as a result of weather patterns) a subsequent set of protective actions emerges, with more time for consideration and discussion of options. The recommendation and decision process for the subsequent protective actions thus may differ from the process that produced the initial protective actions.

This evaluation element will be demonstrated by responsible organizations using the equipment, plans and procedures which would be employed under actual emergency situations. Any scenario involving potential release of chemical agent is applicable. In order to ensure being at the right place at the right time, the evaluator will have to anticipate, based on the plans, scenario, and extent of play agreement, how protective action recommendations will be developed and to whom they are forwarded for final decisions.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background of this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.5 and Appendix D (September 1993), and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, particularly section 3.5.c.(5).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Evacuation:</i>	A protective action that involves leaving an area of risk until the area is safe for return.
<i>Population at Risk:</i>	The population potentially affected by concentrations of chemical agent. The population at risk is calculated by determining the population within the radial distance estimated to be affected by agent from a release.
<i>Protective Action:</i>	An action or measure taken to avoid or reduce exposure to a hazard.
<i>Protective Action Decision Making:</i>	The process of selecting one or more actions to protect a population at risk.
<i>Protective Action Recommendation (PAR):</i>	A recommendation provided to decision maker(s) regarding those actions that should be implemented in order to protect a population at risk.
<i>Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ):</i>	
<i>Immediate Response Zone (IRZ):</i>	The planning zone immediately surrounding each Army installation. Generally it extends to about 10 km (6 miles) from the installation's chemical storage area. At some installations, it extends to about 15 km (9 miles).
<i>Protective Action Zone (PAZ):</i>	The second planning zone beyond the immediate response zone. Generally it extends to about 21 miles from the installation's chemical storage area, and at some installations it extends further.
<i>Precautionary Zone (PZ):</i>	The outermost zone extending beyond the protective action zone. Theoretically it has no limits. Practically, its furthest point is the beyond which emergency planning for the CSEPP would not be required under most conditions.
<i>Sheltering (Shelter-in-Place):</i>	
<i>Normal Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that involves taking cover in a building, closing all doors and windows, and turning off ventilation systems. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Expedient Shelter-in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that, after going into the room selected as a shelter, the inhabitants take measures to reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent enters the room. Such measures would include taping around doors and windows and covering vents and electrical outlets. Effectiveness is improved by using an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Enhanced Shelter-in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that it involves taking shelter in a structure to which weatherization techniques have been applied before the emergency to permanently reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent seeps into it. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Pressurized Shelter- in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that the infiltration of contaminated air from outside the shelter is effectively prohibited by drawing outside air into the shelter through a filter that removes chemical agent. This filtered air creates a positive pressure in the shelter so that clean air is leaking out instead of contaminated air leaking in.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 3.1: Recommendation of Appropriate Protective Actions

Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate and timely protective action recommendations.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Were protective action recommendations (PARs) developed at this location?
[Pl. Guid. 8.5. App. D. pt. D-1.b; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

If YES, answer questions 2-10.

2. Who developed the PARs? [Pl. Guid. 8.5., App. D. D-1.b.; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5); CPG 1-8A p A-22]

3. To whom were the PARs provided? (*Identify official(s) by title.*)
[Pl. Guid. 8.5., App. D. pt. D-1.b.; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

4. What was the **initial** PAR, when was it made, and at what CENL?
[Pl. Guid. 8.5, App. D. pt. D-1.b.; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

TIME	CENL	RECOMMENDATION
_____	_____	_____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. How was the **initial** PAR chosen? [Pl. Guid. 8.5., App. D. pt. D-1.b.; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

- _____ Automatic.
- _____ Based on analysis by technical staff.
- _____ Other.

Explain what it was based on: (initial field report, CENL, guideline in plan, etc.)

6. Were the following factors considered in determining whether to update the initial PARs (or in developing the initial PARs, if not automatic)? (*Check all that apply*)
[Pl. Guid. 8.5., App. D. pt. D-1.b.; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

- _____ Projected exposure from computer models.
- _____ Field measurements.
- _____ Protective Action Guides in the plan.
- _____ Shelter availability.
- _____ Evacuation time estimates.
- _____ Relative exposure savings between evacuation and sheltering.
- _____ Other (*specify:*) _____

7. Was the initial protective action recommendation made in a reasonable amount of time and/or within the time frame specified in the plan?
[Pl. Guid. 8.5., App. D. pt. D-1.b.; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. What **subsequent** PARs were made (if any), when, and at what CENL?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.5., App. D. pt. D-1.b; CAIRA 3-5.c.(5)]

TIME	CENL	RECOMMENDATION
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

9. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

10. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 3.2: Protective Action Decision Making

Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate and timely protective action decisions.

Intent

Protective actions are emergency measures intended to avoid or reduce exposure to chemical agents during and after a chemical accident/incident. A protective action generally includes two items of information: the action to be taken, and the area or population group to which it applies. Generally, the available options are to evacuate or to take shelter (shelter-in-place). Sheltering may involve simply seeking the best available shelter under the circumstances, or depending on preplanning, available equipment and time, may involve other measures. Expedient measures may be taken to improve the airtightness of the available shelter, such as taping doors and windows. Alternatively, it may be possible to seek shelter in a predesignated location that has already been improved, either by conventional weatherization techniques or installation of a filtered-air pressurization system.

The area to which a protective action applies generally will include some or all of the Immediate Response Zone (IRZ) and/or the Protective Action Zone (PAZ). In some cases a protective action may be applied to only the downwind parts of these zones. In some cases, different actions (evacuation vs. shelter) may be appropriate for different areas or for different segments of the population.

The protective action process generally begins with receipt of information, or observation of conditions, indicating that protective actions are (or may become) necessary. This information is then evaluated to select an appropriate protective action. Selection of protective actions may take into account the type of chemical agent involved, the quantity of chemical agent released, projected or actual exposure, meteorological conditions, the time of the release, population concentrations, availability of adequate shelter, evacuation time estimates, and other relevant factors. A protective action recommendation is then forwarded to one or more responsible officials, who make the final decision. Once a protective action decision has been made, it is implemented via public notification and other measures.

This Evaluation Element, "Protective Action Decision Making", focuses on the decision to adopt particular protective actions. The other element under this objective "Recommendation of Appropriate Protective Actions", focuses on the process of determining appropriate protective actions to recommend to decision makers. Implementation of protective actions is covered under other objectives, including Objective 5 (Public Notification, Instructions, and Emergency Information), Objective 7 (Protective Action Implementation), and Objective 8 (Traffic and Access Control).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element, including what organizations perform which of the functions described above, will depend on the installation and local plans, the exercise scenario, and the extent of play agreement. The Army is generally responsible for determining protective actions to be taken on-post, while local public officials are responsible for deciding what protective actions should be taken off-post. The logical flow of events, then, would be for the Army to decide on protective actions on-post, and to furnish a recommendation on off-post protective actions to local officials. However, in most accident/incident scenarios, initial protective action decisions must be made very rapidly to be most effective. Because of this time pressure, some or all of the process of determining initial protective actions may be automated, or delegated to another organization that can react more quickly.

For example, initial protective actions may be based on the installation's daily operational report. Each day, prior to initiation of daily operations, the installation provides a report to the off-post jurisdictions on the planned operations, including a default PAR based on expected weather conditions and the maximum credible event (MCE) associated with the planned operations. The installation and the off-post jurisdictions may have a standing agreement that the off-post jurisdiction will implement this default PAR immediately upon notification of a chemical accident/incident.

Alternatively, off-post jurisdictions may have a Memorandum of Agreement with the Army to delegate initial protective action decision making to the installation, so that a designated on-post official (e.g., the Post Commander) will make initial protective action decisions for off-post communities as well as the installation, and the off-post communities will simply implement them.

In some circumstances there may be more time available for determining appropriate protective actions. That may be the case, for example, if the initiating event evolves slowly. Alternatively, there may be a quick initial set of protective actions, but then as conditions change (e.g., a wind shift occurs, or is anticipated as a result of weather patterns) a subsequent set of protective actions emerges, with more time for consideration and discussion of options. The recommendation and decision process for the subsequent protective actions thus may differ from the process that produced the initial protective actions.

This evaluation element will be demonstrated by responsible organizations using the equipment, plans and procedures which would be employed under actual emergency situations. Any scenario involving potential release of chemical agent is applicable. In order to ensure being at the right place at the right time, the evaluator will have to determine, based on the plans, scenario, and extent of play agreement, where protective action decisions will be made, and by whom.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background of this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.5 and Appendix D (September 1993), and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, particularly section 3.5.c.(5).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Evacuation:</i>	A protective action that involves leaving an area of risk until the area is safe for return.
<i>Population at Risk:</i>	The population potentially affected by concentrations of chemical agent. The population at risk is calculated by determining the population within the radial distance estimated to be affected by agent from a release.
<i>Protective Action:</i>	An action or measure taken to avoid or reduce exposure to a hazard.
<i>Protective Action Decision Making:</i>	The process of selecting one or more actions to protect a population at risk.
<i>Protective Action Recommendation (PAR):</i>	A recommendation provided to decision maker(s) regarding those actions that should be implemented in order to protect a population at risk.
<i>Emergency Planning Zones (EPZ):</i>	
<i>Immediate Response Zone (IRZ):</i>	The planning zone immediately surrounding each Army installation. Generally it extends to about 10 km (6 miles) from the installation's chemical storage area. At some installations, it extends to about 15 km (9 miles).
<i>Protective Action Zone (PAZ):</i>	The second planning zone beyond the immediate response zone. Generally it extends to about 21 miles from the installation's chemical storage area, and at some installations it extends further.
<i>Precautionary Zone (PZ):</i>	The outermost zone extending beyond the protective action zone. Theoretically it has no limits. Practically, its furthest point is the beyond which emergency planning for the CSEPP would not be required under most conditions.
<i>Sheltering (Shelter-in-Place):</i>	
<i>Normal Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that involves taking cover in a building, closing all doors and windows, and turning off ventilation systems. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Expedient Shelter-in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that, after going into the room selected as a shelter, the inhabitants take measures to reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent enters the room. Such measures would include taping around doors and windows and covering vents and electrical outlets. Effectiveness is improved by using an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Enhanced Shelter-in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that it involves taking shelter in a structure to which weatherization techniques have been applied before the emergency to permanently reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent seeps into it. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Pressurized Shelter- in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that the infiltration of contaminated air from outside the shelter is effectively prohibited by drawing outside air into the shelter through a filter that removes chemical agent. This filtered air creates a positive pressure in the shelter so that clean air is leaking out instead of contaminated air leaking in.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations or demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 3.2: Protective Action Decision Making

Demonstrate the ability to make appropriate and timely protective action decisions.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Identify the individuals by title at your assigned location who made protective action decisions or who were consulted in making such decisions.
[Pl. Guid. 8.5, App. D., CAIRA 3-5.c(5), CPG 1-8A p. A-22]

Individuals who made protective action decisions:

Individuals (by title and organization) consulted:

2. What protective action decisions were made and when were they made? (*Include all decisions, initial and subsequent.*) [Pl. Guid. 8.5, App. D.; CAIRA 3-5.c(5)]

TIME	CENL	DECISION
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

3. Were these decisions "automatically made", i.e., pre-approved according to plans and MOUs, or were they made by the decision makers at this location based on protective action recommendations?
[Pl. Guid. 8.5, Appendix D p. D-4 para. 5, pg.D-5 para.1 pt. D-4; CAIRA 3-5.c(5); NRT-1 C.4]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Was a time constraint for protective action decision making specified in the plan?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were the initial protective action decisions made within the time constraints specified in the plan?

[Pl. Guid. 8.5, App. D. pt. D-4.a(3); CAIRA 3-5.c(5)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, why not?

5. Which of the following factors were considered (as appropriate) in making protective action decisions? (*Check those considered.*) [Pl. Guid. 8.5, App. D. pt. D-4; CAIRA 3-5.c(5)]

_____ Projected exposure from computer models.

_____ Exposure from actual field measurements.

_____ P. A. guides adopted in the organization's plan.

_____ Shelter availability.

_____ Evacuation time estimates.

_____ Relative exposure savings between evacuation and sheltering.

_____ Other (*specify:*) _____

Assess the significance of any factors that were not considered.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. Did the decision makers at this location coordinate with other jurisdictions involved in the preparation of protective action decisions?

[Pl. Guid. 8.5, Appendix D pg.D-5 para.2; CAIRA 3-5.c(5)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the coordination process and identify the organizations with which the decision makers at this location coordinated.

7. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

8. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 4: COMMAND AND CONTROL¹

Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency activities, including requesting supplementary assistance.

Evaluation Element 4.1: Command and Control

Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency response activities.

Intent

An effective response to a chemical accident/incident depends on the cooperative and coordinated efforts of the involved on-post and off-post response organizations that are implementing their CSEPP response plans. The response to a chemical accident/incident at a fixed installation will involve the Army's Initial Response Force (IRF) and the activation of emergency operations centers (EOCs) on-post and off-post.

A chemical accident/incident falls under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army. The initial On-Scene Coordinator (OSC) is the Commander of the IRF. Under the direction of the installation commander, the IRF is composed of command and control elements and emergency teams capable of providing emergency medical services and initiating those actions necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate hazards to public health and safety or to the environment. If additional resources are needed and the Service Response Force (SRF) is activated, the Commander of the SRF assumes the duties of the OSC. The installation commander retains a role within the SRF as it joins with the IRF.

The organizational level of government that establishes and operates an off-post EOC will vary from location to location. The off-post EOC staffing usually includes elected officials, as well as emergency management director/coordinators, representatives from governmental agencies and the private sector, and volunteer and support groups. The off-post response may utilize the Incident Command System.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element will focus on the individual(s) (e.g., EOC director/coordinator, OSC, Incident Commander) in charge of the emergency response operation at the location being evaluated, and will also include evaluation of the coordination of the on-post and off-post information flow and decision making. Other demonstrated factors under this evaluation element include (1) clear chains of command, (2) responsible delegation of authority and decision making (particularly protective action decision making), and (3) knowledge and management of available information, personnel, and resources. This evaluation element will be demonstrated as it would be implemented under actual emergency conditions and in accordance with the organization's plans and procedures.

¹

Command and control should be considered synonymous with direction and control.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.2.1 and Appendix A and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, particularly section 3-5.b. and c.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Command and Control:</i>	Management of emergency functions through leadership and use of authority (synonymous with Direction and Control).
<i>Coordination:</i>	Active involvement of staff and response agencies in decision making to integrate available resources and implement the CSEPP response plan.
<i>Incident Command System:</i>	A system of command, which may be used in the off-post communities, that provides for the effective and efficient management of personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications during a response. It may require an incident command post close to the operational scene which must remain in constant coordination with the local EOC, where overall disaster or emergency management decisions are made.
<i>Initial response Force (IRF):</i>	An emergency actions organization tasked to provide first response to a CAI at an installation assigned a chemical surety mission. Under the command of the installation commander, the IRF is composed of command and control elements and emergency teams capable of providing emergency medical service and initiating those actions necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate hazards to public health and safety or to the environment. Depending on the severity of the CAI, the IRF is capable of initiating environmental restoration activities for completion under the installation restoration program.
<i>On-Scene Coordinator:</i>	The federal official designated under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to coordinate and direct federal response forces and removals of hazardous materials. For Department of the Army facilities, the Initial Response Force Commander is the initial OSC; appointment of a Service Response Force Commander/On-Scene Coordinator (SRFC/OSC) may subsequently occur.

*Service Response Force
(SRF):*

A DA-level emergency response organization, commanded by a general officer, capable of performing and sustaining the CAIRA mission. The SRF is composed of the IRF and follow-on forces consisting of a staff and specialized teams from various agencies and organizations involved in the response to and recovery from a CAI.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Command Post

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 4.1: Command and Control

Demonstrate the ability to direct, coordinate, and control emergency response activities.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Who was in charge of the emergency response at your location?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-6), App. A. (pt. A-1.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(a) and (b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-7]

Title: _____

Organization: _____

2. Check the actions/functions this individual performed.
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-8, 2-9, 2-10, 2-12, and 2-15), App. A (pt. A-2.a.-c.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(a) and (b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-7]

_____ Issued instructions to staff.

_____ Provided leadership in decision making.

_____ Involved staff in decision making.

_____ Authorized implementation of protective actions.

_____ Directed coordination with other jurisdictions.

_____ Other (*Describe*)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Did the individual in charge (or his/her designee) demonstrate these activities to the extent that the organization could carry out its essential functions?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-6), App.A (pt. A-1.a.-c.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(a) and (b); CPG 1-8, 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-7]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, please describe the problems observed:

4. At this location describe the activities of, or relationship with, the OSC.
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-15), CAIRA 3-5.b.(2)]

5. At this location, who was the point-of-contact for the OSC?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-15), CAIRA 3-5.b.(2)]

6. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 4.2: Supplementary Assistance

Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for external assistance and to request it from federal agencies or other support organizations.

Intent

The resources needed for day-to-day emergency operations can fall short of those needed during a major emergency. Off-post emergency demands, as well as demands on other components of the jurisdiction, may exceed local capabilities. A CAI has special response and resource requirements not normally associated with natural disasters or most other hazardous materials accidents. For this reason, planning for resource coordination and allocation and for obtaining additional resources becomes critical. For example, the installation's Initial Response Force (IRF) may need to request the Service Response Force (SRF). The SRF, commanded by a general officer, is composed of the IRF and follow-on forces consisting of staff, and specialized teams from various agencies and organizations involved in the response to and recovery from a CAI.

Once the need for outside assistance has been recognized, requests must be made for assistance under mutual aid agreements (if they exist) and federal programs, e.g., the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, commonly referred to as the National Contingency Plan, 40 CFR 300 (NCP), and the Stafford Act (1988).

- Mutual Aid assistance may be available from local governments or other Federal installations nearby. The term "mutual aid" refers to any type of resources or assistance provided according to a prearranged policy. Generally such arrangements will be documented in a Memorandum of Understanding or Memorandum of Agreement, specifying the type of assistance to be provided, the circumstances under which it will be provided, and procedures for requesting it.
- The National Contingency Plan (NCP) authorizes Federal response to emergencies involving hazardous materials. Activities under the NCP may include short-term actions to remove contamination and protect public health and safety, and longer-term actions to remediate environmental effects of the emergency. Response under the NCP is coordinated by the On-Scene Coordinator (OSC), which in the case of a CAI would be an Army officer (initially the IRF Commander). Assistance would be available from the Regional Response Team (RRT) consisting of representatives of several Federal agencies. Procedures for notification and activation of assistance under the NCP are found in the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations* DA Pam.50-6, May 1991.
- Under the Stafford Act, the Federal government may provide assistance to individuals, businesses and governments affected by a disaster, including temporary and long-term housing, disaster unemployment payments, individual and family grant programs, grants to restore public facilities, community disaster loans, and other types of assistance. Assistance depends on a Presidential declaration of necessity. FEMA regulations outline the procedure for requesting such a declaration. Assistance under the Stafford Act is coordinated by FEMA.

This outside assistance must then be integrated into the overall response in accordance with the plan. Supplementary assistance may be in the form of personnel, supplies, services (such as additional medical assistance, reception centers, congregate care facilities, or housing), or funding. When necessary, the requesting organizations should be able to provide external organizations with whatever support they require to provide their assistance or resources effectively.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element involves (1) identifying resource needs, based on the scenario and local resource limitations, (2) securing the commitment of the required resources from external organizations (e.g., mutual aid, NCP, Stafford Act), and (3) arranging for any support needed for the outside agency's response. The requesting organization should be able to demonstrate knowledge of the identity of contact person(s) for each outside organization and appropriate communication system(s) to use. Types of support needed by the responding organization may include air fields, transportation, command posts, office space, telephone lines, radio frequencies, telecommunication centers and miscellaneous supplies and equipment.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario that produces a situation that exceeds the local capability to respond. Although actual exercise participation of the outside support agency is desirable, it is not necessary for the demonstration of this evaluation element.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.2.1 and Appendices G and K, and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, particularly section 3-5.c.(4)(c).

Clarification of Terms

Initial Response Force (IRF):

An emergency actions organization tasked to provide first response to a CAI at an installation assigned a chemical surety mission. Under the command of the installation commander, the IRF is composed of command and control elements and emergency teams capable of providing emergency medical services and initiating those actions necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate hazards to public health and safety or to the environment. Depending on the severity of the CAI, the IRF is capable of initiating environmental restoration activities for completion under the installation restoration program.

Mutual Aid:

An agreement between jurisdictions and/or private entities to provide additional aid or resources to control and mitigate a chemical event.

*Outside Support
Agencies:*

Federal agencies such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and any other governmental, quasi-governmental, or private agencies that provide assistance in the event of a chemical event (e.g., American National Red Cross, Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services).

*Regional Response
Team (RRT):*

The RRTs are provided for under the National Contingency Plan (NCP) and are composed of representatives of Federal agencies and representatives from each State in the Federal region. During a CAI, the OSC may request that the RRT be convened to provide advice or recommendations on specific issues requiring resolution.

*Service Response Force
(SRF):*

A DA-level emergency response organization, commanded by a general officer, capable of performing and sustaining the CAIRA mission. The SRF is composed of the IRF and follow-on forces consisting of a staff and specialized teams from various agencies and organizations involved in the response to and recovery from a CAI.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 4.2: Supplementary Assistance

Demonstrate the ability to identify the need for external assistance and to request it from federal agencies or other support organizations.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Was outside assistance from other government agencies requested?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-15), App. G (pts. G-1.c(2) and G-2.a(2)), App. K (pt. K-7); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(c); CPG 1-8A, p.A-7]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____ (If NO, proceed to Question 2)

If YES, who made the request (title and organization)?

Which agencies/organizations were requested?

What assistance was requested?

Why was this assistance requested?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

2. Was the Service Response Force (SRF) requested?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(c)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, at what time were they requested? _____

3. Was assistance requested from any private sector organizations?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-15); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(c); CPG 1-8A, p.A-7]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____ (If NO, proceed to question 4)

If YES, please indicate the organizations contacted:

What assistance was requested?

4. Was assistance from the Regional Response Team (RRT) requested?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-15); CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(c); CPG 1-8A, p.A-7]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, why was assistance from the RRT requested?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

6. Were there any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 5: PUBLIC NOTIFICATION, INSTRUCTIONS, AND EMERGENCY INFORMATION

Demonstrate the ability to alert the public of a chemical accident/incident and to disseminate appropriate and complete emergency instructions and information in a timely manner.

Evaluation Element 5.1: Alert and Notification of the Public

Demonstrate the physical operations and procedures necessary to alert the public and disseminate official instructions and information.

Intent

This evaluation element concerns the capability for rapidly alerting the public to the existence of an emergency, and providing essential instructions on how to avoid or minimize its impact.

This evaluation element is closely related to Evaluation Element 5.2 "Public Instruction and Emergency Information" and to Objective 9 (Public Affairs). Objectives 5 and 9 are both concerned with communicating information to the public in an emergency situation. Objective 5 is concerned with official information and instructions that are distributed via sirens in voice mode, tone alert radios, EAS, etc., in order to specifically tell the public how to respond to the emergency. Within Objective 5, Evaluation Element 5.1 covers the physical operations and procedures necessary to alert the public and transmit messages with official instructions and information to them; Evaluation Element 5.2 concerns the content of those messages. Objective 9, the Public Affairs objective, is concerned with information that is distributed through news releases, news briefings, and other means, primarily at the JIC.

To provide maximum protection to the public, alert and notification must take place as soon as possible after a chemical accident/incident. Upon learning of conditions requiring notification of the public, a decision should be made as soon as possible. If the decision must be coordinated among multiple organizations, that, too, must be completed quickly. The primary alert and notification system should be able to alert and provide an initial instructional message to essentially everyone within the IRZ within 8 minutes from the time that a decision has been made that the public is in danger.

In order to accomplish this challenging task, CSEPP guidance provides for installation of both outdoor and indoor warning systems throughout populated areas of the IRZ. The outdoor warning system is to consist primarily of electronic sirens capable of broadcasting both an alert signal and voice messages. The indoor warning system is to consist of dedicated tone-alert receivers in each residence, and some special facilities such as schools. The Emergency Alert System (EAS) is also used to disseminate emergency instructions and information to both the IRZ and PAZ. Demonstration of these systems is the key part of exercise play for this evaluation element.

Since sirens occasionally fail, at siren activation points there should be a capability to monitor whether the sirens actually sounded when activated. In addition there should be a

procedure for coping with a failure when it occurs, through backup route alerting or some other means.

A variety of other methods may also be used for alerting and notification, depending on the character of the IRZ. Pagers may be used to notify farmers or ranchers who are commonly outdoors in the IRZ but away from residential areas. PA systems on boats or aircraft, or visual signals such as flares or smoke may be used to alert persons in recreation areas. Highway overpass signs with text-display capability may be used to notify motorists. Supplementary indoor systems include computerized auto-dial telephone systems and systems to display messages on local cable television.

Special provisions should be made for persons who, because of sensory impairment, will not be reached by the above systems. Since the primary systems rely on auditory signals, alternate mechanisms should be provided for hearing-impaired individuals.

Route alerting is considered an acceptable mechanism for alerting and notification in the PAZ. In order to be successful, route alerting requires quick activation of personnel and appropriately equipped vehicles. In addition, certain procedures must be followed in order to ensure that the households along the routes in affected areas are adequately warned.

Last, certain types of facilities are listed separately for alert and notification because of the special challenges they pose. Such facilities include those with special populations (e.g., hospitals, schools, day care centers, nursing homes, and prisons), public congregation centers (transportation hubs such as airports, train and bus stations, sports arenas, auditoriums, and shopping malls), and large business establishments (those with large numbers of employees or patrons). Those facilities are expected to have their own internal emergency response plans, with a designated point of contact for notification. Therefore special provision should be made to ensure that those points of contact are aware of the emergency and of any protective actions.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Responsible organizations should demonstrate the capability to provide both an alert signal and an initial instructional message containing a protective action recommendation in a timely fashion after each decision has been made. (Additional public notification may occur if the results of the hazard evaluation change as the accident progresses.) All alert and notification actions for each sequence leading to the message containing a protective action recommendation (e.g., sheltering or evacuation) should be performed as they would be in an actual emergency. All actions leading up to the actual alerting or broadcast, such as contact with and verification of EAS stations, should be done. However, there is no requirement to actually sound the sirens or other alerting equipment or broadcast the EAS messages; if arranged for in the extent of play agreement, a test message may be aired in order to test the procedures and equipment.

For other activities that require contacts outside the EOC, e.g., route alerting, calls to institutions, or special alerting methods for recreation areas, at a minimum the EOC personnel should demonstrate that they have the information required (list of resources, telephone numbers, etc.) and make a reasonable number of actual contacts. In general the contacts need only convey "this is an exercise message"; that is, no other play by the personnel contacted is required, unless specified by the extent of play agreement. However,

if the organization's plan calls for route alerting, at least one actual route should be run. If only a single route is to be run, the route should be run on the most difficult or heavily populated area. No messages that would be audible to the public should be broadcast for route alerting except for one test message at a predetermined place or time.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is consistent with any scenario presenting a potential or real hazard significant enough to require public notification.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this evaluation element, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.7 and Appendix F.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Public Alerting:</i>	The system for obtaining the attention of the public about a chemical event that may require that they take protective action. Sirens are the most commonly used public alert devices, but they frequently are supplemented by tone alert radios, visual warning devices for the hearing-impaired, and telephone-based alert/notification systems.
<i>Emergency Information:</i>	Material designed to improve knowledge or understanding of an emergency.
<i>Emergency Instructions:</i>	Instructions for protective actions that should be taken in an emergency.
<i>Notification:</i>	Notification refers to providing emergency instructions and information to the public. This should follow the alert. In some systems, the alert and notification functions are inseparable; for example in route alerting, hearing the instructional message over the vehicle's PA system is what alerts the public to the emergency.
<i>Protective Action Decision Making:</i>	The process of selecting one or more actions to protect a population.
<i>Protective Action Recommendations:</i>	A recommendation provided to decision maker(s) regarding those actions that should be implemented in order to protect a population at risk.
<i>Route Alerting:</i>	Normally a supplement to the public alert system, a method for alerting people in areas not covered by the primary system or in the event of failure of the primary system. An affected area is subdivided and route alert teams are dispatched. These teams may drive through, boat, or fly over these areas making protective action announcements over a public address system.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Locations

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Warning Point(s)
Field Locations

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 5.1: Alert and Notification of the Public

Demonstrate the physical operations and procedures necessary to alert the public and disseminate official instructions and information.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. When was this location notified of the conditions that led to notification of the public?
[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-1); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

2. Who made the decision that the public was in danger?
[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-3); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

3. When was the decision made that the public was in danger?
[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-1); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

4. Record the time of each step in the A&N process that was observable at your location, for each system activated (e.g., sirens, tone alert radios, and EAS) and activation sequence: [Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-1); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

		Times for Sequence		
		No. 1	No. 2	No. 3
SIRENS:	Alert Signal Activated	_____	_____	_____
	Notification Message START	_____	_____	_____
	Notification Message END	_____	_____	_____
TONE ALERT RADIOS:	Alert Signal Activated	_____	_____	_____
	Notification Message START	_____	_____	_____
	Notification Message END	_____	_____	_____
EAS:	Alert Signal Activated	_____	_____	_____
	Notification Message START	_____	_____	_____
	Notification Message END	_____	_____	_____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Did the alert signal and notification message fall within the required time frames? (For the SIRENS and TONE ALERT RADIOS only.)
[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-1); CAIRA 3-4.c(4), 3-5.c(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

(NOTE: The standards for the primary IRZ A&N system are: alert signal to start within 2 minutes of the decision that the public is in danger, and not exceed 3 minutes in length. Notification message to start immediately after the alert signal ends, and not exceed 3 minutes in length. Thus the alert signal and message should be completed within 8 minutes of the decision that the public is in danger.)

6. Was route alerting used as a primary alert and notification system?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES: For what area? _____
When were the teams dispatched? _____
When did they complete their routes? _____

(NOTE: If YES, see Question 14).

7. Was the decision to notify the public coordinated with other organizations?
[Pl.Guid. 8.2 (p. 8-7, para. 4), App. J (pt. J-16.c); CAIRA 3-4.c(4), 3-5.c(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, indicate with whom and describe how this was done:

EVALUATOR: _____ TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____ ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____ DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Were arrangements made for periodic rebroadcast of the notification message? (*At least every 12 minutes for 1 hour, every 20 minutes thereafter.*)

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-2); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

9. Were sirens activated from this location? (*If NO, N/A or N/O, skip to Question 13*)

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, indicate the area for which sirens were activated from this location:

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-3); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

_____ On-post only

_____ Entire IRZ

_____ Only this county

_____ Other: _____

10. Was performance of the sirens verified?

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. 4 (pt. F-14); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

11. If there was an actual or simulated siren failure, describe the response:

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-14); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

12. Was there a tone alert radio present, to verify activation?

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-16,17 and 18); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

13. Check any alternative/supplementary methods used for public A&N, and give time(s) of activation:

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (point F-15 and 19); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

	<u>Time(s)</u>
_____ Pagers	_____
_____ Highway signs w/text display	_____
_____ Visual signal	_____
_____ PA on boats or aircrafts	_____
_____ Telephone calls	_____
_____ Cable television interrupt	_____

If any of the above are checked, describe how it was done, who was notified by this method and what message was conveyed.

14. If the plan and exercise call for route alerting, answer a.-e. below.

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-22); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

EOC Activities:

a. Were appropriate routes selected to warn the potentially affected areas?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

b. Were resources to run the routes identified and contacted?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

14. (continued)

Field Activities:

c. What route did you evaluate? _____

d. Record these times for your team:

Dispatch: _____ Begin A&N: _____ Finish A&N: _____

e. Did you team:

_____	Have a siren?
_____	P/A system?
_____	Route map?
_____	Follow its prescribed route correctly?
_____	Go slowly enough so that each household on the route could have heard an actual message broadcast in its entirety?

(Explain any exceptions on your evaluation worksheet.)

f. Was your team provided a message to broadcast over its PA system?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, how was the message developed/chosen?

_____	Prescribed message used?
_____	Prescribed but modified to fit circumstances – blanks filled in etc.?
_____	Not prescribed – developed on the spot?
_____	Message identical to EAS message (which one: _____)

(NOTE: if possible collect a hard copy of the message)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

15. Were means available to ensure alert and notification of hearing-impaired individuals:
[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-20); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

a. Was a list of such individuals available?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

b. Were means available to ensure they are alerted and notified? (e.g., activation of TDD)

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

16. Were means available to ensure alert and notification of institutions, including a listing and point of contact (POC) for emergency notifications? *(Check whether each type was listed, had a POC, and was actually contacted for the exercise.)*

[Pl.Guid. 8.7, App. F (pt. F-20); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4); CPG 1-8 4-3.c.; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

	<u>List</u>	<u>POC</u>	<u>Contacted</u>	<u>N/A</u>
Special Population Centers				
• Hospitals	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Schools	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Day Care Centers	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Nursing Homes	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Jail/Prisons	_____	_____	_____	_____
Public Congregation Centers				
• Airports	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Train Stations	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Bus Stations	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Auditoriums/Theaters	_____	_____	_____	_____
• Malls	_____	_____	_____	_____
Large Business Establishment				
• w/over 50 employees or cap. Over 500 persons	_____	_____	_____	_____
• large construction projects	_____	_____	_____	_____
Others				
• _____	_____	_____	_____	_____
• _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

17. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

18. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 5.2: Public Instructions and Emergency Information

Demonstrate the ability to develop emergency information and instructions to the public that are clear, concise, accurate, and complete.

Intent

In a chemical accident/incident, response organizations must have the capability to formulate and disseminate to the public initial and follow-up messages containing appropriate information regarding the event itself and protective actions. This evaluation element is concerned with the clarity, completeness, and accuracy of message content, and the methods by which messages are developed.

This evaluation element is closely related to Evaluation Element 5.1 and to Objective 9 (Public Affairs). Objectives 5 and 9 are both concerned with communicating information to the public in an emergency situation. Objective 5 is concerned with official information and instructions that are distributed via sirens in voice mode, tone alert radios, EAS, etc. in order to specifically tell the public how to respond to the emergency. Within Objective 5, Evaluation Element 5.1 covers the physical operations and procedures necessary to alert the public and transmit messages with official instructions and information to them; Evaluation Element 5.2 concerns the contents of those messages. Objective 9, the Public Affairs objective, is concerned with information that is distributed through news releases, news briefings, and other means, primarily at the JIC.

The official messages addressed in this evaluation element must fulfill a number of requirements in order to best facilitate public protection. They must be:

- **Accurate.** They must contain accurate information about the emergency, and instructions that accurately reflect and implement the protective action decisions of the responsible authorities.
- **Complete, but concise.** The messages must include everything that the public needs to know in order to best protect themselves. They should be complete enough to ensure that persons without any other knowledge of the hazard will know what to do and when. At the same time, they must be very concise, in order to allow time for the public to carry out the instructions promptly. A reasonable balance must be struck between these two conflicting goals.
- **Clear.** Clarity of instructions should be evaluated from a "common sense" point of view -- can they be readily understood by a member of the public in the affected area who is not familiar with chemical hazards or terminology? They should be couched in clear, simple language and be consistent, both internally and with previous messages. They should refer to emergency information distributed in brochures or telephone books; however, they cannot *rely* on the public having such information. Protective action areas should be described in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries such as major thoroughfares, rivers, or jurisdictions (e.g., town or county lines) that will be familiar to persons in the area.

Development of appropriate messages in a timely manner will generally rely on use of prescribed messages from the plan. Prescribed messages may be designed so as to be easily modified to fit the circumstances; for example, by filling in blanks, or including certain items from a list. *Ad hoc* development of text is time consuming and prone to error, and should generally be avoided; however, it may be required by unusual circumstances.

In some locations, it may be necessary to coordinate messages with other jurisdictions or organizations before they are broadcast, for purposes of authorization or to ensure consistency. If there is more than one source of emergency information, the sources must be coordinated so that the public does not receive inconsistent or contradictory information. Such coordination must not unduly delay dissemination of the information to the public.

There should be a system to ensure that messages, once developed, are accurately disseminated to the public. Messages may be broadcast directly from the EOC where they were developed via a live hook-up or by playing a tape; in that case, no further check is needed. However, if messages must be transcribed or faxed, and then read at another location (such as an EAS station studio) then there should be a system in place to monitor the message as broadcast in order to check its accuracy.

Messages should be authorized by the proper authorities as provided for in the plan. This is generally required by law, in the sense that only certain officials are empowered to recommend protective actions to the public. It also serves as an additional quality control check on the messages.

A log and copies of the messages should be kept, so that emergency personnel are aware of what the public has been instructed to do, and can ensure that response actions are taken accordingly. Awareness of previously disseminated messages also is important when preparing new messages, to ensure that they are consistent and to emphasize what is new.

Where emergency plans require a non-English language brochure, the responsible organizations should demonstrate the ability to disseminate emergency information and instructions in the alternate language(s).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

To evaluate coordination and content, the complete text of each message should be developed, including all necessary coordination, and available in permanent form such as hard copy, electronic copy, or tape. To evaluate conciseness, each message should be read out loud and timed. (Reading the message should take no longer than 3 minutes.) In general, all steps necessary for authorization and dissemination of messages should be taken or simulated, short of actual broadcast to the public. To the extent feasible, where text must be transcribed or transferred from one location to another, that should be carried out in order to check the accuracy of the reproduction. (For example, if the message must be faxed to an EAS radio station, that should be carried out.) Where called for in the plan, foreign-language versions of the messages should be prepared.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is consistent with any scenario presenting a real or potential hazard significant enough to require protective actions by the public.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.7 and Appendices F and J.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Emergency Information:</i>	Material designed to improve knowledge or understanding of an emergency.
<i>Emergency Instructions:</i>	Instructions for protective actions that should be taken in an emergency.
<i>Warning Point:</i>	A 24-hour designated location where emergency notification(s) would be received.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Warning Point(s)
Emergency Operating Center

OFF-POST

Warning Point(s)
Emergency Operations Center(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 5.2: Public Instructions and Emergency Information

Demonstrate the ability to develop emergency information and instructions to the public that are clear, concise, accurate and complete.

POINTS OF REVIEW

For official information and instructions that were distributed via sirens in voice mode, tone alert radios, EAS, and other methods:

Message Content

1. Given the scenario and the protective action decisions that were made, were the information and instructions accurate and appropriate to the situation?
[Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.7 (p. 8-18, para. 2), 8.14.2, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c., 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

2. Did the messages include everything the public needed to know in order to protect themselves? [Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.7 (p. 8-18, para. 2), 8.14.2, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c., 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO describe the problem:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

2. (Continued)

Specific points (*Check all that apply*)

_____	Time message was authorized for release.
_____	Name of agency authorizing instructions.
_____	Nature of the emergency (very brief description).
_____	Area(s) or group(s) affected and <u>not</u> affected.
_____	Clear statement of the recommended protective actions.
_____	Amount of time available for implementing protective actions.
_____	Measures taken to protect children in schools and day care centers.
_____	Reference to public information brochures.
_____	Phone number(s) for information or assistance.

Sheltering:

_____	How to maximize protection when sheltering.
_____	Instructions for transients.

Evacuation:

_____	Evacuation routes.
_____	Chemical agent screening locations and locations of reception centers.
_____	Information for transit-dependent individuals.
_____	Information for other special populations.
_____	Reminder of items to take along.

3. Were the messages understandable to the public (straightforward language, no technical jargon)? [Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.7 (p. 8-18, para. 2), 8.14.2, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c., 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe the problem:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. (Continued)

Specific points (*Check all that apply*)

- _____ Instruction couched in clear, simple language.
- _____ Protective action areas described in terms of familiar landmarks and boundaries.
- _____ Instructions consistent with brochures.
- _____ Instructions internally consistent and consistent with each other.
- _____ New information differentiated from old.

4. Could the messages be read out loud within a reasonable time period (in less than three minutes)? [Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.7 (p. 8-18, para. 2), 8.14.2, App. J (pt. J-19); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c., 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe the problem:

5. Was release of each message authorized by the appropriate official or procedure? [Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.14.2, App. J (pt. J-19.b); CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c., 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

6. Were messages presented in alternate language(s)? (*Note: required only if emergency operations plans require a non-English language brochure.*) [Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.14.2, App J (pt. J-18.c); CAIRA 3-4.c(4), 3-5.c(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c, 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. How were messages developed?

[Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.14.2, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c(4), 3-5.c(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c, 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

_____ Prescribed messages used *verbatim*.

_____ Prescribed but modified to fit circumstances - blanks filled in, etc.

_____ Not prescribed -- developed on the spot.

8. Were the contents of the messages coordinated with other organizations? [Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.14.2, App. J (pt. J-16.c); CAIRA 3-4.c(4), 3-5.c(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c, 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe how that was done, and with what other organizations:

9. Were a log and copies kept of messages, so that personnel could verify what the public had been told at any given point?

[Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.14.2, App J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c, 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

10. If appropriate, was there a mechanism to ensure that messages as broadcast matched what was intended? (e.g., a radio tuned to the EAS station, and a person assigned to record the message as broadcast and check its accuracy)

[Pl.Guid. 8.6, 8.14.2, App J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(4), 3-5.c.(4), 8-4; CPG 1-8 4-3.c, 4-3.d; CPG 1-8A p.A-12]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

11. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organizations plans:

12. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

NOTE TO EVALUATOR: obtain copies of all messages developed for dissemination
To the public.

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 6: COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, FACILITIES, EQUIPMENT, AND DISPLAYS

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities, including communications and other equipment, displays and materials, required to support emergency operations.

Evaluation Element 6.1: Communications Systems

Demonstrate the availability and operability of communication links among all appropriate response locations, organizations, and personnel.

Intent

A coordinated response is contingent upon the ability of response personnel and organizations to communicate effectively with each other regardless of location. Coordinating the emergency response to a chemical accident/incident requires reliable primary and backup communications among the installation, local governments, state agencies, and federal emergency response organizations, including field operations and fixed and mobile medical support resources.

Because emergency information must be transmitted quickly and accurately, the emergency communication system should be capable of both high reliability and redundancy. The system(s) must be in good working order and should be maintained and used regularly. Personnel should be trained and familiar with the communications system, aware of system protocols, and able to handle information related to chemical emergencies efficiently and accurately. Communication protocols should foster the rapid and accurate transfer of information. The system also should be able to accommodate the increased load the emergency response will place on it, with backup systems where needed. This evaluation element covers the availability and operability of communication systems for use between facilities and from facilities to field units, as well as use of communication procedures provided in the response organization's plan.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Under this evaluation element, the response organizations should demonstrate the availability and operability of the communications systems that are planned for use under emergency conditions. The organizations should demonstrate that they are capable of managing their communication systems to ensure that all necessary communication traffic is handled without any delays that would have an adverse impact on the conduct of the emergency operations. Response groups should demonstrate that planned backup communication systems are available if the primary system is overloaded or inoperable. All primary and backup communications equipment to be used in exercises and procedures for use at all facilities and for all field units are to be demonstrated by the transmission and reception of exercise messages. In general, this demonstration is to be accomplished by the use of communications equipment and procedures in the implementation of emergency response actions. All activities associated with the management of communications

capabilities should be demonstrated. Activities associated with this evaluation element should be carried out as specified in the plan except as provided for in the extent of play agreement.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.3.1 and Appendix C and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, particularly section 3-5.c.(2).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Backup Communication System:</i>	The communication system used when the primary system is incapable of handling traffic or is inoperative.
<i>Primary Communication System:</i>	The communication system designated to carry the bulk of traffic.
<i>Communication System:</i>	The assemblage of personnel and equipment, including, but not limited to, radio, telephone, and facsimile communication machines.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Command Post
Decontamination Area
Reception Center/Assembly Area
Congregate Care Center
Medical Facility
Public Affairs Office
Traffic/Access Control Point(s)
Field Operations
Joint Information Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operating Center(s)
Decontamination Area(s)
Reception Center(s)
Congregate Care Center(s)
Hospital(s)
State/Local Public Affairs Office(s)
Traffic/Access control Point(s)
Field Operations
Joint Information Center

EVALUATOR: _____			
LOCATION: _____		TEAM LEADER: _____	
ASSIGNMENT: _____			
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____	PREVIOUS FINDING? Y	N

Evaluation Element 6.1: Communication Systems

Demonstrate the availability and operability of communication links among all appropriate response locations, organizations and personnel.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Identify the primary communication system(s) used during the exercise.
[Pl. Guid. 8.3.1 (pt. 3-7, 3-8, 3-9 and 3-10); CAIRA 3-5.c.(2); CPG 1-8 4-3.b; CPG 1-8A p.A-11]
2. Identify the backup system(s) used and available during the exercise:
[Pl. Guid. 8.3.1 (pt. 3-8); CAIRA 3-5.c.(2); CPG 1-8 4-3.b; CPG 1-8A p.A-11]

USED	AVAILABLE	SYSTEM
_____	_____	Commercial telephone (Specify number of lines ____)
_____	_____	Dedicated telephone line/system
_____	_____	Radio Systems (specify types below)
_____	_____	RACES/ARES
_____	_____	Computer link (describe type below)
_____	_____	Facsimile machine
_____	_____	Other (describe type below)

3. Did the communication systems operate without delay or malfunction?
[Pl. Guid. 8.3.1 (pt. 3-3); CAIRA 3-5.c.(2); CPG 1-8 4-3.b; CPG 1-8A p.A-11]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe the delay or malfunction.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Were secure communications systems required for security reasons?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(4)(a)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

5. Did personnel follow organizational protocol and procedures regarding communications?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain and describe results:

6. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans.

7. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes, procedures, or equipment used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 6.2: Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities with appropriate equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

Intent

To conduct efficient emergency response operations, suitable operating facilities with appropriate equipment and displays (e.g., maps and status boards) are necessary. This evaluation element covers emergency facilities (e.g., emergency operations center, field command post) from which emergency response activities are directed. This evaluation element does not cover specifics of medical facilities and reception/congregate care facilities, which are considered under objectives 12 and 14, respectively.

An EOC should consist of a combination of physical facilities, equipment, personnel, and procedures that enable the response organization to react appropriately to the chemical accident/incident. EOCs, both on- and off-post, should provide a command and control center for response to a chemical accident/incident, as well as for other potential emergencies identified in the community's hazard assessment guidance. Multi-hazard capability is needed because another hazard, such as an earthquake or tornado, could initiate a chemical accident/incident.

Off-post primary and alternate EOCs should be consistent with the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996. The guidance includes information on location, size and layout, protection and security standards, communications, information processing capabilities, and other equipment and supplies for EOCs. Recommendations for all aspects of multi-hazard EOCs are found in three FEMA publications: (1) *CCA General Program Guidelines* (FEMA 1992), (2) *Emergency Operating Centers Handbook* (FEMA 1984a), and (3) *Objectives for Local Emergency Management* (FEMA 1984b).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Under this evaluation element, the response organizations should demonstrate the use of equipment and other displays that would be used in an actual emergency and that are in accordance with the organizations' response plans. Equipment and displays at each emergency facility should be appropriate to the role played by that facility in emergency operations. EOCs should have adequate space, furnishings, lighting, rest rooms, ventilation, and provision for backup power. Layout of the EOC should be arranged for maximum efficiency.

Equipment (e.g., typewriters, copy machines, facsimile machines, and computers/word processors) should be available to support emergency facility operations as necessary. Each response organization should demonstrate that the equipment available at their facility is appropriate to the facility's function in an emergency. Emergency operations should include demonstration, as appropriate, of maps and displays showing the various sectors and/or zones, and the areas affected by the chemical accident/incident. Evacuation routes, reception and congregate care centers, monitoring points, population by evacuation area, familiar landmarks and political boundaries should be displayed in the emergency facility,

as appropriate. Each emergency facility should have a status board which is used to display key events and current actions.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario requiring use of relevant facilities.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.2.1 and Appendix B and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, particularly Section 3-5.c.(1)(d).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Emergency Facility:</i>	Any building, center, room or set of rooms or mobile units that have been designed and equipped to support emergency operations [e.g., Emergency Operating/Operations Center (EOC)].
<i>Emergency Operating/Operations Center (EOC):</i>	A facility where responsible officials gather during an emergency to direct and coordinate emergency operations, to communicate with other jurisdictions and with field emergency forces, and to formulate protective action decisions.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Command Post

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 6.2: Facilities, Equipment, and Displays

Demonstrate the adequacy of facilities with appropriate equipment, displays and other materials to support emergency operations.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Were the following sufficient to support emergency operations? *(Yes or No)*
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. B (pt. B-4 and B-8); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

_____ Space

_____ Furnishings

_____ Lighting

_____ Restrooms

_____ Backup Power

_____ Other (Specify below, e.g., kitchen facilities, sleeping facilities)

(NOTE: If any of the above were insufficient, describe in evaluation worksheets.)

2. Was the following equipment available at this facility? *(Yes or No)*
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. B (pts. B-6, B-7, B-8); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

_____ Computer/word processors

_____ Typewriters

_____ Copier

_____ Television/Radio

_____ Other

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Was available equipment adequate to support emergency operations at this facility?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. B (pt. B-8.b); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, what equipment would enhance emergency operations at this facility?

4. Was the following information displayed or otherwise available? *(Yes or No)*
[Pl. Guid. App. A (pt. A-10.f.(4)); (pt.B-7); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

____ Map or IRZ w/protective action areas indicated
 ____ Population by protective action area
 ____ Evacuation routes
 ____ Shelter locations and capacities
 ____ Wind direction

5. List the types of status boards displayed at this facility.
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. B (pt. B-6.s.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

6. Were displays/status boards updated in a timely manner (i.e., within 10 minutes of receipt of essential information)? [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. A (pt. A-10.f.(4)), App. B (pt. B-6.s.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. Were available displays adequate to support emergency operations at this facility?
Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. A (pt. A-10.f.(4)), App. B (pt. B-6.s.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c);
CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A, p.A-8]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, what display would enhance emergency operations at this facility?

8. Was access to this facility controlled?
[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1 (pt. 2-5), App. B (pt. B-5); CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(c); CPG 1-8 4-3.a; CPG 1-8A,
p.A-8]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

9. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans.

10. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes, procedures, or equipment used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

OBJECTIVE 7: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION FOR SPECIAL POPULATIONS AND FACILITIES

Demonstrate the ability to make and implement appropriate protective action decisions for special populations and facilities in a chemical accident/incident.

Evaluation Element 7.1: Protective Action Implementation for Special Populations

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate and timely protective actions for special populations.

Intent

In the event of a chemical accident/incident, responsible officials may recommend that the public take protective actions in order to avoid or reduce exposure to chemical agent. Within the community, there may be individuals who require assistance in order to take protective actions. The intent of this evaluation element is to measure the community's capability to provide assistance to persons who may require it in order to take protective actions in the event of a chemical accident/incident. Such persons are referred to in this evaluation element as "special populations." As explained below, the term "special populations" includes individuals in a variety of circumstances; their common characteristic is that they cannot simply "jump in the car and go" in an emergency.

Special populations encompass three groups or types of individuals: disabled, institutionalized, and transit-dependent. Disabled individuals are those who, due to a physical or mental impairment, may require assistance with protective actions. For example, residents who are blind or non-ambulatory and cannot evacuate without assistance from others. Institutionalized individuals include residents of institutions such as nursing homes or prisons who may depend on others for assistance with protective actions. Institutionalized individuals may or may not be disabled. Transit-dependent individuals are persons who do not have their own transportation and must depend on others for transport in the event of an evacuation. Examples of transit-dependent individuals range from those who do not drive due to disability (e.g., blindness) to those who normally rely on public transportation or are stranded at home while a family member is out with the car.

Assistance to children in schools and day care centers is covered by Evaluation Element 7.2 "Protective Action Implementation for Schools". Other objectives directly related to implementation of protective actions are Objective 3 (Protective Action Recommendations and Decision Making), Objective 5 (Public Notification, Instructions and Emergency Information), Objective 8 (Traffic and Access Control), and Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration and Congregate Care of Evacuees).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The institutions and resource providers to be contacted during the exercise, and the extent of their participation, will be defined in the extent of play agreement. Participation should be encouraged by the exercise planning team; the demonstration and training value of the exercise will be enhanced by participation of as many institutions and resource providers as possible. Contacts to any non-participating institutions should be simulated via calls to a control cell.

Field resources (e.g., vehicles) should be actually mobilized to the extent feasible. If it is not feasible to mobilize all of the resources that would be used in a real emergency, the particular units to be mobilized should be selected randomly in order to provide a representative demonstration of the available resources.

All aspects of the demonstration, including mobilization of resources and any simulation to be employed, should be detailed in the extent of play agreement to serve as the basis for evaluation. In general, successful demonstration of this evaluation element will involve the following capabilities:

- (a) **Awareness of the presence of special populations.** The jurisdiction should know the identity and location of institutions and disabled individuals within the IRZ and PAZ, and should have an estimate of how many transit-dependent individuals there are. Information should also be available as to which, if any, of the institutions are equipped for enhanced or pressurized sheltering.
- (b) **Ability to identify and contact those affected by the chosen protective actions.** Based on the protective actions chosen and the areas to which they apply, the jurisdiction must be able to identify which special populations are affected and may need assistance. Each institution in the protective action area should be identified and contacted as provided in the extent of play agreement. Contacts should be as realistic as possible and should include verification that they have been notified, what protective action they will be implementing, and what (if any) assistance will be required. Contacts to disabled individuals and non-participating institutions should be simulated via calls to a control cell.
- (c) **Ability to obtain and coordinate resources for assistance.** The jurisdiction should be able to quickly determine what assistance will be required for special populations. Contacts should be made, as provided in the extent of play agreement, to secure resources for that assistance and to perform any necessary coordination. The following guidelines are recommended for effective demonstration:

For evacuation: Each transportation resource provider whose services are required by the exercise scenario should be contacted as provided in the extent of play agreement. Contacts should verify that they are aware of their emergency response role and that the agreed upon resources are available. Coordination with traffic control personnel may be necessary to ensure that buses or other vehicles used for evacuation will be able to reach the facility promptly, and exit promptly once loaded. Each reception center or host facility (e.g., hospitals or nursing homes outside the IRZ and PAZ) that would be receiving evacuated special populations under the scenario should be contacted (as provided for in the extent of play agreement) to verify role knowledge and resource availability.

If possible, volunteers should be used to play the role of special population evacuees. Participation of role-players will enhance the realism of exercise play and bring out logistical problems that otherwise might not be apparent.

For sheltering: In some cases the plan may provide for assistance to institutions or individuals with implementing sheltering measures, e.g., assistance with operating pressurization devices or implementing expedient shelter. Resources and procedures to provide such assistance should be verified.

- (d) **Preparedness at institutions.** Staff at participating institutions should demonstrate their knowledge of emergency procedures, including protective action options, their role in implementing them, how they will be notified, and how to obtain assistance if they need it. If shelter-in-place is demonstrated, the staff should be aware of how to implement it, including (as applicable) implementation of normal, expedient or pressurized shelter-in-place. If evacuation is demonstrated, the staff should be able to identify what transportation resources will be used, and generally be aware of procedures and logistics for evacuation. Physical demonstrations of protective actions should be carried out to the maximum extent feasible, as provided in the extent of play agreement.
- (e) **Ability of the mobilized resources to carry out the required assistance promptly and correctly.** The degree of physical demonstration of resources will be specified in the extent of play agreement for the exercise. Where field resources are mobilized for transportation assistance, the ability of those resources to carry out their assigned assistance tasks may be evaluated. Points to be evaluated would include: prompt mobilization of vehicles and personnel; ability to locate pick up and drop off points, and/or follow prescribed routes; ability to provide assistance to passengers with boarding and alighting; ability to recognize signs and symptoms of agent intoxication and take appropriate action in response; ability to communicate with a base while enroute.

The evaluation form for this element is organized according to location/assignment. Questions 1 through 7 should be evaluated at the EOC, questions 8 and 9 should be evaluated at participating institution(s), questions 10 and 11 should be evaluated in the field (by observation of mobilized resources such as buses or ambulances), and questions 12 and 13 should be completed by all evaluators.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is consistent with any scenario presenting a potential or real hazard significant enough to require implementation of protective actions. If feasible, scenarios should be varied over time to demonstrate protection of all special populations in the IRZ and PAZ.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 8.6, 8.9, 8.12 and Appendix E.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Disabled Persons:</i>	Individuals who, due to a physical or mental impairment, may require assistance with protective actions. For example, residents who are blind, non-ambulatory, frail, or dependent on life-support systems may require assistance from others (and special equipment) in order to evacuate.
<i>Institution:</i>	A facility such as a nursing home, hospital, or prison, where the residents may require special assistance or security in order to implement protective actions.
<i>Institutionalized Persons:</i>	Individuals who reside in institutions such as nursing homes or prisons and may need to depend on others for assistance with protective actions. Institutionalized persons may or may not have special needs.
<i>Protective Action:</i>	An action or measure taken to avoid or reduce exposure to a hazard.
<i>Resource Provider:</i>	Organization supplying resources such as buses, drivers, and other personnel to assist with protection of special populations or school children.
<i>Shelter-in-Place:</i> <i>Normal Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that involves taking cover in a building, closing all doors and windows, and turning off ventilation systems. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
<i>Expedient Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that, after going into the room selected as a shelter, the inhabitants take measures to reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent enters the room. Such measures would include taping around doors and windows and covering vents and electrical outlets. Effectiveness is improved by using an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Enhanced Shelter-in-Place

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that it involves taking shelter in a structure to which weatherization techniques have been applied before the emergency to permanently reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent seeps into it. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.

Pressurized Shelter-in-Place:

A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that the infiltration of contaminated air from outside the shelter is effectively prohibited by drawing outside air into the shelter through a filter that removes chemical agent. This filtered air creates a positive pressure in the shelter so that clean air is leaking out instead of contaminated air leaking in.

Transit-Dependent Persons:

Individuals who do not have their own transportation and must depend on others for transport in the event of an evacuation. Examples of transit-dependent individuals range from those who do not drive due to disability (e.g., blindness) to those who normally rely on public transportation or are simply stuck at home while a family member is out with the car. They may or may not be disabled.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field Locations

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Field Location(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 7.1: Protective Action Implementation for Special Populations

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate and timely protective actions for special populations.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Coordination and contacts -- evaluated at EOC.

1. Did the jurisdiction have a complete listing of the special populations within its part of the IRZ and PAZ, including: *(Indicate by Yes, No, N/A or N/O)*
[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

_____ Institutions;
_____ Individual disabled residents; and
_____ An estimate of the number of transit-dependent individuals.

Did emergency response officials know, or have access to information as to which institutions (if any) were equipped for enhanced, expedient or pressurized shelter-in-place?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

2. When protective action decisions were made, was the jurisdiction able to quickly determine which special populations and individuals were affected?
[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were they promptly contacted, to verify notification and determine needs for assistance? *(Note: The extent of play agreement will define whether particular contacts should be actual, or simulated by calling a control cell.)*

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

When were these contacts started? _____ Completed? _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Was assistance provided to special populations in implementing sheltering?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, how was this assistance provided?

4. Was transportation assistance provided to special populations?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, answer the rest of question number 4.

Who was it for? (Institutions, disabled individuals, or transit-dependent general population)

Record the providers contacted, resources committed, and resources actually mobilized for the exercise.

Provider	No. of Vehicles Committed	Type of vehicle (bus/van/ambulance, etc.)	No. actually mobilized for exercise
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

Did they coordinate with traffic control personnel to ensure the vehicles could get in and out without obstruction?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Were specialized reception/host facilities opened? (*Note: appropriate reception or host facilities, e.g., host nursing homes, hospitals, prisons, should be contacted as provided in the extent of play agreement.*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, list the facilities and indicate what populations they were to accommodate.

6. What other actions were taken to secure resources and implement protective actions for special populations?

[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

7. Did the resources secured match the needs of the affected special populations (sufficient numbers of right types of vehicles, personnel, etc.)?

[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, briefly note discrepancy here and discuss in Evaluation Worksheet.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Implementation -- evaluated at participating institution(s).

8. Did officials and staff at the institution demonstrate knowledge of their role in protecting the resident special population ? *(Put Y, N, N/A, or N/O below.)*
 [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

_____ How they are notified of a chemical emergency?

_____ What protective actions may be recommended for their facility?

_____ Their role in implementing the protective action? (As provided in the plan – e.g., procedures for transport, or for implementing shelter-in-place.)

_____ Who they can turn to for assistance and how to get in touch with them?

9. Were protective actions implemented at this location?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were they carried out promptly and correctly?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Briefly note what was done:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Implementation -- field evaluation of Resource Provider.

10. Were resources mobilized to demonstrate evacuation assistance to special populations?
[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, provide the following information:

Organization observed?	_____
Type of vehicle?	_____
Dispatched from?	_____ Time: _____
Pick-up point?	_____ Time: _____
Drop-off point?	_____ Time: _____
Route followed?	_____

Was a driver and vehicle ready to go promptly following the request for assistance?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the driver briefed on the hazard, the destination, the route to follow etc.?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Did the driver follow the route and find the pick up and drop off points correctly?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were communications demonstrated while enroute?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, with whom did they communicate?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

11. Did field personnel demonstrate knowledge of: [Pl. Guid. 8.10.1, App. E; CAIRA App. E.]

How to recognize signs and symptoms of agent intoxication?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

What to do if they suspect agent intoxication?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

All evaluators complete the following questions.

12. Did the organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

13. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 7.2: Protective Action Implementation for Schools

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate and timely protective actions for school children.

Intent

This evaluation element focuses on the ability of schools, day care centers and local emergency response organizations to identify, contact, and provide appropriate resources to implement protective actions for the school and day care population. The scope of this evaluation element encompasses all children at schools and day care centers, both public and private, within the IRZ and PAZ.

In the event of a chemical accident/incident, responsible officials may recommend that the public take protective actions in order to avoid or reduce exposure to chemical agent. Schools and day care centers must be prepared to implement those actions to protect the children in their care.

Because of constraints on time and logistics, in general it is not considered practical for parents or guardians to immediately retrieve their children in the event of an emergency. Local emergency response organizations must be prepared to identify and contact affected facilities, and provide assistance with sheltering procedures, transportation, traffic control, or other measures as needed and provided for in the plan. In addition, protective actions for schools and day care centers must be carefully publicized so that parents are aware of measures being taken to protect the children and will know where to go to retrieve them.

Other objectives directly related to implementation of protective actions are Objective 3 (Protective Action Recommendations and Decision Making), Objective 5 (Public Notification, Instructions and Emergency Information), Objective 8 (Traffic and Access Control), and Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration and Congregate Care of the Public).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The schools, day care centers and resource providers to be contacted during the exercise, and the extent of their participation, will be defined in the extent of play agreement. Participation should be encouraged by the exercise planning team; the demonstration and training value of the exercise will be enhanced by participation of as many schools, day care centers, and resource providers as possible. Contacts to any non-participating organizations should be simulated via calls to a control cell. The local emergency response organizations should demonstrate, as prescribed in the extent of play agreement, all coordination aspects of the element, including identifying and contacting the affected facilities, securing resources for assisting those facilities, and providing appropriate information to the public. Staff at participating schools and day care centers should demonstrate knowledge of required protective actions and how to obtain assistance if needed.

Field resources (vehicles) should be actually mobilized to the extent feasible. If it is not feasible to mobilize all of the resources that would be used in a real emergency, the particular units to be mobilized should be selected randomly in order to provide a representative demonstration of the available resources.

All aspects of the demonstration, including mobilization of resources and any simulation to be employed, should be described in the extent of play agreement to serve as the basis for evaluation. Successful demonstration of this evaluation element generally will involve the following functions and capabilities:

- (a) **Awareness of schools and day care centers within the IRZ and PAZ.** The jurisdiction should have access to information about the identity, location and approximate capacity (average attendance) of schools and day care centers within the IRZ and PAZ, including public facilities and licensed private facilities. Information should also be available as to what shelter options are available at those facilities.
- (b) **Ability to identify and contact those affected by the chosen protective actions.** Based on the protective actions chosen and the areas to which they apply, the jurisdiction should be able to identify which schools and day care centers are affected and may need assistance. Each such school or day care center should be identified, and contacted as provided in the extent of play agreement. Contacts should be as realistic as possible and should include verification that they have been notified, what protective action they will be implementing, and what (if any) assistance will be required.
- (c) **Ability to obtain and coordinate resources for assistance.** The jurisdiction should be able to quickly determine what assistance will be required for the affected schools and day care centers. Contacts should be made, as provided in the extent of play agreement, to obtain resources for that assistance and to perform any necessary coordination. The following guidelines are recommended for effective demonstration:

For evacuation: Each transportation resource provider whose services are required by the exercise scenario should be contacted as provided in the extent of play agreement. Contacts should verify that they are aware of their emergency response role and that the agreed upon resources are available. Coordination with traffic control personnel may be necessary to ensure that buses or other vehicles used for evacuation will be able to reach the facility promptly, and exit promptly once loaded. Each reception center or host facility that would be receiving evacuated children under the scenario should be contacted (as provided in the extent of play) to verify role knowledge and resource availability.

If possible, volunteers should be used to play the role of special population evacuees. Participation of role-players will enhance the realism of exercise play and bring out logistical problems that otherwise might not be apparent.

For sheltering: In some cases the plan may provide for assistance to schools or day care centers with implementing sheltering measures, e.g., assistance with operating pressurization devices or implementing expedient shelter. Resources and procedures to provide such assistance should be verified.

- (d) **Dissemination of information to public.** Information as to protection of children in schools and day care centers must be provided to the public. Otherwise, parents or guardians may attempt to pick them up at inappropriate or incorrect times or places, thus delaying their being reunited and possibly incurring unnecessary risks. Information should be prepared about each affected facility, including instructions for parents and guardians as to when and where they may rejoin their children. This information should be forwarded to the personnel responsible for distributing it to the public (e.g., via EAS).
- (e) **Preparedness at schools and day care centers.** Staff at participating schools and day care centers should demonstrate their knowledge of emergency procedures, including protective action options, their role in implementing them, how they will be notified, and how to obtain assistance if they need it. If shelter-in-place is demonstrated, the staff should be aware of how to implement it, including (as applicable) implementation of normal, expedient or pressurized shelter-in-place. If evacuation is demonstrated, the staff should be able to identify what transportation resources will be used, and be aware of procedures for evacuation, such as assembling the children and accompanying them until rejoined by their parent or guardian. Physical demonstrations of protective actions should be carried out to the maximum extent feasible.
- (f) **Ability of mobilized resources to carry out the required assistance promptly and correctly.** As stated above, resources for transportation assistance to schools and day care centers should be mobilized for the exercise to the extent feasible. If that is done, then the ability of those resources to carry out their assigned tasks may be evaluated. Points to be evaluated would include: prompt mobilization of vehicles and staff; ability to locate pick up and drop off points, and/or follow prescribed routes; ability to recognize signs and symptoms of agent intoxication and take appropriate action in response; and ability to communicate with a base while enroute.

The evaluation form for this element is organized according to location/assignment. Questions 1 through 6 should be evaluated at the EOC and/or school district office; questions 7 and 8 should be evaluated at participating schools and day care centers; questions 9 and 10 should be evaluated in the field (by observation of mobilized resources such as buses); and questions 11 and 12 should be answered by all evaluators.

Demonstration of this evaluation element requires a scenario presenting a potential or real hazard significant enough to require implementation of protective actions for one or more schools or day care centers. If feasible, scenarios should be varied over time to stimulate participation by all schools and day care centers in the IRZ and PAZ.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 8.6, 8.9, 8.12 and Appendix E.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Facility:</i>	As used in this evaluation element, a school or day care center.
<i>Protective Action:</i>	An action or measure taken to avoid or reduce exposure to a hazard.
<i>Resource Provider:</i>	Organization supplying resources such as buses, drivers, and other personnel to assist with protection of special populations or school children.
<i>School children:</i>	Children in public and private schools and day care centers.
<i>Shelter-in-Place:</i> <i>Normal Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that involves taking cover in a building, closing all doors and windows, and turning off ventilation systems. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
<i>Expedient Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that, after going into the room selected as a shelter, the inhabitants take measures to reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent enters the room. Such measures would include taping around doors and windows and covering vents and electrical outlets. Effectiveness is improved by using an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
<i>Enhanced Shelter-in-Place</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that it involves taking shelter in a structure to which weatherization techniques have been applied before the emergency to permanently reduce the rate at which air or chemical agent seeps into it. Effectiveness is improved by going into an interior room. The shelter should be opened up or abandoned after the toxic plume has passed.
<i>Pressurized Shelter-in-Place:</i>	A protective action that is similar to normal shelter-in-place except that the infiltration of contaminated air from outside the shelter is effectively prohibited by drawing outside air into the shelter through a filter that removes chemical agent. This filtered air creates a positive pressure in the shelter so that clean air is leaking out instead of contaminated air leaking in.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Schools & Day Care Centers

OFF-POST

Emergency operations Center(s)
Schools & Day Care Centers
Field Activities

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 7.2: Protective Action Implementation for Schools

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to implement appropriate and timely protective actions for school children.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Coordination Questions -- Evaluated at EOC and/or School District Office.

1. Did emergency response officials know, or have access to the following information about schools and day care centers in the IRZ and PAZ?
(Note: should include all public and private schools and licensed day care facilities.)
[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

Check off:

_____	Names and telephone numbers
_____	Locations
_____	Approximate capacities (avg. attendance)

Did emergency response officials know, or have access to information as to which such facilities (if any) were equipped for enhanced, expedient, or pressurized shelter-in-place?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

2. Were schools and day care centers affected by protective actions promptly identified?
[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were they promptly contacted, to verify notification and determine needs for assistance? (Note: The extent of play agreement will define whether particular contacts should be actual, or simulated by calling a control cell.)

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

When were these contacts started? _____ Completed? _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Was assistance provided to schools or day care centers in implementing sheltering?
[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, how was this assistance provided?

4. Was transportation assistance provided to schools or day care centers? [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, answer the remainder of question 4.

Which schools/day care centers were assisted?

Record the providers contacted, resources committed, and resources actually mobilized for the exercise.

Provider	No. of Vehicles Committed	Type of vehicle (bus/van/car etc.)	No actually mobilized for exercise
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

Did they coordinate with traffic control personnel to ensure the vehicles could get in and out without obstruction?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Were designated host facilities contacted to coordinate reception of evacuated children?
(Note: The extent of play agreement will define whether particular contacts should be actual, or simulated by calling a control cell.) [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 2-3.c, 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, list the facilities contacted:

6. Was information prepared for public distribution, about what actions were taken to protect children in schools and day care centers, and when and where they could be picked up?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, was this information promptly forwarded to personnel responsible for distributing it to the public (e.g., via EAS)?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the information accurate and complete?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Briefly note any problems:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Implementation -- Evaluated at School or Day Care Center.

7. Did officials and staff at the school or day care center demonstrate knowledge of their role in protecting the children? (*put Y, N, N/A, or N/O below*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

_____ How they are notified of a chemical emergency?

_____ What protective actions may be recommended for their facility?

_____ Their role in implementing the protective action? (As provided in the plan—
e.g., assembling children for transport, or procedures to implement shelter-in-place.)

_____ Who they can turn to for assistance and how to get in touch with them?

8. Were protective actions physically demonstrated at this location?

[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were they carried out promptly and correctly?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Briefly note what was done:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Implementation – Field Evaluation of Resource Provider.

9. Were resources mobilized to demonstrate evacuation assistance to schools or day care centers?

[Pl. Guid. 8.6, 8.9, 8.12, App. E; NRT-1, pp. 56-58; CPG 1-8 4.3.e-g; CPG 1-8A 2-4.g,h, App. A.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, provide the following information:

Organization observed? _____

Type of vehicle? _____

Dispatched from? _____

Time: _____

Pick-up point? _____

Time: _____

Drop-off point? _____

Time: _____

Route followed? _____

Was a driver and vehicle ready to go promptly following the request for assistance?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the driver briefed on the hazard, the destination, the route to follow etc.?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe exceptions:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. (continued)

Did the driver follow the prescribed route and find the pick up and drop off points correctly?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were communications demonstrated while enroute?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, with whom did they communicate? _____

10. Did field personnel demonstrate knowledge of: [Pl. Guid. 8.10.1, App. E; CAIRA App. E.]

How to recognize signs and symptoms of agent intoxication?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

What to do if they suspect agent intoxication?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

All evaluators complete the following questions:

12. Did the organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

13. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 8: TRAFFIC AND ACCESS CONTROL

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas and to control evacuation traffic flow.

Evaluation Element 8.1: Traffic and Access Control

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to control access to evacuated and sheltered areas and to control evacuation traffic flow.

Intent

When an emergency is imminent or has occurred, control of access into the affected area (accident site, sheltered area, evacuated area) must be established in order to prevent additional persons from encountering risk of exposure to agent. Access control also helps to prevent crime (e.g., theft) in evacuated areas. In general, access control on-post will be the responsibility of the Army, and off-post access control will be the responsibility of civilian authorities.

Control of access to a restricted area will involve blocking vehicle traffic on all roads leading into the area as well as other relevant parts of the traffic network. Roadblocks generally should be staffed, but in some cases unstaffed barricades may be acceptable. In addition, access via railways, waterways, and air traffic should be blocked or diverted. Coordination with other organizations may be necessary to accomplish this.

As a protective action, evacuation may be ordered or recommended for on-post and/or off-post areas. On-post, non-essential personnel may be evacuated from work areas, and support areas and facilities such as billeting, food services, and recreational facilities may be evacuated. Off-post, some of the IRZ and/or some of the PAZ may be evacuated. A timely, orderly evacuation will require traffic control on the evacuation routes to expedite the movement of the population. Personnel at traffic control points may be required to ensure that traffic follows the evacuation route (e.g., turns a certain way at an intersection), reverse lanes to increase route capacity, or spot accidents and call for assistance.

This evaluation element covers control of access to areas that are restricted due to protective actions, and traffic control to facilitate evacuation of affected on-post or off-post areas and facilities. Access control and security at the immediate site of the accident or incident is addressed in Objective 13 (Field Response), Evaluation Element 13.3 "Security and Accountability" and Personal Protective Equipment is addressed in Evaluation Element 13.1 "Emergency Worker Exposure Control".

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Contacts made to resource providers, and the extent of participation of organizations that are responsible for performing traffic and access control, will be defined in the extent of play agreement. Participation should be encouraged by the exercise planning team; the demonstration and training value of the exercise will be enhanced by participation of as many organizations as possible. Contacts to any non-participating organizations should be simulated via calls to a control cell.

Field resources (e.g., vehicles, equipment/material, and personnel) should actually be mobilized to the extent feasible. If it is not feasible to mobilize all of the resources that would be used in a real emergency, the particular units to be mobilized should be selected randomly in order to provide a representative demonstration of the available resources.

All aspects of the demonstration, including mobilization of resources and any simulation to be employed, should be detailed in the extent of play agreement to serve as the basis for evaluation. In general, demonstration of this evaluation element will include activities at EOCs and in the field involving the following capabilities:

- (a) **Determination of the locations of access and traffic control points.** The jurisdictions should know the location of pre-determined control points and should be able to make a decision regarding the placement of ad-hoc control points (if the plan allows for such) as the situation requires. The evaluator(s) in the EOC may see the control points depicted on maps and/or displays.
- (b) **Activation of resources to establish control points.** The jurisdictions should be able to contact resource providers requesting the activation and/or mobilization of pre-determined and ad hoc control point resources (vehicles, equipment/materials or personnel). The evaluator(s) in the EOC may observe and evaluate the contacts being made and/or the resources for the control points activated. The evaluator(s) in the field may only be able to observe and evaluate the resources as they arrive.
- (c) **Arrangements to block access via other means.** The jurisdictions should know the procedures required to block access to the restricted area from railways, waterways, and from the air as described in their plans. The evaluator(s) in the EOC should observe and evaluate this activity, if required.
- (d) **Coordination with other organizations and jurisdictions.** The jurisdictions and organizations should coordinate activities as required by their plans. Both the EOC and the field evaluator(s) should be able to observe and evaluate this activity.
- (e) **Ability to react to scenario changes or message injects.** The jurisdictions and the response organizations/personnel should be able to react to changes in the play as required by the scenario, or through controller injected messages. This may require repositioning control points, and/or mobilizing additional resources to respond to the situation (e.g., tow-trucks required to clear a traffic impediment). Both the EOC and the field evaluator(s) should be able to observe and evaluate this activity.
- (f) **Ability to communicate with the base jurisdiction/organization.** The response jurisdictions/organizations should be able to communicate with their personnel while in transit to, and while deployed at control points. Information regarding protective actions (e.g., changes to a protective action, repositioning of control points due to a wind shift, or another reception center being opened) should be provided as necessary. Both the EOC and the field evaluator(s) should be able to observe and evaluate this activity.
- (g) **Ability to prepare for, and dispatch promptly following activation, and to find the correct location.** The response organizations and the resource providers should be able

to deploy their assets to the control point promptly. In addition, the responders should be able to locate their assigned point(s) and arrive there expeditiously. Both the EOC and the field evaluator(s) should be able to observe and evaluate this activity.

- (h) **Knowledge of the emergency situation and response actions.** The field responders should demonstrate knowledge of the emergency situation and the response actions, including the Chemical Event Notification Level (CENL), release status, protective actions, evacuation routes, reception center locations, and the signs and effects of chemical agent exposure. The evaluator(s) in the field should be able to observe and evaluate this activity.

Depending on assigned locations, the evaluator(s) will observe exercise play from the determination of required control points and dispatch through the completion of the control point assignment. Normal traffic should not be interfered with during the exercise unless so specified in the extent of play agreement.

In accordance with the response organization's plan, all the activities required to demonstrate the evaluation element are to be carried out as they would be in an actual emergency. The evaluation form is arranged according to location of expected activity: generally questions 1 through 6 should be answered based on observation of EOC activity, and questions 8 through 13 should be based on observation of field activity. Question 7 should be answered as appropriate, and questions 14 and 15 should be answered by all evaluators.

Exercise of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario with on- and off-post protective actions.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this evaluation element, refer to *the Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 8.8 and Appendix G, and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, Sections 3-5.c.(10) and 5-4.b.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Access Control:</i>	All activities accomplished for the purpose of controlling entry of persons into a restricted area (i.e., preventing the public from entering accident site, sheltered or evacuated areas and permitting emergency workers with essential missions to enter the area.
<i>Traffic Control:</i>	All activities accomplished for the purpose of facilitating evacuation in vehicles along specific routes.
<i>Restricted Area:</i>	Area subject to protective actions, into which access will be controlled.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Traffic/Access Control Point(s)

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Traffic/Access Control Point(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 8.1: Traffic and Access Control

Demonstrate the ability and resources necessary to control evacuation traffic flow and access to evacuated and sheltered areas.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Evaluate at Emergency Operations Center:

1. Did the staff identify access control points to block road access to restricted areas?
[Pl. Guid. 8.8.1 (pt. 8-1), App. G (pt. G-1.d.(1); CAIRA 5-4.c.(2); NRT-1 C.9.b, C.11; CPG 1-8 3.3.(e), 3.3(i); CPG 1-8A, p. A-15(130)] *(Attach a map if appropriate.)*

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

Did the staff identify other means of ingress (e.g., railway, water, air) that would have to be blocked or diverted?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

2. Were traffic control points identified to manage traffic along evacuation routes?
[Pl. Guid. 8.8.1, (pt. 8-2), App. G (pt. G-2.b(2)); CAIRA 3-5.c.(10), 5-4.c.; CPG 1-8, 4-3.i; CPG 1-8A, p. A-15(130)]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

3. Were arrangements made to activate access and traffic control points?
[Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-3); App. G(pt. G-1.d., pt. G-2.b.); CAIRA 3-5.c.(10), 5-4.c.; CPG 1-8, 4-3.i; CPG 1-8A, p. A-14(125)]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

If YES, when were these calls made?

Call(s) to activate access control points: _____

Call(s) to activate traffic control points: _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Were arrangements made (directly or through another agency) to block access by other means (e.g., railroad, water, air)?

[Pl. Guid. App. G (pt. G-1.a.); CPG 1-8, 4-3.i., Ann. E.IV.B.3.(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15(130)]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

If YES, when were these calls made?

Call(s) to block rail traffic: _____

Call(s) to block water traffic: _____

Call(s) to block air traffic: _____

5. Were sufficient resources identified to staff all of the access and traffic control points that would be needed? (*Organizations were actually contacted to verify that resources would be available.*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(p. 8-4), App. G(pts. G-1.c.(2) and G-2.a.(2)); CAIRA 3-5.c.(10), 5-4.b.; CPG 1-8, 4-3.i., Ann. E.IV.B.3(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A. p. A-14(124)]

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

What organizations committed staff or other resources (e.g., barricades) for access and traffic control?

6. Was sufficient information supplied to organizations implementing access and traffic control, regarding: (*put Yes, No, N/A or N/O*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-13), App. G(pts. G-1.d.(6) and G-2.c.(4)); CAIRA 3-5.c.10., 5-4.b.; CPG 1-8, 4-3.i., Ann. E.IV.B.3(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A.p. A-14(125)]

_____ Emergency classification?

_____ Release of agent status?

_____ Protective actions?

_____ Evacuation routes?

_____ Opening of reception center/congregate care centers?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. (continued)

If NO, explain:

Was this information updated, as conditions changed? (e.g., changes in CENL, wind direction, protective action areas)

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Evaluate at EOC or based on Field Observation, as appropriate:

7. Did personnel responsible for access and traffic control respond to any traffic impediments, accidents, or other situations necessitating the securing of supplemental resources?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-4), App. G(pt. G-2.b(11)); CPG 1-8, 4-3.i, Ann. E, IV.B.3(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-23(220)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were the proper organizations contacted to provide necessary resources for clearing impediments, accidents, etc.?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If necessary, was evacuation traffic re-routed around the impediment?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Briefly note the nature of the situation and what was done in response:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluate based on field observation of access/traffic control:

8. What organization did you observe? [Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pts. 8-3, 8-5), App. G(pt.G-1.d); CAIRA 3-5.c.10., 5-4.b.; CPG 1-8, 4-3.i, Ann. E.IV.B.3(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-14(125)]

Where were they dispatched from? _____

Were they briefed prior to dispatch?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

Were they provided with a specific route to follow to avoid contaminated areas on the way to the control point?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

When were they dispatched? _____

When did they arrive? _____

Was this the correct location?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____ N/O _____

What was the nature of the assignment? (*Check one*)

_____ Access control, or

_____ Traffic control

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Did the control point personnel know: (*put Yes, No, N/A or N/O*) [Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-5), App. G (pts.G-1.d., e., pt. G-2.b.(10),(11)); CPG 1-8, 4-3.i, Ann. E.IV.B.3(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-14(125)]

_____ Current CENL?

_____ Current protective action(s)?

_____ Their assignment (i.e., which way traffic should go/not go)?

_____ Evacuation routes?

_____ Destination points?

_____ Location of reception centers?

_____ Whether there had been a release of agent?

10. Were control point personnel provided detailed maps (including sufficient extra copies for distribution to evacuees as needed) depicting all evacuation routes, TCPs, ACPs, Reception Centers and Mass Care Facilities? [Pl. Guid. App. G. (pts. G-1.e. and G-2.b.(10)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

11. Did they have appropriate equipment available to establish the control point? [Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-4), App. G(pts.G-1.d.(3) and G.2.b.(5)); CPG 1-8, 4-3.i, Ann. E.IV.B.3(c); CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-14(125)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

12. Were they able to communicate with a base from their control point? [Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-13), App. G(pts. G-1.d.(6) and G-2.c.(4))]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

13. After deployment, were they kept up-to-date as to changes in protective actions or other circumstances that might affect their assignment?

[Pl. Guid. 8.8.1(pt. 8-13), App. G(pts. G-1.d.(6) and G-2.c.(4))]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Explain any changes and their effect on the control point assignment (e.g., redeployment):

Evaluate at all locations:

14. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

15. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

OBJECTIVE 9: PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Demonstrate the ability to disseminate accurate information to the news media and process inquiries from the public regarding the chemical accident/incident.

Evaluation Element 9.1: Emergency Public Information -- Media

Demonstrate the ability to develop and coordinate dissemination of clear, accurate, complete, and timely information to the news media.

Intent

During a chemical event, it is critical that coordinated, accurate, and timely information be provided to the public and the media. An effective emergency public information program anticipates and monitors the concerns of the public and media and provides frequent, timely information on the emergency situation and any necessary actions the public should take.

Coordinated information should be provided to the media, to assure that the public receives clear and consistent information; prevent dissemination of or dispel conflicting, inaccurate or misleading information; and promote public confidence in the ability of responsible jurisdictions and organizations to protect the public health and safety.

Public information specialists from the Army, federal, state, and local jurisdictions, and volunteer agencies should cooperate to provide coordinated, consistent and integrated information about their response activities and the overall emergency response effort. The cooperation of all participating jurisdictions and organizations in an integrated joint emergency public information effort will allow for the release of balanced, thorough, accurate, and well-timed information to the media and public throughout the course of the emergency response.

Each jurisdiction should designate a public information officer (PIO) or a public affairs officer (PAO) to communicate with the news media in the event of a CAI. Each PIO/PAO should be supported by a staff to assist with information gathering, development of written materials, response to telephone inquiries, and other related tasks. Information should be distributed via news releases, media briefings, interviews, answers to inquiries from the media, and distribution of previously developed informational materials.

Public information staff should monitor media coverage of the emergency and inquiries from the media and public in order to identify inconsistent, conflicting, confusing, misleading, erroneous or insufficient information the public or media may be receiving, or areas of concern that may need to be addressed by participating organizations.

A Joint Information Center (JIC) should be established as the focal point for coordination and dissemination of information during the emergency. Facilities and equipment at the JIC must be adequate to support operations. The JIC should have adequate space, infrastructure and equipment to support the surge of personnel, media and activity that can be expected in the event of an emergency.

Reliable communication links are essential to the JIC's function. In order for the JIC to serve effectively as an information clearinghouse, a continual flow of information must be

maintained to and from the participating response organizations. The JIC staff must have prompt access to the latest information from the EOCs and other response locations. In addition, the JIC staff must be able to communicate with public information staff operating at other locations, to coordinate release of information.

The JIC is the key facility devoted to the public information function. However, it is not the only location public information activities will occur. Inquiries from media and the public may be expected to begin immediately as soon as there is any indication of something unusual at the installation. Thus PIO/PAOs will likely have to begin distributing information from their offices, or from the EOC, prior to activation of the JIC. After the JIC is activated, PIO/PAOs or other personnel at the EOC will still have a role in gathering and developing information to be forwarded to the JIC for distribution. In addition, it should be anticipated that members of the media will go wherever and talk to whomever they can in their search for information, and will not limit themselves to the JIC.

This evaluation element is closely related to Objective 5 (Alert and Notification of the Public). Objectives 5 and 9 are both concerned with communicating information to the public in an emergency situation. Objective 5 is concerned with official information and instructions that are distributed via sirens in voice mode, tone alert radios, EAS, etc., in order to specifically tell the public how to respond to the emergency. Objective 9 is concerned with information that is distributed at the JIC (or at other locations) through media channels and by direct answers to inquiries from the public. This evaluation element (9.1) covers information distributed through media briefings, news conferences, interviews, news releases and other oral and written disseminations of information to the media. The other evaluation element under this objective, Element 9.2, "Public Inquiries", addresses information provided directly to the public by staff that answer inquiries from the public telephoned to a "public inquiry" number.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Responsible jurisdictions should demonstrate the ability to gather, disseminate and coordinate information to the media and the public as soon as the need arises. Public information activities will likely be initiated at a PIO/PAO office or EOC. Once the JIC is activated, it will be the primary center for distribution of information. However, EOCs and PIO/PAO offices will continue to play a role in gathering and coordinating information, and may perform other public information functions as well. The evaluation form is designed to accommodate evaluation of public information activities wherever they occur.

The quality and quantity of information disseminated is the most important part of the demonstration. The information provided to the media should be:

- **Accurate.** Information provided at briefings and in media releases should accurately reflect the situation, particularly with respect to the accident scenario and recommended protective actions. Accuracy of released information and media reporting should be monitored.
- **Complete.** The media should be supplied with all significant information available to the emergency response organizations, provided it has been properly authorized for release. (For example, the jurisdiction may have a policy not to release names of injured persons until family members have been notified.) In addition, prepared

background and explanatory material, such as fact sheets, should be available pertaining to chemical agents and the accident response process.

- **Clear.** Clarity should be evaluated from a "common sense" point of view -- can the information be readily understood by a member of the public in the affected area who is not familiar with chemical hazards or terminology? The information should be couched in clear, simple language and avoid unnecessary use of technical terms, acronyms and jargon that may be confusing. Information released should be consistent, both internally and with previously disseminated information.
- **Timely.** Information provided in media briefings and releases should not lag unreasonably behind the flow of events. Information of importance to public health and safety, such as changes in protective actions, should be distributed as soon as possible.
- **Coordinated.** Information coming from the various response organizations should be coordinated to promote consistency. Spokespersons, including those at the JIC and those at other locations (if any), should exchange news releases and other written material and discuss information to be provided orally in advance of the dissemination when possible. When coordination in advance is not possible, every effort should be made to promptly provide all jurisdictions with the information disseminated.

The responsible jurisdictions should demonstrate establishment of a JIC, set up as it would be in an actual emergency, where participating organizations can coordinate their emergency public information activities. Each organization should have a designated spokesperson with access to all necessary information and technical staff. A full range of media briefing activities should take place, including, at a minimum, presentation of news conferences or briefings and generation of news releases.

To ensure that accurate and complete information is reaching the public, public information staff should demonstrate the ability to monitor and respond to media reporting and public inquiries. Prompt follow-up should be demonstrated if media monitoring, inquiries from the public or information from other sources indicate that the public or media has received erroneous, misleading, unclear, inconsistent, confusing or insufficient information.

Responsible jurisdictions should also demonstrate the capability to respond to telephone inquiries from the media. A telephone number for inquiries should be provided to the media. A team of personnel should be assigned to answering inquiries received. Team members should be trained in how to deal with the media and should demonstrate the capability to handle media calls for specific requests such as film footage, photo opportunities, background information or interviews. Team members should be kept apprised of current information about the emergency and response efforts. They should be provided copies of background explanatory material and of all EAS messages and written news releases. Team members should log all calls received, noting the name and organization of the caller, phone (and facsimile number, if applicable) and the nature of the inquiry. Calls should be referred to the PIO/PAO or other appropriate JIC staff as necessary. The team should also demonstrate the ability to detect patterns in the inquiries that indicate the presence of rumors, misinformation, or confusion; such indications should be reported to the PIOs/PAOs for clarification. Once so reported they should be researched, as necessary, and an appropriate response given in news releases and media briefings.

There should be a team leader to manage team activities, ensuring that team members are kept up to date on events, and providing coordination with the PIO/PAO staff.

All public information activities, including set up of facilities, use of materials and equipment, preparation of releases, and other functions, should be performed as they would be in an actual emergency according to the plans and procedures and the extent of play agreement.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario. Some means should be provided for demonstrating interaction with reporters during news conferences or briefings, by arranging for exercise controllers or public information officers to play the roles of reporters. A control cell should be used to generate telephone media inquiries.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Joint Information Center (JIC):</i>	A facility staffed by spokespersons from the Army, federal, state, and local jurisdictions, as well as volunteer agencies, for the purpose of providing a single, designated focal point for contact with the media and to facilitate exchange and coordination of information among spokespersons from different organizations. It provides a location for public information specialists to collaborate on and coordinate the gathering, analysis, production and release of public information.
<i>Public Information Officer/Public Affairs Officer (PIO/PAO):</i>	An emergency response staff member with the responsibility to develop and/or deliver emergency public information for media distribution. A PIO/PAO may also be a spokesperson, or may only develop materials to be delivered by someone else.
<i>Spokesperson:</i>	An emergency response staff member with the responsibility for delivering emergency public information to the media.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Public Affairs Office, Media Center
and/or other location(s)

OFF-POST

Joint Information Center, EOCs,
and/or other designated locations

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 9.1: Emergency Public Information -- Media

Demonstrate the ability to develop and coordinate dissemination of clear, accurate, complete, and timely information to the news media.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Check the type of facility evaluated:
[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

_____ Joint Information Center (JIC)

_____ EOC

_____ Other (specify) _____

2. When was the decision made to activate the JIC?
[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

TIME: _____

With whom was coordination accomplished? *(List name and organization)*

When was the JIC activated? TIME: _____

How were the media informed that the JIC had been activated?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

JIC Staffing:

3. What jurisdictions had public information staff at the JIC?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

Were all jurisdictions represented?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, note exceptions:

JIC Facility:

4. Did the JIC have enough space, infrastructure and equipment to support operations?
 (Check off. Explain any deficits in an evaluation worksheet)
 [Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

- | | |
|-------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| _____ | A large briefing room adequate to accommodate expected media. |
| _____ | Private (media-free) work areas for public information personnel. |
| _____ | Interview areas set aside for one-on-one interviews. |
| _____ | Effective communications systems to enable the PIOs/PAOs to maintain contact with EOCs and all other relevant response locations. |
| _____ | Sufficient equipment such as word processing, fax machines, and copiers to support operations. |
| _____ | Sufficient electrical service to support the surge of demand from computers, lights, cameras, PA systems, radio equipment, etc. |

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. (continued)

- _____ Office furniture, equipment and supplies.
- _____ Adequate parking.
- _____ A minimum of ten telephones for media use.
- _____ Work area for a public inquiry telephone team.
- _____ Work area for a media inquiry telephone team.
- _____ Provision to control access to the facility (*e.g., a sign-in desk and I.D. badges*).

5. When were **media briefings** held? (*Record time of each briefing.*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

Briefing 1:	_____	Briefing 4:	_____
Briefing 2:	_____	Briefing 5:	_____
Briefing 3:	_____	Briefing 6:	_____

6. Was information provided at **media briefings**:

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

_____	Accurate?	_____
_____	Timely?	_____
_____	Clear?	_____
_____	Complete?	_____

(*Check all that apply. Use the lines at right to briefly note any problems, and explain them fully in an evaluation worksheet.*)

7. When were **news releases** issued? (*Record times of all news releases. Note: include all written releases composed during the exercise, whether termed a "release," "bulletin," "alert," etc. -- i.e., everything except prescribed materials.*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

Release 1:	_____	Release 4:	_____
Release 2:	_____	Release 5:	_____
Release 3:	_____	Release 6:	_____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Was information provided in **news releases**:

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

_____ Accurate? _____
 _____ Timely? _____
 _____ Clear? _____
 _____ Complete? _____

(Check all that apply. Use the lines at right to briefly note any problems, and explain them fully in an evaluation worksheet.) (Note: collect copies of all news releases and attach to the evaluation form.)

9. Did the PIOs/PAOs give any telephone interviews?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, was the information provided in **telephone interviews**:

_____ Accurate? _____
 _____ Timely? _____
 _____ Clear? _____
 _____ Complete? _____

(Check all that apply. Use the lines at right to briefly note any problems, and explain them fully in an evaluation worksheet.)

10. Did public information staff at this location have access to prompt and complete information about their organization's response activities?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

11. Did each PIO/PAO receive copies of all EAS messages?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

At what time did they receive copies of the EAS messages?

EAS #1: _____	EAS #4: _____
EAS #2: _____	EAS #5: _____
EAS #3: _____	EAS #6: _____

Were the EAS messages consistent with JIC releases?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

12. Was background/explanatory material about chemical agents and chemical accident response procedures:

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

____ Provided to all appropriate JIC staff?

____ Available for distribution to media?

13. When appropriate, was authorization obtained prior to release of information?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

14. Where appropriate, was information released in other languages?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, which language(s)? _____

15. Was released information coordinated with other PIO/PAOs and spokespersons:

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

• At this location? YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

• At other locations? YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Describe the process for coordinating information:

Did they exchange hard copies of all news releases?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

16. Were staff and equipment assigned to monitor radio and television broadcasts for accuracy? [Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

17. Was a team of personnel assigned to answer media telephone inquiries?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

What organization(s) directed and staffed this function?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

17. (continued)

How many staff were available to answer media inquiries? _____

How many telephone lines were dedicated to media inquiries? _____

Was there a designated team leader?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

How were media informed of the number to call to access the team?

18. Were the team members provided current, complete, accurate information about the emergency and response efforts?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

19. Did they demonstrate the capability to handle media calls for specific requests such as film footage, photo opportunities, background information or interviews?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

Were all calls logged, with name, organization, and phone number of caller?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the team able to handle the traffic of incoming calls? (i.e., did not get "overloaded")

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

20. Did the team demonstrate the ability to detect, from the nature or pattern of the inquiries, possible rumors, misinformation or areas of confusion that should be referred to PIOs/PAOs for clarification?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Briefly note any such items identified: _____

21. Were the PIO/PAO staff informed (by the media inquiry team or the public inquiry team) of areas needing clarification?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, what were they? _____

Did the PIO/PAO staff develop appropriate release(s) to address them?

22. Did the organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

23. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 9.2: Public Inquiries

Demonstrate the ability to receive and respond to inquiries from the public in a coordinated and timely fashion.

Intent

An effective public inquiries program serves two purposes. First, it provides information and assistance to the public on a one-on-one basis. Second, it serves as a feedback mechanism for public information. Patterns in public inquiries may indicate the presence of unconfirmed reports, rumors, misinformation, or areas requiring clarification that should be addressed in news releases and briefings.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Responsible jurisdictions should demonstrate the capacity to receive and effectively respond to numerous simultaneous telephone calls from the general public and to respond to questions, requests, or comments posed by them. A bank of telephones and team of personnel should be assigned to this function. The team should demonstrate the capability to provide accurate information to callers. The team should have current information about the emergency and response efforts and should be provided copies of background explanatory material and of all EAS messages and written news releases. If a call requires additional information, the team should demonstrate the ability to either refer the caller to an appropriate source, or promptly obtain the information and call back with the answer. All calls should be logged, with the name and telephone number of the caller. There should be a team leader to manage team activities, ensuring that team members are kept up to date on events, and providing coordination with the PIO/PAO staff.

The team should also demonstrate the ability to detect patterns in the inquiries that indicate the presence of unconfirmed reports, rumors, misinformation, concern, or confusion; such indications should be reported to the PIOs/PAOs for clarification. Once so reported they should be researched, as necessary, and an appropriate response given in news releases and media briefings.

The telephone number(s) for public inquiries should be publicized promptly via EAS and/or media information so that the public knows what number to call for information. The public information number should not be the same as the media inquiry number, which should be reserved for media use only.

All scenarios are compatible with this evaluation element. For proper demonstration, a large number of messages must be prepared and called in by exercise controllers. All equipment that would be used in the public inquiries program should be in place and operable for the exercise.

Clarification of Terms

Rumor: Information unconfirmed by an official source.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Public Affairs Office
(or other designated locations)

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Joint Information Center
(or other designated locations)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 9.2: Public Inquiries

Demonstrate the ability to receive and respond to inquiries from the public in a coordinated and timely fashion.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Was a team of personnel assigned to answering public telephone inquiries?
[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Where was it located? _____

When was it activated? TIME: _____

What organization(s) directed and staffed the public inquiry operation?

How many personnel were available to answer calls? _____

How many telephone lines were dedicated to public inquiries? _____

Was there a designated team leader?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

How was the public informed of the number to call for inquiries?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

2. How did the public inquiry team receive information about the emergency and response efforts? (*Check all that apply.*)

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

_____ Verbal briefings
_____ Copies of EAS messages
_____ Copies of news releases
_____ Other:

Was the team provided current, complete, accurate information about the emergency and response efforts?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the team provided background/explanatory material about chemical agents and response procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

3. Did the public inquiry team provide prompt, accurate, consistent, and responsive information to callers?

[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

Were all calls logged, with name and telephone number of caller?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was the team able to handle the traffic of incoming calls? (i.e., did not get "overloaded")

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____ TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____ ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____ DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Did the public inquiries team demonstrate the ability to detect, from the nature or pattern of the inquiries, possible rumors, misinformation or areas of concern or confusion that should be referred to PIOs/PAOs for clarification?
[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Briefly note the nature of any such items identified:

Did they notify the PIO/PAO staff of areas needing clarification?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, when was that notification made? TIME: _____

5. Was the public inquiry telephone number publicized?
[Pl. Guid. 8.14, App. J; CAIRA 3-4.c.(11), 3-5.c.(11), App. H; CPG 1-8 4.3.d; CPG 1-8A 2-4.f, pp. A-20,21.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, how was it publicized?

____ News briefings
____ EAS messages
____ Public information brochures and postings
____ Other: _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. Did the organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

7. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

OBJECTIVE 10: MEDICAL SERVICES - FIRST RESPONSE

Demonstrate appropriate initial medical response activities for the chemical agent(s) identified in the exercise.

Evaluation Element 10.1: Administration of Self Aid, Buddy Aid, and Initial Treatment in a Potentially Contaminated Environment

Demonstrate the ability to administer appropriate self-aid, buddy aid and initial treatment for a person with injuries received in a potentially contaminated environment.

Intent

Many emergency operations following a chemical accident/incident require deploying installation emergency workers to the field, putting them at risk of significant exposure to the chemical agent(s). If there is an event with a significant off-post impact, civilian emergency workers may be involved in the response and could also be exposed. Emergency workers must be trained to recognize symptoms of distress and exposure, and take appropriate actions, including use of antidotes when appropriate.

Because rapid treatment of chemical agent casualties can be crucial to survival, initial treatment of exposed individuals in response to a chemical accident/incident is of the utmost importance so as to minimize immediate illness or fatalities.

This objective is related to Objectives 11 (Medical Response - Transportation) and 12 (Medical Response - Medical Facilities). Also related are Objective 13 (Field Response), Evaluation Element 13.2 "Emergency Worker Decontamination" and Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration and Congregate Care of Evacuees), Evaluation Element 14.1 "Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination" and Evaluation Element 14.2 "Decontamination of Evacuees".

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

This evaluation element will be demonstrated primarily at the site of the chemical accident/incident, using the equipment and procedures that would be used in a real emergency, but it may also be demonstrated at off-post locations. In the **Immediate Response** phase, the emergency workers who may be exposed to chemical agent must be able to protect themselves. They should demonstrate knowledge of the various chemical agents, the symptoms they cause, decontamination, and administration of antidotes. Additional assistance would subsequently be provided by the **Medical Response Teams**. They should demonstrate capability to provide adequate initial treatment of potentially exposed patients and to prepare them for evacuation, including contamination control

measures (primarily decontamination). Emergency medical technicians and other personnel also should demonstrate knowledge of the correct priority of emergency medical treatment procedures for patients exposed to chemical agents, and segregation (triage) procedures. The availability and use of appropriate chemical agent antidotes, medical supplies, and equipment for detecting chemical agents are to be demonstrated.

Finally, the ability to stabilize the patient(s) and transfer them to the team(s) that will transport them to a designated medical facility should be demonstrated.

Immediate Response

Demonstration of this evaluation element, on-post and off-post, will include knowledge of the **symptoms of exposure** (see below for a description of symptoms of agent exposure) and appropriate **self-aid** and **buddy-aid** for a person or persons with injuries in a (potentially or actually) contaminated environment.

- (1) **Symptoms of exposure** to agent via inhalation (the most common exposure route for volatile agents such as GB) include runny nose, blurred vision, pinpoint pupils (miosis), and chest tightness with shortness of breath. Symptoms of cutaneous (skin) exposure (the most common type of exposure to agents such as VX) include localized sweating or muscular twitching followed by systemic effects such as nausea or abdominal cramps. Reaction to mustard agents are not always immediate and may not be apparent for up to 48 hours after exposure. In minutes to hours, symptoms may include blisters on the skin, redness, swelling, itching of skin and eyes. (For additional information on symptoms, consult the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, Table E-1, pp. 78-79.)
- (2) **Self-aid** consists of measures a person exposed to agent can apply in helping his or herself, including decontamination and administration of chemical agent antidote.
- (3) **Buddy-aid** consists of emergency actions taken by an individual to assist a person exposed to agent who is unable to perform self-aid. These actions include masking the casualty, administering antidote, giving assisted ventilation, and decontaminating and evacuating the casualty. It is essential that buddy-aid providers recognize the importance of timely provision of an adequate airway, assurance of adequate breathing effort, establishment of control of blood loss, and rapid and proper administration of antidote. If more than one person (or "buddy") is available to provide assistance, one can perform the airways, breathing and circulation (ABCs) of cardiopulmonary resuscitation and the other can administer the antidote.

Medical Response Team

Following (or concurrent with) self-aid and buddy-aid measures, a medical response team [the Medical Response Team (MRT) on-post and the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) off-post] should be deployed to the scene. The medical response team will provide the requisite medical care after receiving the casualty in the following order of priority:

- (1) **Emergency treatment to save life or limb takes precedence over decontamination.**
Airway management or control of hemorrhage may be as important as treatment of chemical agent poisoning.
- (2) When a (potentially or actually) contaminated casualty has an injury resulting in respiratory difficulty, loss of consciousness, hemorrhage, or shock, the recommended order of priority of emergency actions is as follows:
 - (a) The medical responder should protect him or herself by donning protective equipment (see below for description of protective equipment).
 - (b) The casualty should be removed upwind from the immediate area of liquid contamination.
 - (c) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be performed (as needed) in conjunction with (d) and (e).
 - (d) Chemical agent antidote should be administered (if necessary).
 - (e) The casualty should be decontaminated (to include removal of contaminated clothing). (See below for description of decontamination procedures.)
 - (f) Additional emergency care for shock, wounds, and illness that may endanger life or limb should be administered.
 - (g) Supportive care for less urgent injuries should be administered.
 - (h) Once the above are performed and the patient is stabilized, the patient should be evacuated to a medical facility.
 - (i) Throughout, the proper contamination control procedures should be followed (see below for a brief description of these procedures).

Personnel Protective Equipment (PPE)

On-post personnel protective equipment for this activity would be Level A, including an M3 toxicological agent protective (TAP) suit, M9-series mask with M3-series TAP hood, TAP boots, TAP gloves, surgical gloves for GB or VX operations, and explosive handler's coveralls for GB or VX operations or impregnated underwear for mustard operations. Lower level PPE is at the discretion of the commander in emergency situations, provided that personnel are not exposed directly to levels of chemical agent that exceed the protection factor of the PPE employed and that they are not exposed directly to an unprotected mode of exposure. (See *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991.)

Procedures to Prevent the Spread of Contamination include wearing appropriate protective clothing and placing a protective covering in any emergency vehicle in which a patient may be transported.

Decontamination Procedures for the Injured

- (1) Remove outer clothing from the injured by cutting the clothing and lifting the casualty free of the clothing onto a wire stretcher or a stretcher with a non-absorbent surface.
- (2) Remove remaining clothing by cutting it and pulling it from under the injured.
- (3) Removing any potentially contaminated bandage material, exercising extreme caution when removing bandages used to control bleeding.
- (4) Removal of eyeglasses and contact lenses (hands should be decontaminated before removing contacts or a contact lens remover should be used on the person with contacts).
- (5) Flushing the eyes with large amounts of lukewarm water.
- (6) Gently washing the face and hair with soap and lukewarm water, followed by a thorough rinse with lukewarm water.
- (7) Decontaminating other body surfaces likely to have been contaminated using either (a) undiluted household bleach followed by a clear water rinse or, if no bleach is available, (b) washing with copious amounts of lukewarm soapy water and rinsing with clear lukewarm water.
- (8) Applying fresh bandages where necessary to control bleeding.
- (9) Assuring that all wastewater is contained for proper disposal.

Demonstration of this evaluation element at the chemical event site is compatible with any scenario that exposes an emergency worker to agent. Off-post demonstration will require a scenario that has the possibility of exposing emergency workers or the public to the agent.

Activities associated with this evaluation element should be carried out as specified in the plan and procedures unless deviation from the plan and procedures is specified in the extent of play agreement.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, Chapter 6 (Medical Support), particularly 6-5 "Medical Treatment", and the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L (Planning Standard for Decontamination). CSEPP guidance for Medical Response is currently under development.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Antidote:</i>	A remedy to counteract the effects of agent. The Mark I Nerve Agent Antidote Kit contains an injectable drug to counteract the effects of nerve agent exposure. Injections may be repeated at 5- to 20-minute intervals until three injections are given without the advice of a physician.
<i>Buddy-Aid:</i>	The administration of chemical agent antidote to a person exhibiting symptoms of severe chemical agent poisoning who is unable to perform self-aid.
<i>Contamination:</i>	Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any other material that constitutes a source of potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.
<i>Decontamination:</i>	The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.
<i>Emergency workers:</i>	Personnel performing essential missions within the area potentially affected by the chemical agent to protect the health and safety of the public. The term is applicable to first responders to the chemical event site and others engaged in activities such as manning traffic control along evacuation routes, performing emergency medical services and decontamination, driving evacuation and medical response vehicles, and performing fire and rescue activities, including route alerting.
<i>Medical Response Team:</i>	Refers to both on and off-post response teams. On-post the Medical Response Team (MRT) is led by a physician or physician's assistant and provides: emergency medical triage, treatment, stabilization, and evacuation of victims from the chemical event site to a medical treatment facility. Off-post the medical response team is most likely to be the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) team who will provide the same services.
<i>Self-Aid:</i>	The administration of a chemical agent antidote to oneself upon experiencing early symptoms of chemical agent poisoning.
<i>Triage:</i>	The process of sorting or selection of patients to determine priority of care to be rendered to each.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Field Command Post
Field Operations
CAI Site
Personnel Decontamination Station(s)
On-Post Medical Treatment Facility

OFF-POST

Field Operations
Congregate Care Facilities
Personnel Decontamination Station(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 10.1: Administration of Self Aid, Buddy Aid, and Initial Treatment in a Potentially Contaminated Environment

Demonstrate the ability to administer appropriate self-aid, buddy aid and initial treatment for a person with injuries received in a potentially contaminated environment.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Which organization(s) demonstrated this evaluation element at this location?
[CAIRA 6-5; CPG 1-8, App. H, III, B.1.2; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

2. What type(s) of immediate medical response was demonstrated?
[CAIRA 6-5.a.(1) & (2); CPG 1-8, Ann. H, III, B; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

_____ Self-aid?

_____ Buddy-aid?

_____ Other? _____

3. Was a medical response team or medical response personnel mobilized to this location?
[CAIRA 6-5.-a.(3); CPG 1-8, Ann. H, III, B.1.b and D.1; CPG 1-8A, App. A, pp. A-15, A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, what time were they called? _____

When did they arrive? _____

Was the medical response team or medical response personnel wearing appropriate personal protective equipment?

[CAIRA App. F; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.c; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe why not:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Was triage performed?

[CAIRA 6-1.c., CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.c.; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe:

5. Did the medical response team or medical response personnel follow the correct priority of emergency medical treatment procedures when treating patients?

[CAIRA 6-1, 6-5.b, App. E; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

What injury or medical condition was treated by the medical response team?

Describe the injury or medical condition:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. Did the medical response team or medical response personnel have the appropriate chemical agent antidotes (if applicable), medical supplies, and equipment for treatment of injured patients? [CAIRA 6-2.b, 6-2.f., Tables 6-1 and 6-2; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, D.1.d; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

7. Were appropriate procedures used to prevent the spread of contamination? [Pl. Guid. App. L; CAIRA 6-5.b.(2)(a)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

8. Did the medical response team or medical response personnel ensure that all potentially contaminated patients had been decontaminated? [Pl. Guid. App. L-7; CAIRA 6-5.b., 6-5.d., 13-5.b., App. M; HM-EEM Manual 14-2.2; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.3; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe why not:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. (continued)

Were all decontaminated patients prominently tagged as decontaminated before being transported? [Pl. Guid. App. L(pt. L-6.i.); CAIRA 6-5.d.; HM-EEM Manual 14-2.2; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.4; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

9. Were decontaminated patients subsequently kept under medical surveillance for symptoms of agent exposure?

[CAIRA App. G; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B-3; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

10. Were appropriate procedures followed in segregating contaminated personnel from non-contaminated people?

[Pl. Guid. App. L(pt. L-6); CAIRA 13-5.b.; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.C; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe procedures demonstrated:

11. Were additional health care providers requested (e.g., ambulance drivers, emergency medical personnel)?

[CAIRA 6-5.a.(3); CPG 1-8, Ann. H, D.1.b; CPG 1-8A, App. A. pp. A-15, A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, from which organizations?

12. Were patients stabilized prior to transport?

[CAIRA 6-5.b; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.3; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

13. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

14. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

OBJECTIVE 11: MEDICAL SERVICES – TRANSPORTATION

Demonstrate appropriate medical transportation response activities for the chemical agent(s) identified in the exercise.

Evaluation Element 11.1: Transportation of Injured, Potentially Contaminated Individuals to Medical Treatment Facilities

Demonstrate the adequacy of personnel, procedures, equipment, and vehicles for transporting injured, potentially contaminated individuals to medical treatment facilities.

Intent

Planning for medical services during the response to a chemical accident/incident is critical to ensure that injured, potentially contaminated victims can receive appropriate medical care without unnecessary risk to the medical personnel and facilities used in transport and treatment, while maintaining service to the community at large. Some chemical accident/incidents have the potential for generating large numbers of victims.

This evaluation element focuses on both the prevention of the spread of agent from the contaminated victim who may have a medical problem or injury and treatment during his/her transport by ambulance or medical helicopter to a medical facility. Initial decontamination may be accomplished under Objective 10 (Medical Services – First Response).

This objective also is related to Objective 12 (Medical Response – Medical Facilities), Objective 13 (Field Response), Evaluation Element 13.2 “Emergency Worker Decontamination” and Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration and Congregate Care of Evacuees), Evaluation Element 14.1 “Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination: and Evaluation Element 14.2 “Decontamination of Evacuees”.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The medical response team (or medical response personnel if a full team is not in attendance) that is providing the transportation may be the same as the initial response team. However, if the medical transportation providers are a new set of personnel, they should check on the cleanest route before driving into a potentially contaminated area. They should receive a briefing on the patient(s) condition and status. If there is time, depending on the urgency of the patient(s) condition, they may perform an additional analysis of the patient’s condition. The correct priority of emergency treatment should be determined, as follows:

- (1) **Emergency treatment to save life or limb takes precedence over decontamination.**
Airway management or control of hemorrhage may be as important as treatment of chemical agent poisoning.
- (2) When a (potentially or actually) contaminated casualty has an injury resulting in respiratory difficulty, loss of consciousness, hemorrhage, or shock, the recommended order of priority of emergency actions is as follows:
 - (a) The medical responder should protect him or herself by donning protective equipment.
 - (b) Casualty should be removed upwind from the immediate area of liquid contamination.

- (c) Cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be performed (as needed) in conjunction with (d) and (e).
- (d) Chemical agent antidote should be administered (if necessary).
- (e) The casualty should be decontaminated (to include removal of contaminated clothing). (See below for description of decontamination procedures.)
- (f) Additional emergency care for shock, wounds, and illness that may endanger life or limb should be administered.
- (g) Supportive care for less urgent injuries should be administered, and the patient stabilized for transport.
- (h) The patient should be evacuated to a medical facility.

The medical transportation providers should follow correct contamination control procedures, including wearing gloves and additional protective clothing, and placing a protective covering in the interior of the vehicle. On-post the patient, if not yet certified as decontaminated, and not in critical medical condition, should be kept under surveillance. If contamination is found, the patient(s) should be decontaminated by following decontamination procedures, as follows:

Decontamination Procedures for the Injured

- (1) Remove outer clothing from the injured by cutting the clothing and lifting the casualty free of the clothing onto a wire stretcher or a stretcher with a non-absorbent surface.
- (2) Remove remaining clothing by cutting it and pulling it from under the injured.
- (3) Removing any potentially contaminated bandage material, exercising extreme caution when removing bandages used to control bleeding.
- (4) Removal of eyeglasses and contact lenses (hands should be decontaminated before removing contacts or a contact lens remover should be used on the person with contacts).
- (5) Flushing the eyes with large amounts of lukewarm water.
- (6) Gently washing the face and hair with soap and lukewarm water, followed by a thorough rinse with lukewarm water.
- (7) Decontaminating other body surfaces likely to have been contaminated using either (a) undiluted household bleach followed by a clear water rinse or, if no bleach is available, (b) washing with copious amounts of lukewarm soapy water and rinsing with clear lukewarm water.
- (8) Applying fresh bandages where necessary to control bleeding.
- (9) Assuring that all wastewater is contained for proper disposal.

[For further information about decontamination refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L (Planning Standard for Decontamination)].

Before leaving the site with the patient(s), the medical transportation providers should determine to which medical facility the victim is to be taken and maintain communications with the facility while enroute, including reporting on the condition of the patient(s) to the facility. Such information would include: the age and gender of the patient(s), the physical condition of the patient, data on vital signs (e.g., blood pressure), any special medical treatment that has already been provided (e.g., administration of chemical agent antidote) or that may be required, an indication of the type of chemical agent(s) involved, decontamination procedures performed, where the patient(s) was picked up, and estimated time of arrival (ETA). The transferring organization needs to ensure the proper transfer of responsibility for the patient's care.

After the patient is delivered to the medical treatment facility the following measures should be taken: the medical transportation providers should be screened for signs or symptoms of chemical exposure, containment of any contaminated clothing/bandages, the transportation providers should be decontaminated (if necessary), the vehicle should be taken out of service (if necessary due to potential contamination), and all equipment should be bagged and tagged for future monitoring and decontamination (if necessary).

All activities are to be completed as they would be in an actual emergency; however, all traffic rules and laws must be obeyed during the transport. Transport services involved in the exercise may be designated before the exercise.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario which has injured patients showing symptoms of agent intoxication needing transport to medical facilities.

Clarification of Terms

Contamination: Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any other material that constitutes a source of potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.

Decontamination: The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.

<i>Emergency Workers:</i>	Personnel performing essential missions within the area potentially affected by the chemical agent to protect the health and safety of the public. The term is applicable to first responders to the chemical event site and others engaged in activities such as manning traffic control along evacuation routes, performing emergency medical services and decontamination, driving evacuation and medical response vehicles, and performing fire and rescue activities, including route alerting.
<i>Medical Response Team:</i>	Refers to both on and off-post response teams. On-post the Medical Response Team (MRT) is led by a physician or physician's assistant and provides: emergency medical triage, treatment, stabilization, and evacuation of victims from the chemical event site to a medical treatment facility. Off-post the medical response team is most likely to be the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) team who will provide the same services.
<i>Triage:</i>	The process of sorting or selection of patients to determine priority of care to be rendered to each.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Field Activities
(incl. Transportation)
Medical Facility

OFF-POST

Field Activities
(incl. Transportation)
Medical Facility

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

**Evaluation Element 11.1: Transportation of Injured, Potentially Contaminated
Individuals to Medical Treatment Facilities**

Demonstrate the adequacy of personnel, procedures, equipment, and vehicles for transporting injured, potentially contaminated individuals to medical treatment facilities.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Which organization(s) demonstrated this evaluation element at this location?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(7), 6-5.b.(2)(h); CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.d; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15 (136) & p. A-16 (152)]

Indicate the location where the patient(s) was picked up for transportation to a medical facility.

What type(s) of transportation (vehicle, plane, helicopter, boat) was used?

Note times for the following:

Request for Transportation: _____	Arrival at Location: _____
Departure from Location: _____	Arrival at Med. Facility: _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

2. Was the medical response team instructed on the appropriate, contamination-free route to the accident site?

[CAIRA 6-2.b., 6-3.b.; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15 (133)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

3. Was the medical response team briefed on the status of the patients?

[CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b. & B.8; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16(145)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If decontamination had been performed previously, was the patient appropriately tagged?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

4. Did the incoming medical response team perform additional patient evaluation?

[CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b. & B.8; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16(145)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Did the medical response team follow the correct priority of emergency medical treatment procedures when treating patients?

[CAIRA 6-1, 6-5.b.; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b.; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

6. Did the medical response team employ the following contamination control procedures for themselves and the vehicle? (*Check all that apply.*) [CAIRA 6-5.b(2)(a), App. F]

____ Wore gloves

____ Wore protective clothing

____ Placed protective covering on interior of vehicle

____ Other (Describe) _____

7. Was the patient screened for evidence of chemical agent exposure prior to being placed in the vehicle? [Pl. Guid. App. L; CAIRA 6-5.d.; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.3; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. 4-16(141)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, check procedures demonstrated:

____ Observation of symptoms of nerve agent exposure

____ Other (Describe) _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Was the patient decontaminated prior to being placed in an ambulance or other transport vehicle? [Pl. Guid. App. L; CAIRA 6-5.d; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.3; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. 4-16(141)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, check equipment and procedures used:

____ Outer clothing removed?
 ____ Extraneous items removed (i.e., bandages, jewelry, eyeglasses, contact lenses, wallet, weapons, hearing aid, wigs and toupees, prostheses, etc.)?
 ____ Eyeglasses/contact lenses removed?
 ____ Eyes flushed with water?
 ____ Face/hair washed with lukewarm soapy water and rinsed?
 ____ Decontamination of other body parts with 5% hypochlorite (bleach) solution?
 ____ Bandages replaced (if applicable)?
 ____ Clean clothing donned?
 ____ Follow up monitoring performed?
 ____ Other (Describe) _____

Were records kept of the results of the decontamination?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, attach a copy of the record to your report.

If decontaminated, was the patient appropriately tagged as decontaminated?
 [Pl. Guid. App. L (pt. 6.i.); CAIRA 6-5.d.; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.4; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

9. Was the patient stabilized prior to transport in the medical vehicle?
 [CAIRA 6-5.d.; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.3; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

10. Identify the medical facility where the patient was taken:

[CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.C.; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-16(147) and (160)]

11. Did the medical response team verify clean evacuation routes prior to departure?

[CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b.; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15(133)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

12. Did the medical response team/vehicle crew actually transport the patient to that facility?

[CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.b.; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15(133)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

13. Did the medical response team/vehicle crew communicate with the receiving medical facility while enroute? [CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.f. & B.12; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15(152)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

14. Was patient care sustained during transfer of the patient to the medical facility?

[CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, B.1.f. & B.12; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-15(152)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, indicate patient information transferred to receiving medical facility (*check all that apply*):

- _____ Age, gender of patient?
- _____ Physical condition of the patient?
- _____ Data on vital signs (e.g., blood pressure)?
- _____ Type of first aid administered by first responder?
- _____ Has chemical agent antidote been administered?
- _____ Medical treatment provided in transit?
- _____ Special medical treatment/resources required?
- _____ Where patient was picked up for transfer to medical facility?
- _____ Decontamination procedures performed on the patient(s) prior to transit?
- _____ Expected time of arrival?
- _____ Other (*specify*) _____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

15. After patient was delivered to the hospital, which of the following measures were taken?
(Check those measures taken.)

[Pl. Guid. App. L; CAIRA 6-3; CPG 1-8, Ann. H, D.2.e; CPG 1-8A, App. A, p. A-17(160)]

- _____ Crew screened for signs or symptoms of chemical exposure?
- _____ Contaminated clothing of crew bagged and tagged?
- _____ Crew decontaminated?
- _____ Ambulance taken out of service (if necessary due to potential contamination)?
- _____ Contaminated equipment bagged and tagged?
- _____ Contaminated wastes bagged and tagged?
- _____ At what location(s) were these measures taken? _____

16. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES _____ NO _____ N/A _____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

17. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES _____ NO _____

If YES, describe:

OBJECTIVE 12: MEDICAL SERVICES - MEDICAL FACILITIES

Demonstrate appropriate medical response treatment by health care personnel during a chemical accident/incident.

Evaluation Element 12.1: Adequacy of Medical Facility and Health Care Personnel in Handling Potentially Contaminated Individuals

Demonstrate the adequacy of medical treatment facilities and health care personnel in handling potentially contaminated patients with injuries or medical problems received during a chemical accident/incident.

Intent

Medical services are a critical response element for a chemical accident/incident. Health care personnel should ensure that patients receive appropriate medical care without unnecessary risk of contamination to the facility and staff. Since chemical events have the potential for generating large numbers of casualties, every effort should be made to save lives through the timely use of antidotes and decontamination. The application of triage principles is as valid here as in any other emergency. Adequate communications between emergency site personnel, ambulances, and medical treatment facilities are essential throughout the response.

This evaluation element focuses on appropriate treatment of previously decontaminated but still potentially contaminated patients who may have other medical conditions. Appropriate treatment is agent-specific. Initial treatment is covered by Objective 10 (Medical Services - First Response). Activities concerning transport of the patient are found in Objective 11 (Medical Services - Transportation).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Activities demonstrated for this evaluation element include initial transfer of patient information, availability of appropriately trained staff, and implementation of decontamination control procedures. The role of a potentially contaminated patient requiring medical treatment should be played during the exercise. The patient's medical conditions (including exposure) or injuries may be indicated on an attached tag, represented by moulage, or indicated by a controller. Ideally, the simulated casualty also will provide vital information to the players by effective role playing.

Initial transfer of patient information will be demonstrated by the ambulance crew or the appropriate response organization and the receiving medical facility. Essential information provided to the medical facility should include: the age and gender of the patient, the physical condition of the patient, data on vital signs (e.g., blood pressure), any special medical treatment that has already been provided (e.g., administration of chemical agent antidote) or that may be required, an indication of the type of chemical agent involved, decontamination procedures performed, where the patient was picked up, and estimated time of arrival (ETA). The transferring organization needs to ensure the proper transfer of responsibility for the patient's care. Information on chemical agents and their properties should be available at receiving medical facilities. (General information on transfer of patient information obtained from *Emergency Care and Transportation of the Sick and Injured*, American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 3rd ed., Chicago, IL, 1981, pp. 382-383.)

The receiving medical facility should demonstrate the ability to follow procedures and decontaminate the patient following decontamination procedures.

Decontamination Procedures for the Injured

- (1) Remove outer clothing from the injured by cutting the clothing and lifting the casualty free of the clothing onto a wire stretcher or a stretcher with a non-absorbent surface.
- (2) Remove remaining clothing by cutting it and pulling it from under the injured.
- (3) Removing any potentially contaminated bandage material, exercising extreme caution when removing bandages used to control bleeding.
- (4) Removal of eyeglasses and contact lenses (hands should be decontaminated before removing contacts or a contact lens remover should be used on the person with contacts).
- (5) Flushing the eyes with large amounts of lukewarm water.
- (6) Gently washing the face and hair with soap and lukewarm water, followed by a thorough rinse with lukewarm water.
- (7) Decontaminating other body surfaces likely to have been contaminated using either (a) undiluted household bleach followed by a clear water rinse or, if no bleach is available, (b) washing with copious amounts of lukewarm soapy water and rinsing with clear lukewarm water.
- (8) Applying fresh bandages where necessary to control bleeding.
- (9) Assuring that personnel have been decontaminated.

[For further information about decontamination refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L (Planning Standard for Decontamination)].

These activities should be demonstrated in accordance with the response organizations' plans. The medical facilities participating may be designated prior to the exercise under the extent of play agreement.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario that results in the potential for exposure to personnel.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, Chapter 6 (Medical Support), particularly 6-5 "Treatment in the Field". *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L (Planning Standard for Decontamination).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Chemical Agent Casualty:</i>	A person who has been affected sufficiently by a chemical agent to prevent or seriously degrade the ability to function normally.
<i>Contamination:</i>	Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any other material that constitutes a source of potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.
<i>Persons with Injuries or Medical Problems:</i>	Persons with injuries and/or acute internal conditions, such as a heart attack, not due to exposure to chemical agent.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

<u>ON-POST</u>	<u>OFF-POST</u>
Medical Facility	Medical Facility

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 12.1: Adequacy of Medical Facility and Health Care Personnel in Handling Potentially Contaminated Individuals

Demonstrate the adequacy of medical treatment facilities and health care personnel in handling potentially contaminated patients with injuries or medical problems received during the chemical accident/incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Indicate the name and location of the medical facility. [CAIRA 6-1.c, 6-2.b]

Name: _____

Location: _____

2. What organization was responsible for notifying the medical facility?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(1)(b), 3-5.c.(7)]

When was the medical facility notified?

Time	Chemical Event Notification Level
_____	_____

Was the notification of the medical facility timely (i.e., in time for the facility to prepare adequately for the arrival of chemical agent casualties)? [CAIRA 3.5.c.(1)(b)]

YES ___ NO ___ N/A ___ N/O ___

If NO, describe problems:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Did the medical facility staff communicate with the transportation crew while enroute?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(7)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

If YES, check that information which was provided to the hospital staff by the ambulance crew.

<hr/>	Age, gender of patient?
<hr/>	Physical condition of the patient?
<hr/>	Data on vital signs (e.g., blood pressure)?
<hr/>	Decontamination procedures performed on the patient?
<hr/>	Type of first aid administered by first responders?
<hr/>	Has chemical agent antidote been administered?
<hr/>	Medical treatment provided in transit?
<hr/>	Special medical treatment/resources required?
<hr/>	Where patient was picked up for transfer to medical facility?
<hr/>	Expected time of arrival?
<hr/>	Other (<i>specify</i>) _____

What additional information about the patient was requested by the medical facility staff from the ambulance crew (or any other party notifying the facility of the accident)?

If the facility received information from someone other than the ambulance crew, give organizational affiliation and title (or function) of the person providing the information.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. What medical staff were available at the facility (e.g., physicians, nurses, toxicologists, security personnel)? [CAIRA 6-3]

5. Was triage of incoming patients (if more than one) performed?
[CAIRA 6-1.c]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

6. At what time did the ambulance arrive at the medical facility? _____

7. If the patient was thought to have been exposed to agent, was additional decontamination performed? [Pl. Guid. App. L-7; CAIRA 13-5.b.(2)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. (continued)

If YES, check equipment and procedures used:

_____	Outer clothing removed,
_____	Extraneous items removed (e.g., bandages, jewelry, eyeglasses, contact lenses,
_____	Wallet, weapons, hearing aid, wigs and toupees, prosthesis, etc.)?
_____	Eyeglasses/contact lenses removed?
_____	Eyes flushed with water?
_____	Face/hair washed with lukewarm soapy water and rinsed?
_____	Decontamination of other body parts with 5% hypochlorite (bleach) solution?
_____	Bandages replaced (if applicable)?
_____	Clean clothing donned?
_____	Follow up monitoring performed?
_____	Other (Describe) _____

8. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

9. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 12.2: Casualty Tracking System

Demonstrate the system used to track casualties that have occurred as a result of a chemical accident/incident (including those that may be caused by response efforts or protective action decisions issued).

Intent

Since chemical accident/incidents have the potential for generating a large number of casualties, a system used to track casualties should be in place. Data collected with the system should be used when consultation concerning chemical casualty management is provided to the medical community.

This evaluation element focuses on the system that is used to track casualties that are a result of a chemical accident/incident, including those that may be caused by response efforts or protective action decisions issued. Pertinent data would be collected for each casualty and would serve as a basis for a summary report. This information may prove to be essential for medical, public affairs, legal matters, and resource management.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Activities demonstrated for this evaluation element include the use of a system to track casualties, collection of various kinds of data and its availability to support organizations, and compilation of a summary report.

A system used to track casualties should be demonstrated during the exercise. Also, an identification method used to distinguish casualties should be demonstrated. Casualties may be identified by name or identification number, or by other methods.

Organizations should demonstrate the capability to collect pertinent data while in the field. Pertinent data should include number of fatalities, location, number of hospital admissions, number of patients referred for outpatient care, number of persons with agent exposure, number of persons with non-related injuries, number of persons with anxiety reactions and any changes occurring within 24 hours of tracking system data collection. Tracking system data should be collected for on- and off-post casualties.

Tracking system data should be compiled in a summary report and the format of the report should be demonstrated. Organizations should demonstrate how these data might be utilized when coordinating with support organizations. The application of automated emergency management information to casualty tracking should be demonstrated, if applicable.

These activities should be demonstrated in accordance with the response organizations' plans. The level of demonstration may be designated prior to the exercise under the extent of play agreement.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible under any scenario that results in the potential for exposure to personnel.

Clarification of Terms

*Chemical Agent
Casualty:*

A person who has been affected sufficiently by a chemical agent to prevent or seriously degree the ability to function normally.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Field locations
Emergency Operating Center
Medical Facility

OFF-POST

Field Locations
Emergency Operations Center
Medical Facilities

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 12.2: Casualty Tracking System

Demonstrate the system used to track casualties that have occurred as a result of a chemical accident/incident (including those that may be caused by response efforts or protective actions issued).

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Was a method utilized to track casualties resulting from a chemical accident/incident?
[CAIRA 6-4.d]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, do not continue with this evaluation element.

If YES, indicate type of tracking system utilized (e.g., hard copy forms, automated emergency management system, etc.)

What organization was responsible for tracking casualty data?

2. What identification method(s) was used to distinguish casualties, e.g., by name or identification number?

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Check information used in the tracking system. [CAIRA Figure 6-1]

_____ Fatalities?
 _____ Hospital Admissions?
 _____ Outpatient Care?
 _____ Number of persons with agent exposure?
 _____ Number of persons with non-related injuries?
 _____ Number of persons with anxiety reactions?
 _____ Changes in the last 24 hours?
 _____ Location?
 _____ Other?

4. Were next-of-kin notified? [Army Reg. 600-8-1, 7.1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, discuss potential effects:

5. Would tracking system data be compiled in a summary report? [CAIRA Figure 6-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

6. Was tracking system data made available to other support organizations, e.g., medical facilities, public affairs, etc.?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

8. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 12.3: Handling Potentially Contaminated Human Remains

Demonstrate the ability to properly handle potentially contaminated human remains.

Intent

It may become necessary during a chemical accident/incident to cope with human remains that are or may be contaminated with chemical agent. Fatalities that occur as a result of a CAI must be appropriately handled in order to prevent the spread of contamination.

The remains of deceased CAI casualties should be treated with the same respect and procedures that would be used in any accident. However, all fatalities must be monitored for contamination and decontaminated if necessary prior to return of the body to the family for funeral services and burial. This should be performed as soon as monitoring equipment is available and in a manner that preserves the deceased's dignity.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Activities that will be demonstrated for this evaluation element will be limited to immediate actions in the field. That is, until monitoring and decontamination of remains can be conducted, remains of fatalities should be sealed in double body bags, properly labeled, and held, preferably at a single holding point.

For this evaluation element, the organization must demonstrate the ability to properly contain, label, and store remains of potentially contaminated fatalities pending future treatment and disposition. Proper labeling of remains is an identification tag (including last name, first name, middle initial and social security number) either around the neck of the victim and/or securely fastened to the body bag. An appropriate storage area would be inside, in a cool, secure place.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Contamination:</i>	Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any material that constitutes a source of potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.
<i>Contaminated Persons:</i>	Persons who have chemical agent on themselves or their clothing.
<i>Decontamination:</i>	The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Field Locations
Medical Facility

OFF-POST

Field Locations
Medical Facility

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 12.3: Handling Potentially Contaminated Human Remains

Demonstrate the ability to properly handle potentially contaminated human remains.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Were there any (simulated) fatalities as a result of the (simulated) chemical accident/incident? [CAIRA 9-3.d(10)(a)(b)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, do not continue with this evaluation element.

If YES, were the remains monitored for contamination?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, continue to question 3.

If YES, describe the monitoring method(s) used:

2. If contamination was found, were the remains decontaminated?
[CAIRA 9-3.d(10)(a)(b)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, continue to question 3.

If YES, describe decontamination methods used:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Were the remains placed in double body bags for appropriate future disposition?
[CAIRA 9-3.d(10)(b)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problem:

4. Were the remains appropriately labeled? [Army Reg. 600-8-1, 23-3.b(2)(a)(b) & (3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

Was the remains stored in an appropriate area?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

6. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 13: FIELD RESPONSE

Demonstrate the ability to contain and control chemical agent contamination.

Evaluation Element 13.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure to chemical agent(s).

Intent

Emergency operations following a chemical accident/incident may require deploying emergency workers to the field, putting them at risk of exposure to the chemical agent(s). Protecting the safety and health of emergency workers and limiting contamination are important aspects of the response. Emergency workers must become fully aware of the hazards associated with the agent(s) and the severe danger of approaching known or suspected contaminated sources or conducting decontamination without appropriate personal protective equipment. Responders must be trained to recognize symptoms of distress and exposure. Safety regulations must be followed to protect workers during the emergency operations.

This evaluation element will be demonstrated primarily near the site where agent is released during the chemical accident/incident and in the potential downwind hazard area where personnel should demonstrate the use of equipment and procedures that would be used in an actual emergency. If there is an event with a significant off-post impact, other emergency workers may be involved in the response and could also be exposed. The use of self-injected antidote by Army personnel is addressed in Objective 10 (Medical Services - First Response). Decontamination is addressed in Evaluation Element 13.2 "Emergency Worker Decontamination", Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration and Congregate Care of Evacuees), and Objective 10 (Medical Services - First Response).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The demonstration of the evaluation element on-post will involve demonstration of knowledge of the hazards involved and appropriate use of protective equipment by the emergency worker, including limitations imposed by "stay times", and awareness of the symptoms of exposure. The appropriate authorities must determine when emergency workers may reenter a restricted area and the conditions under which they may reenter. All activities will be carried out in accordance with the organizations' plans and procedures.

The potential scope of this evaluation element extends to all on-post emergency workers who would be at risk of exposure to chemical agent. This includes (but is not limited to) members of the response teams at the accident/incident site, members of field teams conducting monitoring and sampling for chemical agent, and decontamination facility personnel. Planning guidance requires that all emergency workers who may be exposed to chemical agents as a result of their assignment receive approved personal protective equipment, such as protective clothing, respirators, agent detection equipment, and nerve agent antidotes. The Army requires that a two-person concept must be strictly enforced at all times during operations for the safety of all personnel and the security of the chemical surety material. The norms for personal protective equipment for Army personnel are fully set forth in Army documents, including *CAIRA Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991.

The extent of play agreement should specify the extent of demonstration of exposure control to emergency worker personnel. Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible on-post with any scenario.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.10 and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Sections 2-10.b(b), 3-5(c)(9), 7-3, and Appendices E and F.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Emergency Workers:</i>	Personnel performing essential missions within the area potentially affected by the chemical agent to protect the health and safety of the public. The term is applicable to first responders to the chemical event site and others engaged in activities such as manning traffic control along evacuation routes, performing emergency medical services and decontamination, driving evacuation and medical response vehicles, and performing fire and rescue activities, including route alerting.
<i>Personal Protective Equipment (PPE):</i>	Chemical protective clothing and respiratory protection to enable responders to conduct activities while protecting themselves from contamination. This equipment should protect the skin, eyes, and respiratory tract of the responders.
<i>Reentry:</i>	Entry of personnel into an affected area following a chemical accident/incident. Reentry can be restricted (e.g., entry of monitoring crews) or unrestricted (limited public access).
<i>Stay time:</i>	Allowable time for an emergency worker to be dressed out in personal protective equipment.
<i>Two-Person Concept:</i>	A system designed to prohibit access by an individual to chemical surety material by requiring the presence at all times of at least two authorized personnel capable of detecting incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task being performed. Each person must be familiar with applicable safety and security requirements.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center
Field command Post
Field Operation(s)

OFF-POST

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 13.1: Emergency Worker Exposure Control

Demonstrate the ability to continuously monitor and control emergency worker exposure to chemical agent(s).

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Identify which organizations demonstrated this objective at this location.
[Pl. Guid. 8.10; CAIRA 3-5.c.(9)]

-
2. Answer the following questions regarding the use of personal protective equipment. (*Put Yes, No, N/A, N/O in the space as appropriate.*)

_____ Was personal protective equipment available to the emergency workers at this location? [Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-2); CAIRA App. F; HM-EEM Eval. Forms 10.6]

_____ Was the use of personal protective equipment demonstrated?
[Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-3); CAIRA 7-3.c.(1), App. F; HM-EEM Eval. Forms 10.7]

_____ Was personal protective equipment properly fitted prior to use?

_____ Was the equipment properly used, as specified in the plan?
[Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-3); CAIRA, App. F; HM-EEM Eval. Forms 10.10]

_____ Was the personal protective equipment of the proper type for use by the emergency workers at this location under the conditions of the accident?
[Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-2); CAIRA 3-5.c.(9), 7-3.b.(1), App. F]

_____ Was there a sufficient quantity of personal protective equipment of the proper type for use by the emergency workers at this location? [Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-2)]

Describe any problems:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Was there a person responsible for ensuring that proper personal protective equipment was used and that stay time limits were adhered to? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(9); HM-EEM Eval. Forms 10.11]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Specify individual by title and organization. _____

4. Were emergency workers aware of their stay time? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(9)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were any waivers to deviate from worker protection standards and criteria (e.g., stay time) granted? [CAIRA 2-10.b.(1)(b), 3-5.c.(9)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, who or what organization provided waiver?

Did emergency workers demonstrate knowledge of signs and symptoms of chemical agent exposure? [Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-4); CAIRA, App. E]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

5. Were operations in hazardous areas performed using the two-person concept? [CAIRA 7-3; HM-EEM Eval. Forms 10.19]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

6. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES _____ NO _____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 13.2: Emergency Worker Decontamination

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies for the decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

Intent

Decontamination should occur as soon as possible to minimize the effect on personnel and to allow for normal operation of equipment and facilities as soon as possible. Decontamination should be conducted as close to the contaminated area as possible to limit the spread of contamination. Since decontamination requires a significant amount of time and decontamination material, it is essential that decontamination only be performed on what is necessary, e.g., high priority operations. The first priority is people, the second is essential equipment (e.g., ambulances), and the third is other requirements.

This evaluation element focuses on the procedures and facilities that would be used to decontaminate emergency workers, their equipment, and vehicles. Decontamination areas are normally fixed facilities, although in some instances organizations may utilize mobile units. Decontamination areas should be large enough to accommodate the number of emergency workers and the amount of equipment requiring decontamination. While personnel safety, site conditions, and the status of equipment should be a primary concern during a response, improper handling and disposal of wastes and contaminants following a chemical accident/incident creates additional long-term problems. Attention should also be given to the ability of decontamination personnel to follow appropriate containment procedures for contaminated waste. Decontamination is also addressed in Objective 10 (Medical Services - First Response), Objective 11 (Medical Services - Transportation), Objective 12 (Medical Services - Medical Facilities) and Objective 14 (Screening, Decontamination, Registration, and Congregate Care of Evacuees).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Emergency worker decontamination is generally performed in a fixed or mobile facility. Demonstration of this evaluation element should involve using the facility, equipment and procedures set up as they would be in an actual emergency, with all contamination control measures in place.

Under this evaluation element, procedures for checking personnel, monitoring or sampling equipment and vehicles for exposure to contamination should be performed as they would be in an actual emergency. Record-keeping procedures for each emergency worker processed through the decontamination station should be demonstrated. When a decontamination facility is set up, the personnel either demonstrate their methods for containing runoff and contaminated wastes or describe how this will be done. Each decontamination area should be designed, staffed and equipped to provide decontamination functions for all potentially contaminated personnel. If resources are available, potentially contaminated personnel should be separated by gender. If available resources are not adequate to provide separate facilities for each gender, decontamination should be performed according to priority without regard to gender. Decontamination should include procedures for immediately decontaminating personnel in order of priority. The order of priority exercised should be as follows: 1) all emergency workers who exhibit any signs or symptoms of exposure to chemical agent; 2) all emergency workers who may have been exposed to chemical agent regardless of whether they

exhibit signs or symptoms of exposure; and 3) all emergency workers whose contamination status cannot be clearly determined by interview or other means.

Specific procedures for personnel decontamination station(s) are addressed in *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Appendix G. The standard CAIRA personnel decontamination station is established to support CAIRA operations. The purposes are to provide a boundary line marking the edge of the restricted area -- the hot line, a controlled entry and exit point to the chemical accident/incident site and a systematic means to decontaminate personnel and equipment leaving the chemical accident/incident site.

After decontamination is complete, decontamination staff should check individuals for signs and symptoms of agent exposure. Individuals should be remonitored to confirm successful decontamination. Upon confirmation, the individual should be directed to a re-dressing area. Each individual to have undergone decontamination at the area should be marked with an indication of the treatment that was applied to the individual and the time at which decontamination was complete. Records should accompany individuals that give details on decontamination actions taken, completion time of decontamination, time of release from observation area, and a description of any medical treatment administered in conjunction with decontamination.

The organizations should demonstrate the ability to decontaminate emergency equipment and vehicles, and to contain the runoff. Potentially contaminated vehicles should be kept in a separate parking area prior to decontamination. Potentially contaminated equipment should be decontaminated or stored in a secure place for decontamination or disposal at a later date. If the decontamination process might cause damage to the potentially contaminated equipment or vehicles, the process should be described to the evaluator.

Given the substantial differences between demonstration and simulation of this evaluation element, the extent of the demonstration of decontamination facilities, procedures and equipment should be described in detail in the extent of play agreement.

Demonstration of the evaluation element is compatible with any scenario in which personnel and equipment are exposed to the chemical agent.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Section 8.10 and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Sections 3-5, 6-5, 7-3, 13-3, 13-5 and Appendices G and L.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Contamination:</i>	Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any other material that constitutes a source of potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.
<i>Decontamination:</i>	The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.
<i>Emergency Workers:</i>	Personnel performing essential missions within the area potentially affected by the chemical agent to protect the health and safety of the public. The term is applicable to first responders to the chemical event site and others engaged in activities such as manning traffic control along evacuation routes, performing emergency medical services and decontamination, driving evacuation and medical response vehicles, and performing fire and rescue activities, including route alerting.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

OFF-POST

Personnel Decontamination Station(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 13.2: Emergency Worker Decontamination

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies for the decontamination of emergency workers, equipment and vehicles.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. What organization(s) demonstrated emergency worker decontamination at this location?

2. Where was emergency worker decontamination demonstrated?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(8), App. G]

Provide time of activation. _____

3. Which emergency workers were processed at this location?
(Include organizational affiliation.)

4. Was a record established for each person that arrived at the facility?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the contents of these records. (Or attach a sample copy of the record)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Were procedures to minimize contamination of the facility demonstrated?
[CAIRA, 13-5.b., App. G]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

6. Were procedures demonstrated to segregate potentially contaminated persons from uncontaminated persons? [CAIRA, 13-5.b., App. G]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

7. Were personnel decontamination procedures properly demonstrated? [Pl. Guid. 8.10.1 (pt. 10-5), CAIRA 13-5.b., App. G, App. L, App. M-1.c.(1); HM-EEM Eval. Forms 10.21]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, briefly note any problems.

8. Were clean clothes provided to those persons who were processed through the decontamination facility? [CAIRA App. G]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Were procedures demonstrated for segregating potentially contaminated vehicles and equipment? [CAIRA 13-5.c.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, note problems:

Did the facility have sufficient parking space for the number of vehicles expected?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, note problems:

10. Were priorities for decontamination followed? [CAIRA 13-5.b.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, note why not:

11. Were there adequate supplies of decontamination materials?
[CAIRA 13-5.a.(3), 13-5.b., App. L, App. M]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, note problems:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

12. Were measures taken to control contaminated liquid and/or solid waste?

[CAIRA 13-5.a.(6), App. G]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, note problems:

13. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

14. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 13.3: Security and Accountability

Demonstrate the ability to secure accident locations and account for chemical agent and weapons involved in a chemical accident/incident.

Intent

The presence of chemical surety material at a chemical accident/incident site requires immediate implementation of an effective security program. A chemical accident/incident may require coordination between the Army and civilian law enforcement agencies. This coordination should be effected immediately. Civilian response personnel may have already established some form of control off-post to keep non-essential personnel from interfering with their response and emergency lifesaving efforts. The presence of chemical agents or munitions off an installation may require the establishment of a National Defense Area (NDA) to permit effective and legal control of non-Federal lands by military forces, with security coordinated with civilian law enforcement agencies. Even after establishment of a NDA, close coordination with civil law enforcement agencies is essential to an effective program.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The demonstration of the evaluation element will involve demonstration of knowledge and implementation of proper security and accountability procedures. Security at the chemical accident/incident site should: a) control the site; b) protect chemical surety materials and components; c) safeguard classified defense information and protect DOD equipment or material; d) provide for coordination with civilian law enforcement agencies; e) provide necessary operations security; f) counter potential terrorist or radical group activities or intelligence collection efforts; and g) protect security personnel from agent and explosive hazard. Accountability includes the identification and documentation of individual munitions or bulk storage containers (e.g., serial numbers), tracking of their movement and disposition of contents.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible on-post with any scenario. Off-post demonstration will require a scenario that has the possibility of chemical agent being moved to an off-post location. All activities are to be carried out in accordance with the organizations' plans and procedures.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 3.2.3, 8.8 and Appendix G, and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Sections 3-5, 5-1, 5-2, 5-4, and 7-3.

Clarification of Terms

<i>Chemical Surety Material:</i>	Chemical agents and their associated weapon systems, or storage and shipping containers.
<i>National Defense Area:</i>	An area established on non-Federal lands located within the United States, its possessions or territories, for the purpose of safeguarding classified defense information, or protecting DOD equipment or material.
<i>Restricted Area:</i>	Area subject to protective actions, into which access will be controlled.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Field Location(s)
(chemical accident/incident sites)

OFF-POST

Field Location(s)
(chemical accident/incident sites)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 13.3: Security and Accountability

Demonstrate the ability to secure accident locations and account for chemical agent and weapons involved in a chemical accident/incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Where was the chemical accident/incident?

ON-POST _____

If agent is present Off-Post, provide location.

2. What organization(s) and staff demonstrated security at this location?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(10), 5-1, 5-2; CPG 1-8A, (pt. 124 and 126); HM-EEM Eval. Forms 11.2]

If this location is **off** the military installation, was security assistance obtained from civilian law enforcement agencies? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(10)(a), 5-1.a., 5-2.d., 5-3.b., 5-4.b.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, what organization provided security assistance, if different from above?

3. Were actions taken to secure access to this location/area and to secure the chemical agent/weapons? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(10), 5-4.b., 5-4.c., 5-4.d.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. (continued)

Was a security perimeter established? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(10), 5-2, 5-3, 5-4.c.(1)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was access to the location/area restricted to authorized and necessary personnel?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(10)(a), 5-4.c.(2); HM-EEM Eval. Forms 11.3]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

Were non-necessary personnel evacuated from the affected site?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(8), 3-5.c.(10), 7-3.a.(6)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

4. Was a National Defense Area established at this site? [Pl. Guid. 8.8; CAIRA 3-5.c.(10)(a), 5-4.b.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe any problems that occurred:

5. What organization(s) and staff demonstrated accountability at this location?
[CAIRA 5-1, 5-2, 7-3.a.(5)]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. Were actions taken to establish accountability for chemical agent and/or weapons involved in the chemical accident/incident? [CAIRA 5-1, 5-2, 7-3.a.(5)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, identify actions taken.

7. Was all surety material involved in the chemical accident/incident accounted for? [CAIRA 3-5.c.(8), 5-1, 5-2, 7-3.a.(5)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

8. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 13.4: Resupply of Chemical-Unique Materials

Demonstrate the ability to maintain adequate supplies of the chemical-unique materials that will be required to respond to a chemical accident/incident.

Intent

The intent of this evaluation element is to demonstrate the availability on and off-post of those materials, such as antidotes to chemical agent(s), personal protective equipment, and chemicals for neutralization of the chemical agent(s), that would specifically be used in a chemical accident/incident. Plans should call for designated amounts of specific supplies to be stored and available and replacements accessible.

Installations with a chemical surety material mission maintain certain stockpiles of supplies for CAIRA operations. In addition, there is a "Push Package" stored at a designated installation which can be requested through appropriate Army channels. The "Push Package" is a contingency stockpile of material to be used during a chemical accident/incident at that installation, which may be made available for a chemical accident/incident at other installations.

This evaluation element is not intended to cover all aspects of the logistics requirements of any major response, such as billeting, etc., but is limited to specialized resources that would be in particular demand during a chemical accident/incident. The identification of other required resource capabilities is covered in Objective 4 (Command and Control), Evaluation Element 4.2 "Supplementary Assistance".

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

This evaluation element will be demonstrated by those organizations and at those locations with requirements for chemical accident/incident specific materials, such as field teams, decontamination centers, and medical facilities. All the activities to be demonstrated under this element will be carried out in accordance with the organizations' plans and procedures, and the extent of play agreement.

Estimates of the amounts of materials that would have been required as compared to the amount available will be made. Unless provided for otherwise in the extent of play agreement, chemical-unique materials may not be used. If additional resources would under actual conditions be needed, arrangements must be made to procure the additional materials. These materials do not need to be delivered; however, all arrangements for the acquisition and delivery should be made.

Demonstration of the evaluation element is consistent with any scenario which stresses the available supply of chemical-unique materials.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Sections 3-5, 9-2 and 9-4, and Appendices F and L.

Clarification of Terms

*Chemical-Unique
Materials:*

Those specific materials and equipment which would be required primarily in response to a chemical accident/incident, such as antidotes to chemical agents and decontamination chemicals.

Push Packages:

Contingency stocks, maintained at a designated location, for use during a chemical accident/incident at that installation, which may be made available for a chemical accident/incident at other installations.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center(s)
Chemical accident/incident site(s)
Decontamination center(s)
Medical facility(s)
Field location(s)

OFF-POST

Emergency Operations Center(s)
Chemical accident/incident site(s)
Decontamination center(s)
Medical facility(s)
Field location(s)

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 13.4: Resupply of Chemical-Unique Materials

Demonstrate the ability to maintain adequate supplies of the chemical-unique materials that will be required to respond to a chemical accident/incident.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Were chemical-unique supplies and/or equipment used at your location? (e.g., chemical agent antidotes, decontaminant solution, monitoring equipment or personal protective equipment for chemical agents) [CAIRA 3-5.c.(14), 9-4.a.(2), Table F-1, App. L]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

2. Were there adequate stocks on hand to accommodate the scenario activities?
[CAIRA 3-5.c.(14), 9-4.a.(2)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, what additional supplies and/or equipment was needed?

Were sources of additional supplies identified? [CAIRA 9-2.d.; CPG 1-8A, (pt. 150)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were arrangements made to obtain additional supplies and/or equipment?
[CAIRA 9-3.a.(1), 9-4.a.(2); CPG 1-8A, (pt. 117 and 118)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were these arrangements made according to the plan or the extent of play?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

2. (continued)

If NO, describe problems:

From whom were additional supplies and/or equipment requested.

3. Did any of the chemical-unique supplies have a designated shelf-life?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, were supplies within the expiration date?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe problems:

4. Was a "Push Package" requested? [CAIRA 9-2.d.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

6. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

OBJECTIVE 14: SCREENING, DECONTAMINATION, REGISTRATION, AND CONGREGATE CARE OF EVACUEES

Demonstrate the ability to screen and decontaminate persons, vehicles and other belongings as well as to register and provide congregate care to evacuees.

Evaluation Element 14.1: Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination

Demonstrate the ability to screen evacuees for symptoms of chemical agent exposure, identify the potential for chemical agent contamination of persons, vehicles or other belongings and to take appropriate action.

Intent

Contamination control includes those activities designed to screen evacuees for agent exposure, remove the contamination, and prevent further spread of the agent. This includes persons evacuated from the IRZ/PAZ in the affected zones as well as civilian and military installation personnel evacuated from the installation. If any nonessential post personnel are moved off the installation, this evacuation must be coordinated with the evacuation of the general public. Plans should specify a process for receiving evacuated persons who are potentially contaminated, screening persons for chemical agent exposure, decontaminating them, and training evacuation and congregate care personnel to recognize symptoms of agent exposure.

Screening areas to check evacuees for signs of agent exposure or possible contamination are co-located with reception centers. Reception Centers should be located appropriately so that they will not impede evacuation. After initial screening occurs, evacuees will be directed to decontamination facilities, medical care facilities, or congregate care centers as appropriate. Persons showing possible signs of agent exposure should be segregated, decontaminated, and treated according to the severity of their injuries. Knowledge of the route taken when evacuating will help the screening personnel to determine the probability of agent contamination. Staff at reception centers should register the evacuees and maintain records of all persons who have arrived there, their treatment, and their indicated destinations.

Resources must be adequate to screen evacuees at these areas, determine their needs, and then refer evacuees to a congregate care center or other appropriate facility. The area should have adequate space and parking to carry out its designated functions. Potentially contaminated vehicles and other belongings should be contained and/or segregated. Medical personnel, or those trained in chemical agent exposure, should be present. Use of antidotes, if needed, would also be demonstrated under Objectives 10 (Medical Activities - First Response), 11 (Medical Activities - Transportation), and 12 (Medical Activities - Medical Facilities).

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The responsible organizations will demonstrate this evaluation element by setting up a screening area as they would in an actual emergency in accordance with the response organizations' plan. Screening for exposure to chemical agent should take place at a reception center appropriately designated in the response organization's plan. Responders should show availability of sufficient personnel and resources to carry out the screening procedures according to their plan.

The response organization should demonstrate the capability to process evacuees through screening procedures in an orderly fashion. Evacuees should enter the screening area at one designated and controlled entrance. Evacuee screening procedures should include a physical inspection for signs and symptoms of chemical agent exposure and an evacuee interview, if appropriate, to determine if evacuees have evacuated from the area within the plume, have traveled through any portion of the plume area or have come in contact with any people, animals, or objects that have been located in or traveled through the plume and have not been decontaminated. Symptoms of exposure to agent via inhalation (the most common exposure route for volatile agents such as GB) include runny nose, blurred vision, pinpoint pupils (miosis), and chest tightness with shortness of breath. Symptoms of cutaneous (skin) exposure (the most common type of exposure to agents such as VX) include localized sweating or muscular twitching followed by systemic effects such as nausea or abdominal cramps. Reaction to mustard agents are not always immediate and may not be apparent for up to 48 hours after exposure. In minutes to hours (up to 48), symptoms may include blisters on the skin, redness, swelling, itching of skin and eyes. (For additional information on symptoms, consult the *CAIRA Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, Table E-1, pp. 78-79.) The response organization should demonstrate procedures for segregating potentially contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees.

The organizational capabilities of the facility and the adequacy and knowledge of the staff are key points of the demonstration of this evaluation element. If there are a number of facilities which might be needed, planners will decide which should be activated and arrangements made for their use ahead of time.

Demonstration of the evaluation element is compatible with any scenario that requires possible exposure of some of the population.

For further information about screening for exposure to chemical agent, refer to *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, May 1991, Table E-1, pp. 78-79, and the *Planning Guidance for Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L (Planning Standard for Decontamination).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Screening Areas:</i>	Areas where screening for exposure to chemical agent of evacuees takes place. Registration may also be done in this location.
<i>Decontamination:</i>	The process of decreasing or eliminating the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.
<i>Evacuees:</i>	All persons leaving the installation, and/or the IRZ/PAZ due to the chemical accident/incident.
<i>Screening:</i>	The process of determining whether persons, vehicles, and other belongings are potentially contaminated.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Screening Area(s) or
Other designated location(s)

OFF-POST

Reception Center/Screening Area(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 14.1: Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination

Demonstrate the ability to screen evacuees for symptoms of chemical agent exposure, identify the potential for chemical agent contamination of persons, vehicles or other belongings and to take appropriate action.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. What organization was responsible for screening the public for chemical agent contamination? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-5.a., App. L, L-5.e.]

2. At what location was this activity demonstrated? [Pl. Guid. 8.15]

3. At what time and chemical event notification level (CENL) was the center activated? [Pl. Guid. 6.1, 8.15]

Time? _____ CENL? _____

4. Did activation of the screening areas occur prior to the arrival of evacuees? [Pl. Guid. 6.1, 8.15]

YES ___ NO ___ N/A ___ N/O ___

If NO, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Was a record established for each person that arrived at the facility?
[Pl. Guid. App. K, K-5.a.(3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the contents of these records. *(Or attach a copy of a record)*

6. How many workers were present to perform initial screening of the public? _____
(Attach roster) [Pl. Guid. 8.15.1, 15-2]

7. Describe procedures used to screen evacuees who might have been exposed to chemical agent?
[CAIRA Table E-1, pp. 78-79; Pl. Guid. App. K, K-5.a., App. L, L-5.g.]

Were procedures used in accordance with the response organizations' plans?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

8. Were any persons determined to be contaminated?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, what procedures were demonstrated to segregate contaminated and uncontaminated persons? [Pl. Guid. App. K, K-5.a.]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Were contaminated persons sent to a decontamination area?
[Pl. Guid. App. K, K-5.a., App. L, L-5.e.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

10. Were uncontaminated persons sent to the appropriate facilities, e.g., congregate care or medical facility? [Pl. Guid. 8.15.1, 15-3, App. K, K-5.d.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

11. Were procedures demonstrated for segregating uncontaminated and potentially contaminated vehicles, equipment, and evacuees' belongings?
[Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5, L.5.h.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

12. Was there sufficient parking at the center to accommodate the number of vehicles expected as a result of the evacuation? [Pl. Guid. App. K, K-4.c.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

13. Was transportation to a congregate care facility available for evacuees, if required?
[Pl. Guid. App. K, K-5.c.(4)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

14. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

15. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 14.2: Decontamination of Evacuees

Demonstrate the ability to decontaminate evacuees, and segregate potentially contaminated vehicles and other belongings.

Intent

One of the first priorities after a chemical accident/incident is to ensure that persons found to be contaminated or potentially contaminated at a screening area are properly decontaminated. Immediate action to remove or neutralize the agent on evacuees is necessary to minimize adverse health impacts to that person and to avoid secondary contamination of response elements and facilities. Official decontamination areas staffed by trained personnel with access to all equipment and materials needed to decontaminate and care for exposed individuals should be established.

This evaluation element covers decontamination of evacuees determined to be contaminated or potentially contaminated via the screening process described in Evaluation Element 14.1 - "Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination". Decontamination of emergency workers is covered under Evaluation Element 13.2 - "Emergency Worker Decontamination".

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element includes the establishment of a decontamination area at each reception center or other pre-designated area. Staff at the decontamination area should segregate potentially contaminated vehicles and other items brought by evacuees and thoroughly decontaminate potentially contaminated evacuees and injured persons.

Staffing of the decontamination area should include appropriately trained, equipped and clothed personnel who are able to decontaminate the maximum number of contaminated individuals expected to arrive at the decontamination area. Staff at the decontamination area should be promptly alerted so that staffing can take place as quickly as possible after the public has been alerted and notified of the chemical accident/incident.

Decontamination should include procedures for immediately decontaminating people in order of priority. The order of priority exercised should be as follows: 1) all people who exhibit any signs or symptoms of exposure to chemical agent; 2) all people who may have been exposed to chemical agent regardless of whether they exhibit signs or symptoms of exposure. (This would include all people who have evacuated from the area within the plume, those who traveled through any portion of the plume area while evacuating, and those who have come in contact with people, animals, or objects that have been located in or traveled through the plume and have not been decontaminated); and 3) all people whose contamination status cannot be clearly determined by interview or other means.

Each decontamination area should be designed, staffed and equipped to provide decontamination functions for all potentially contaminated individuals. Decontamination areas are normally fixed facilities which in some instances incorporate the use of mobile units. The decontamination area should be located where adequate supplies of water and electricity are available or can be made available. If resources are available, potentially contaminated individuals should be separated by gender. If available resources are not adequate to provide separate facilities for each gender, decontamination should be performed according to priority.

People should surrender personal belongings and remove all clothing prior to decontamination. Any clothing that would normally be removed over the head should be cut off. Decontamination area staff wearing protective clothing should remove personal property from evacuees, contain property in a bag with an identification label, and place the bag in a secure storage location for later disposition. Potentially contaminated eyeglasses and contacts should be properly decontaminated and/or stored. Potentially contaminated individuals' skin (with the exception of the face) should be blotted with decontamination solution such as undiluted household bleach. The individual should be instructed to take a lukewarm shower and flush the face and eyes with a generous amount of water, and then wash the face and remainder of the body with soapy water and rinse.

After decontamination is complete, decontamination staff should check individuals for signs and symptoms of agent exposure to confirm successful decontamination. Upon confirmation, the individual should be directed to a re-dressing area. Each individual to have undergone decontamination at the area should be marked with an indication of the treatment that was applied to the individual and the time at which decontamination was complete. Records should accompany individuals that give details on decontamination actions taken, completion time of decontamination, time of release from observation area, and a description of any medical treatment administered in conjunction with decontamination.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario that requires possible exposure of some of the population.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this objective, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Appendix L (Planning Standard for Decontamination).

Clarification of Terms

Contamination: Chemical agent (typically in liquid form; including droplets and/or aerosols) deposited on skin, clothing, or any other material that constitutes a source or potential agent exposure until it is neutralized, removed, or degrades naturally.

Decontamination: The process of decreasing the amount of chemical agent on any person, object, or area by absorbing, neutralizing, destroying, ventilating, or removing chemical agents.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Screening Area(s)
Or other designated location(s)

OFF-POST

Reception Center/Decontamination Area(s)

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 14.2: Decontamination of Evacuees

Demonstrate the ability to decontaminate evacuees, and segregate potentially contaminated vehicles and other belongings.

1. What organization was responsible for decontamination of the public?
[Pl. Guid. App. L]

2. At what location was this activity demonstrated? [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5.]

Was this co-located with the initial screening area? [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

3. At what time and chemical event notification level (CENL) was the area activated?
[Pl. Guid. 6.1, App. L]

Time? _____ CENL? _____

4. Did activation of the decontamination area occur prior to the arrival of evacuees?
[Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5.d]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

5. Was a record established for each person that was processed through the facility?
[Pl. Guid. App. L, L-6.j.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe the contents of these records. *(Or attach a copy of a record)*

6. How many workers were present to perform decontamination of the evacuees? *(Attach a copy of roster, if available)* [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5.c.]

7. Describe procedures used to decontaminate evacuees. [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5.c, e, f, L-6]

Describe procedures used for segregating potentially contaminated vehicles and evacuee belongings. [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5, L-5.h.]

8. Was an order of priority exercised during decontamination? [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-2., L-5.e.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Were decontamination procedures performed in accordance with the organization's plans and procedures?

YES ___ NO ___ N/A ___ N/O ___

If NO, describe:

10. Did the organization have the capability to provide clean clothing to persons with contaminated clothing? [Pl. Guid. App. L, L-6.g.]

YES ___ NO ___ N/A ___ N/O ___

11. Were decontamination procedures able to process the number of people who might need decontamination in a timely manner as required under the organization's plan?
[Pl. Guid. App. L, L-5.c., L-6.]

YES ___ NO ___ N/A ___ N/O ___

If NO, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

12. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

13. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

Evaluation Element 14.3: Evacuee Registration

Demonstrate the ability to conduct a receiving and registration program for evacuees at designated reception centers.

Intent

Evacuated persons, including installation personnel who are not considered essential to the response or other critical operations, should be registered and screened for contamination (Screening activities are described in Evaluation Element 14.1, "Screening Evacuees for Agent Contamination"). Reception centers for registering evacuees and directing them to appropriate congregate care centers and facilities should be designated along evacuation routes at locations that would not impede evacuation. These reception centers should maintain records of all persons who have arrived there and their indicated destinations. Resources must be adequate to determine the needs of the evacuees, take any immediate actions necessary, and then refer evacuees to a congregate care center or other appropriate facility. The reception center should have adequate space and parking to carry out its designated functions.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

The responsible organizations will demonstrate this evaluation element by setting up the reception center as they would in an actual emergency in accordance with the response organizations' plans. They will show the availability of enough personnel and resources to carry out the registration and any other activities required by the plan.

Responsible organizations should demonstrate that they have the capability to register evacuees upon arrival at the reception center. One master record might be established which would be used at reception, screening and decontamination areas or separate records might be established at all three areas and collected information might be shared among areas. The registration activities demonstrated at the reception center should include the establishment of a registration record for each person, consisting of the person's name, address, results of screening, and time of decontamination, if any. The organization should demonstrate the ability to use such records as means for locating and reuniting families.

The adequacy of the facility and the organizational capabilities and knowledge of the staff are key points of evaluation of this evaluation element. If the facility is not available at the appropriate time according to the exercise scenario, the activities may be demonstrated out of sequence. This should be agreed upon before the exercise. If there are a number of facilities which might be needed, planners will decide which should be activated and arrangements made for their use ahead of time.

Demonstration of the evaluation element is compatible with any scenario that requires evacuation of some of the population.

Further details on the planning and operation of reception centers may be found in *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, particularly Section 8.15 (Evacuee Support) as well as Appendix K (Planning Standards for Evacuee Support).

Clarification of Terms

Evacuees: All persons leaving the installation, and/or the IRZ/PAZ due to the chemical accident/incident.

Reception Center: Facility where registration, and possibly screening and decontamination of evacuees takes place.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Screening Area(s)
Or other designated location(s)

OFF-POST

Reception Center

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 14.3: Evacuee Registration

Demonstrate the ability to conduct a receiving and registration program for evacuees at designated reception centers.

(Registration will probably take place at the same location that the screening for exposure to chemical agent and decontamination takes place. This location is referred to as a reception center.)

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. What organization(s) was responsible for demonstrating registration of evacuees at the reception center? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-3, K-5.b.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-24, 237]

2. At what location was this activity demonstrated? [Pl. Guid. 8.15.1, 15-2, App. K, K-4]

At what time and chemical event notification level (CENL) was the reception center activated? [Pl. Guid. 6.1, 8.15]

Time? _____ CENL? _____

3. Was the reception center activated prior to the arrival of evacuees? [Pl. Guid. 6.1, 8.15]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

4. Were staff at the reception center able to communicate with appropriate facilities (e.g., EOCs, medical facilities)? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-2]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, describe:

5. Were reception center staff aware of the approximate number of evacuees expected at this facility? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

6. Describe the procedures used by the staff to register evacuees. (*Attach a copy of a sample record*). [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-5.b.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-24, 240]

7. Were evacuees directed to a congregate care facility through the use of a pre-scripted map? [Pl. Guid. 8.15.1, 15-3]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Was transportation to a congregate care facility available for evacuees, if required?
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-5.c.(4)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

8. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

9. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

This page not used.

Evaluation Element 14.4: Congregate Care

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the congregate care of evacuees.

Intent

Congregate care facilities provide essential services (food, housing, first aid and medical services, and special information) on a short-term basis for individuals who have been made temporarily homeless as a result of a chemical accident/incident. Congregate care facilities are usually set up in schools, churches, or other institutional buildings that have been determined as suitable in advance. Emergency use of the facility should be provided for in a memorandum of agreement. In many instances, multiple facilities are designated for congregate care use; one or more may be activated in an emergency depending on the number of individuals being evacuated and which geographic areas are evacuated. Designated facilities should be located outside the IRZ and preferably outside the PAZ.

Each designated facility should be adequate to handle the basic needs of evacuees up to its stated capacity. Space, equipment and facilities should be adequate to provide for basic housing and food service. Security services, medical services and social services should be available, as well as access to further care if needed. Facilities designated for care of special populations, such as disabled individuals, should be appropriately equipped and staffed to handle those populations. The organization managing the facility should be able to provide the evacuees with current information about the emergency. In addition, the organization should be able to assist evacuees in locating family members that may have become separated during the emergency and provide arrangements for the care and handling of evacuees pets.

Many communities have arrangements with the American Red Cross (ARC) to activate, staff, and operate the congregate care facilities.

When there is a possibility of agent contamination, evacuees should be screened for contamination (and decontaminated if necessary) prior to entering a congregate care facility. Contamination screening, decontamination, and registration of evacuees may be performed at a separate reception center, or at the congregate care facility. Those functions are evaluated under the other elements of this objective (Evaluation Elements 14.1 - 14.3.)

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

Demonstration of this evaluation element will generally take place at an EOC and at one or more designated congregate care facilities. At the EOC, once evacuation has been selected as the protective action, the staff should quickly determine how many and which particular congregate care facilities should be activated. They should then contact those organizations responsible for activation of the identified facilities. All such contacts should be actually made, to verify availability of resources.

Activated facilities should demonstrate the ability to provide essential services to evacuees, including shelter, food, sanitation services, family assistance, first aid, child care, and medical services.

Congregate Care Facility Guidelines. Below are general guidelines regarding the capabilities that should be demonstrated. It is not necessary that the facility demonstrate absolute adherence to the letter of the guidelines. Rather, the facility manager should demonstrate that he/she understands the importance of managing the available resources to meet as many of the guidelines as possible.

- Responsible organizations are to demonstrate the ability to staff facilities with managerial personnel, nurses, registration clerks, cooks, kitchen helpers, servers, building maintenance and security personnel, sanitation personnel, crisis counselors, social workers, child care personnel and interviewers to assess needs of evacuees and make appropriate referrals for assistance. Capability to staff the facility may be demonstrated by presentation of a current staff roster by the shelter manager.
- Congregate care staff are to check evacuees entering the facilities to make sure that they have been through the reception and registration process, including screening for contamination if appropriate per the scenario.
- Space should be allocated in the facility to support first aid, reception and registration, serving of meals, storage of food and supplies, storage of evacuee belongings, child care, and rest rooms. The facility should conform as much as possible, with the ARC planning guidelines, *Mass Care Preparedness and Operations* (ARC 1987).
- Food services at the facility should conform, as closely as possible, to the following ARC planning guidelines: two hot meals a day for everyone, plus a mid-day lunch for children, the aged, expectant and nursing mothers, and disaster victims doing heavy work.
- Facilities should demonstrate availability of or access to the following: a variety of paper products, including napkins, towels, sanitary napkins, and diapers; cleaning supplies, toiletry items or ARC comfort kits; fuel for cooking and transportation; registration supplies; toilets; water supply (water should meet all applicable drinking water standards and the supply should be adequate to provide at least five gallons of water per evacuee per day); food preparation equipment; and heaters or fans.
- Facility staff should be able to use the evacuee registration system to help reunite families that have been separated as a result of the emergency. They should be able to poll other reception and congregate care facilities to determine if someone has been registered elsewhere. Likewise, they should be able to handle inquiries from other locations as to whether a given person is located at this facility.
- Security should be provided at the facility through access to police or other security services.
- Congregate care facilities are to demonstrate capability for providing at least minimal first aid services to evacuees. Medical staff should be capable of recognizing signs and symptoms of chemical agent exposure. Personnel should know where to refer persons for additional or specialized medical care. If an institution evacuates its medically dependent patients, the institution should provide medical care. Provisions should be made for medically dependent persons evacuated from their homes. Provisions should be made for child care for unaccompanied children.

- Activated facilities with responsibility for services to any special population groups, such as the mobility impaired, are to demonstrate the capability to deal with special needs these groups may have.
- Facility staff should be familiar with arrangements for handling pets brought by evacuees. Arrangements should include provisions for care, identification, food, water and shelter.

Capabilities may be evaluated by conducting a walk-through of the facility which provides the evaluator an opportunity to observe physical facilities, equipment, and supplies, and to interview congregate care staff. Alternatively, capabilities may be demonstrated by setting up stations for various services and providing those services to evacuees. Material that would be unduly difficult or expensive to transport (e.g., cots, blankets, sundries, and large-scale food supplies) may not be presented; availability of such items would be demonstrated by presentation of a list of sources, with locations and quantities. The extent of play agreement should clearly indicate the expected demonstration.

Demonstration of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario requiring congregate care of evacuees.

Further details on the planning and operation of congregate care facilities may be found in *Sheltering and Care Operations* (FEMA 1987), *Mass Care-Preparedness and Operations* (American Red Cross, 1987), and *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, particularly Section 8.15 (Evacuee Support) as well as Appendix K (Planning Standards for Evacuee Support).

Clarification of Terms

<i>Congregate Care Facility:</i>	Facility for providing emergency lodging and care for people made temporarily homeless by an emergency. Essential basic services (feeding, family reunification, etc.) are provided.
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Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

OFF-POST

Congregate Care Facilities

This page not used.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 14.4: Congregate Care

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the congregate care of evacuees.

POINTS OF REVIEW

Evaluate at Emergency Operations Center (EOC):

1. At the EOC, once evacuation was selected as the protective action, did the staff quickly determine how many and which particular congregate care facilities should be activated? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-1.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Did the staff promptly contact those organizations (e.g., host EOCs) responsible for activation of the identified facilities? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-1.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Record the organizations contacted and facilities selected for activation:
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K]

Were the facilities selected appropriate in terms of capacity and location, given the scenario situation? [Pl. Guid. App. K, K-6.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-24, 242]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Evaluate at Congregate Care Facility:

2. What agency was responsible for managing the congregate care facility? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-3.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-24, 237]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

What other agencies were represented at the facility and what were their roles?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-3, K-8.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-24, 231]

AGENCY	ROLE
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

3. Who (what organization) notified the manager to activate the congregate care facility?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-8.]

At what time and chemical event notification level (CENL) was the facility manager notified? [Pl. Guid. 6.1; CPG 1-8A, p. A-7, 54]

Time? _____ CENL? _____

4. At what time and CENL was the congregate care facility set up and activated?
 [Pl. Guid. 6.1, 8.15]

Time? _____ CENL? _____

5. According to the facility manager, what was the capacity of the congregate care facility?
 [Pl. Guid. App. K, K-6.]

6. What measures would be taken in the event that the congregate care facility's capacity was exceeded? (*Obtain through interview with facility manager*). [Pl. Guid. App. K, K-9.a.]

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

7. Were evacuees required to have registration cards (indicating they have been through the reception process) in order to gain entry into the congregate care facility?
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-5.b.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Describe procedures that would be followed in the event an evacuee arrived without having a registration card?

8. Did the facility have the following: (*check off and explain any missing items in your narrative summary.*) [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-6.d.-f., K-7.a. & f., K-11.]

<p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>Enough space for its stated capacity of evacuees, including 40-60 square feet of sleeping space per person, and space for functions such as first aid, meal service, child care, etc?</p> <p>Appropriate infrastructure to support the operation (heating and cooling, water supply, sanitary facilities, kitchen facilities, parking, etc.)?</p> <p>Secure storage for evacuee belongings?</p> <p>Social Services?</p> <p>Arrangements for the care and handling of evacuees' pets?</p>
------------------------------------------------------------------	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

9. Could the organization managing the facility provide food service as follows:
(*This information is to be obtained via interview with the facility manager.*)
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.b.]

<p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p>	<p>Two hot meals a day?</p> <p>Midday lunch for children and the elderly, expectant and nursing mothers, and those doing heavy work?</p> <p>Sufficient food supply for second servings?</p> <p>The ability to meet special dietary requirements?</p>
-----------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

10. Did the organization managing the facility have access to adequate supplies of:
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.]

	Paper products such as napkins, disposable diapers, etc.?
	Cleaning supplies?
	Toiletry items or ARC comfort kits?
	Water?

11. Were staff at the congregate care facility able to communicate with other appropriate facilities (e.g., EOCs, medical facilities, other congregate care facilities)?
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-2.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

12. Did the staff have the capability to assist evacuees with locating separated family members? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.i.(3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

13. Did the facility have a medical treatment station for evacuees?
[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.e.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

What organization was responsible for activation and staffing of this station?

14. Were arrangements made to provide access to medical care for any evacuees requiring more assistance than could be provided at the facility? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.e.(3)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

15. Were measures taken to ensure public safety at the congregate care facility (e.g., emergency phone numbers on hand)? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.f.]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

Were there security personnel at the facility?

[Pl. Guid. 8.15, App. K, K-7.g.; CPG 1-8A, p. A-15, 127]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

16. Were evacuees kept informed as to what was happening in the affected area? [Pl. Guid. 8.15, 15-8, App. K, K-7.i.(2)]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

17. Was the facility staffed and equipped to handle disabled evacuees (such as those using wheelchairs), if applicable? [Pl. Guid. 8.9, 9-4]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

18. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how the play was different from the response organization's plans:

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

19. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

OBJECTIVE 15: 24-HOUR OPERATIONS

Demonstrate the ability to maintain appropriate staffing and essential functions during a chemical accident/incident (CAI) on a continuous, 24-hour basis.

Evaluation Element 15.1: Ability to Maintain 24-Hour Operations

Demonstrate the ability to maintain appropriate staffing and essential functions during a chemical accident/incident (CAI) on a continuous, 24-hour basis.

Intent

Emergency response activities for a chemical accident/incident are likely to require response efforts over a time period of more than one day. Essential functions such as communications, direction and control of operations, hazard assessment, public information, chemical agent monitoring, and other functions should be on a continuous 24-hour basis. Therefore, additional shifts of key response staff are needed for these functions.

At the same time, the transition from one shift of key response staff to the next should be carefully managed to avoid discontinuity in operations or loss of important information. Key response staff include those necessary to carry out the essential functions and responsibilities of an emergency response organization.

Demonstration of Evaluation Element

To demonstrate this evaluation element, response organizations should be capable of providing replacement personnel to staff all essential functions on a continuous 24-hour basis. EOCs, both on- and off-post, must be capable of 24-hour operations. The EOCs should have staff capable of receiving reports, analyzing data, alerting emergency response personnel and the local community, and recommending protective actions. Incoming staff should be appropriately briefed by the outgoing staff. They should demonstrate appropriate knowledge of their emergency response roles and functions and be able to carry out appropriate coordination activities with other response organizations. All activities should be carried out in accordance with the organizations' plans and procedures.

Participation should be encouraged by the exercise planning team; the demonstration and training value of the exercise will be enhanced by participation of as many organizations and personnel as possible. All aspects of the demonstration, including options such as double staffing, actual shift changes or other variations, and any simulation to be employed, should be detailed in the extent of play agreement negotiated prior to the exercise.

Exercise of this evaluation element is compatible with any scenario with on- and/or off-post activities.

For further information about the intent, policy and technical background for this evaluation element, refer to the *Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program*, May 17, 1996, Sections 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1 and Appendices A and B, and the *Chemical Accident or Incident Response and Assistance (CAIRA) Operations*, DA Pam. 50-6, 1991, Section 3-4.c.(1).

Clarification of Terms:

Essential Functions: Response activities crucial in a chemical event. They include communications, direction and control of operations, hazard assessment, reception and care of evacuees, and public information.

Key Response Staff: Those emergency personnel necessary to carry out essential functions in a chemical event.

Where Demonstrated

Specific location(s) for demonstration of this evaluation element should be designated in the extent of play agreement, based on installation and local response plans and the exercise scenario. Typical locations for demonstration are:

ON-POST

Emergency Operating Center(s)
Field Location(s)
Joint Information Center

OFF-POST

Emergency Operating Center(s)
Field Location(s)
Joint Information Center

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

Evaluation Element 15.1: Ability to Maintain 24-Hour Operations

Demonstrate the ability to maintain appropriate staffing and essential functions during a chemical accident/incident on a continuous, 24-hour basis.

POINTS OF REVIEW

1. Were continuous 24-hour operations demonstrated?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, how was this demonstrated?

_____ Shift Change

_____ Double Staffing

_____ Other _____

2. Identify the organizations that demonstrated continuous 24-hour operations at your location.

[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

**** Attach a roster, if available ****

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

3. Identify the positions for which continuous 24-hour operations were demonstrated.
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

*** Attach a roster, if available ***

4. Were there any positions not staffed after the "shift change"?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If YES, list the positions.

5. Were the incoming staff briefed by the outgoing staff?
 [Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

6. Did the briefing enable the incoming staff to continue the responsibilities of their positions?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, explain:

7. Did incoming staff continue all operations initiated by the outgoing staff?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe:

8. Did the incoming staff demonstrate full knowledge and the ability to carry out their emergency response roles and functions?

[Pl. Guid. 8.2.1, 8.5.1, 8.8.1, App. A, (pt. A-4), App. B, (pts. B-2 and B-4); CAIRA 3-4.c.(1); CPG 1-8, p. A-1]

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____ N/O ____

If NO, describe any problems.

EVALUATOR: _____	TEAM LEADER: _____
LOCATION: _____	ASSIGNMENT: _____
PHONE NUMBER: _____	DATE: _____ PREVIOUS FINDING? Y N

9. Did the response organization follow its plans and procedures?

YES ____ NO ____ N/A ____

If NO, describe how play was different from the response organization's plans:

10. Were any innovative or noteworthy processes or procedures used?

YES ____ NO ____

If YES, describe:

EXERCISE
EVALUATION WORKSHEET

Location: _____
Evaluator: _____
Objective: _____
Number: _____

STRENGTH, FINDING, OR OBSERVATION *(circle one)*

Brief Title: _____
Description: _____

Discussion: *(Include previous finding number and details, if applicable)*

Reference(s): _____

Recommendation(s): _____

(Use continuation sheet, if required)

APPENDIX D

EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENTS

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CSEPP GUIDE FOR EXERCISE EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENTS

D.1 INTRODUCTION

This guide discusses the purpose and process for developing Extent-of-Play Agreements for CSEPP exercises, whether they are to be full federally managed and evaluated exercises, or alternate year exercises developed at the local site community level. Examples of Extent-of-Play Agreements are available from the Army/FEMA Co-Directors for reference.

D.2 BACKGROUND

Extent-of-Play Agreements are born out of a common need for communities to conduct meaningful exercises and exercise planners to have a basic outline from which to develop those exercises. The individual Agreements should be the product of dialogue between an emergency manager, coordinator or training officer at the appropriate level (local to local, state to state, region to region or federal to federal) and the jurisdiction, agency, organization, corporation or installation who will be participating in the exercise. The overall Extent-of-Play Agreement for a jurisdiction or installation is a mosaic of individual agreements with each of the player groups within that jurisdiction or installation. Embedded in Extent-of-Play Agreements are elements that lead to scenario development, scope of the exercise, scheduling, impact of real world events, and simulation requirements. **To be effective, the Extent-of-Play Agreement should be treated as a *de facto* contract between the exercise planning team, controllers, evaluators and participating entities.** Without that commitment, the goal of conducting and participating in a meaningful exercise will be compromised.

D.3 EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENTS

D.3.1 Who will participate?

Individual player groups do not necessarily sign the overall Extent-of-Play Agreement, but they do provide essential input to it through an individual agreement or questionnaire response. A questionnaire, developed by the Co-Directors, identifies the agency, what capabilities they would like to demonstrate in the exercise, a point of contact, etc. The questionnaire process is logically tasked to the CSEPP manager, coordinator or training officer who will then combine the results in the overall jurisdiction or installation's Agreement. This person should be a member of the exercise planning team, but need not be a trusted agent.

D.3.2 What will be demonstrated?

The combined Extent-of-Play Agreement should describe what will be demonstrated by the jurisdiction in the exercise. That will be translated into a list of objectives, and where and by whom those objectives will be demonstrated. That translation can be provided

by the person tasked with compiling the overall Agreement. Individual agreements or questionnaire responses need not make reference to program objectives, but they should relate to community plans and the individual response group's standard operating procedures (SOP). In years when a full federally managed and evaluated exercise is to be conducted, with all exercise objectives to be demonstrated, the overall Agreement needs to illustrate how that full demonstration will be accomplished.

The level of detail provided in the Extent-of-Play Agreement should be sufficient to support exercise design, without getting down to minute details of plans and response. Finer detail may be provided prior to the exercise in the Plans Briefing, during the exercise, in the Hot Wash following the exercise, or in comments regarding the draft Report.

D.3.3 Why, i.e., purpose of exercising?

The purpose for developing and utilizing a comprehensive exercise Extent-of-Play Agreement is to provide exercise play that, to the highest degree reasonably possible, closely approximates how a community would actually respond to a real event with conditions similar to that created in the exercise scenario. In doing so, opportunities may be provided to exercise both new and long established capabilities. Those opportunities may also include exercising mutual aid actions between jurisdictions and agencies that have been discussed but not tried. In short, a well thought out and comprehensive Extent-of-Play Agreement can make the difference between an exercise that is worth doing and one that is not.

D.3.4 When will they exercise?

The process of developing a comprehensive Extent-of-Play Agreement should give the community the opportunity to discuss and agree on when they want to exercise in the future. That discussion could extend to time of day, day of week, month and season. That discussion may take place too late to influence the date of the upcoming exercise, but it could influence scheduling of subsequent exercises.

A second and equally important answer to the "When" question is when should the comprehensive Extent-of-Play Agreements be complete? Since they significantly influence scenario development, simulation requirements and exercise evaluation, the Agreements must be complete in the early stage of annual exercise planning.

D.3.5 Where will they demonstrate?

The process of developing a comprehensive Extent-of-Play Agreement should also include planning relative to plume direction and extent, areas to demonstrate evacuation or shelter-in-place capabilities, host communities, etc. Such planning projected over several years can result in comprehensive exercising and development of the entire community's capabilities.

D.3.6 How will they participate?

Comprehensive Extent-of-Play Agreements will identify which elements of the exercise will be demonstrated through actual play and which will need to be simulated. In the short run, the list of simulation requirements will be important from the standpoint of exercise support. In the long run, items requiring simulation during exercise play may become the focus of budget requests, either for training or resources.

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DISTRIBUTION

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- 1-25. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Chemical and Radiological Preparedness Division, CSEPP Exercise Coordinator, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-3679
- 26-27. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Director, Readiness Division, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2738
- 28. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Public Affairs, 500 C Street SW, Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-4600

FEMA REGIONAL OFFICES

- 29. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I, Division Director, Preparedness, Training and Exercise Division, J. W. McCormack Building, Post Office and Courthouse, 4th Floor - Room 462, Boston, MA 02109-4595, (617) 223-9557
- 30. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II, Division Director, Preparedness, Training and Exercise Division, 26 Federal Plaza - Room 1351, New York, NY 10278, (212) 225-7215
- 31-36. Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region III, CSEPP Program Manager Preparedness, Training and Exercise Division, Liberty Square Building, 2nd Floor - 105 S. Seventh Street, Philadelphia, PA 19106, (215) 931-5592
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ARMY HEADQUARTER

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- 74-75. Deputy Assistant Secretary to the Army, For Chemical Demilitarization, (Dr. Theodore M. Prociv), 2451 Crystal Drive, Suite 640, Arlington, VA 22202
- 76-77. U.S. Defense Ammunition Center, ATTN: SMCAC-ASE, Savanna, IL 61074-9639
- 78-79. U.S. Defense Ammunition Center, ATTN: SIOAC-ASE, McAlester, OK 74501

INSTALLATIONS

- 78-97. CSEPP Exercise Coordinator, U.S. Army Soldiers and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), ATTN: SSBOE-CS, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5423
- 98-102. Commander, Anniston Chemical Activity, ATTN: SSBOE-AN, Bldg 363, 7 Frankford Ave., Anniston, AL 36201-9195
- 103-107. Commander, Blue Grass Chemical Activity, ATTN: SSBOE-BG (CSEPP Coordinator), 2091 Kingston Highway, Richmond, KY 40475-5008
- 108-112. Commander, Deseret Chemical Depot, ATTN: SSBOE-DC (CSEPP Coordinator), Tooele, UT 84074-5000
- 113-117. Commander, Edgewood Chemical Activity, ATTN: SSBOE-EC, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21010-5423
- 118-122. Commander, Newport Chemical Depot, ATTN: SSBOE-NC, P.O. Box 121, Newport, IN 47966-0121

- 123-127. Commander, Pine Bluff Chemical Activity, ATTN: SSBOE-PB (CSEPP Coordinator), 10020 Kabrich Circle, Pine Bluff, AR 71602-9500
- 128-132. Commander, Pueblo Chemical Depot, ATTN: SSBOE-PC (CSEPP Director) 45825 Highway 96 East, Pueblo, CO 81001-5000, (719) 549-4198
- 133-137. Commander, Umatilla Chemical Depot, ATTN: SSBOE-CO (CSEPP Coordinator), Hermiston, OR 97838-9544

CSEPP STATES

- 138-140. CSEPP Coordinator, Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Plans Division (CSEPP), P. O. Drawer 2160, Clanton, AL 35045-5160, (334) 712-0174
- 141-143. CSEPP Coordinator, Arkansas Office of Emergency Services, P. O. Box 758, Conway, AR 72032-0758, (501) 730-9816
- 144-146. CSEP Program Manager, Colorado Office of Emergency Management, Camp George West, 1500 Old Golden Rd., Golden, CO 80401, (303) 273-1787
- 147-149. CSEPP Manager, Illinois Emergency Management Agency, 110 E. Adams, Springfield, IL 62701-1109
- 150-152. CSEPP Coordinator, Indiana State Emergency Management Agency, 302 W. Washington Street, Room E-208, Indianapolis, IN 46204, (317) 232-6878
- 153-155. State CSEPP Exercise and Training Officer, Kentucky Division of Emergency Management, 1117 U.S. Highway 60 West, Frankfort, KY 40601-6168, (502) 564-5004
- 156-158. CSEPP Coordinator, Maryland Emergency Management Agency, 2 Sudbrook Lane East Pikesville, MD 21208, (410) 486-4422
- 159-161. CSEP Program Manager, Oregon Emergency Management, Eastern Region Office, 125 SE 1st, Pendleton, OR 97801
- 162-164. CSEP Program Manager, Utah Division of Comprehensive, Emergency Management,
P. O. Box 8136, Salt Lake City, UT 84108-0136, (801) 538-3400
- 165-167. CSEP Program Manager, Washington Military Division, MS:TA-20 Bldg. 20, Camp Murray, WA 98430-5122

IMMEDIATE RESPONSE ZONE (IRZ) COUNTIES

- 168-169. CSEPP Coordinator, Calhoun County Emergency Management Agency,
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- 170-171. CSEPP Coordinator, Talladega County Emergency Management Agency,
P. O. Box 43, Talladega, AL 35161, (256) 761-2125
- 172-173. Grant County CSEPP Coordinator, Office of Emergency Services, Box 98,
Sheridan, AR 72150, (870) 942-3333
- 174-175. Jefferson County CSEPP Coordinator, 101 East Barraque, Pine Bluff, AR 71601,
(870) 541-5470
- 176-179. CSEPP Coordinator, Pueblo County Department of Public Safety & Operations,
320 West Tenth St., Pueblo, CO 81003-2995, (719) 583-6200
- 180-181. CSEPP Coordinator, Vermillion County Emergency Response, 259 Vine Street,
Clinton, IN 47842, (765) 832-5500
- 182-183. Madison County CSEPP Coordinator, Madison County DES, P. O. Box 919,
Richmond, KY 40476-0919, (606) 624-4787
- 184-185. Harford County CSEPP Program Manager, Department of Emergency Operations,
2220 Ady Road, Forest Hill, MD 21050-1707, (410) 638-4900
- 186-187. CSEPP Coordinator, Baltimore County Emergency Preparedness, 700 East Joppa
Road, Towson, Md 21286-5500, (410) 887-5996
- 188-189. Umatilla County Emergency Management Director, 216 S.E. 4th Avenue ,
Pendleton, OR 97801, (541) 276-7111, ext. 246
- 190-192. Tooele County Emergency Management Director, 47 South Main Street, Tooele,
UT 84074, (435) 843-3260
- 193-194. Morrow County Emergency Management Director, P.O. Box 622, Heppner, OR
97836, (541) 676-5161
- 195-196. CSEPP Coordinator, Parke County Emergency Management, 110 East High St.,
Rockville, IN 47872, (765) 569-3646
- 197-198. Benton County Emergency Management, Deputy Director, Dept. of City of
Richland, 651 Truman Ave., Richland, WA 99352, (509) 628-2600

PROTECTIVE ACTION ZONE (PAZ) AND HOST COUNTIES

- 199-200. Director, Etowah County Emergency Management Agency, P. O. Box 267, Gadsden, AL 35902-0267, (256) 549-4575
- 201-202. St. Clair CSEPP Coordinator, St. Clair County Emergency Management Agency, 1610 Cogswell Ave. B-10, Pell City, AL 35125, (256) 884-6800
- 203-204. Clay County CSEPP Coordinator, Clay County Emergency Management Agency, P. O. Box 427, Ashland, AL 36251, (205) 396-5886
- 205-206. Cleburne County CSEPP Coordinator, Cleburne County Emergency Management Agency, 118 Emergency Ln., Heflin, AL 36264, (256) 463-7130
- 207-208. Saline County CSEPP Coordinator, 102 S. Main, Level B, Benton, AR 72015, (501) 303-5667
- 209-210. Lincoln County CSEPP Coordinator, Room B-106, Courthouse, Star City, AR 71667, (870) 628-5595/4332
- 211-212. Arkansas County CSEPP Coordinator, Courthouse, Stuttgart, AR 72160, (870) 673-3730
- 213-214. Little Rock CSEPP Coordinator, City of Little Rock OES, 720 West Markham, Little Rock, AR 72201, (501) 371-4540
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- 217-218. Prairie County CSEPP Coordinator, P.O. Box 278, Des Arc, AR 72040, (870) 256-4851
- 219-220. Dallas County CSEPP Coordinator, Route 2, Box 341, Fordyce, AR 71742, (870) 352-8303
- 221-222. Lonoke County CSEPP Coordinator, 200 N. Center, Lonoke, AR 72086, (501) 676-3011/3499
- 223-224. North Little Rock CSEPP Coordinator, 1206 Sycamore, North Little Rock, AR 72114, (501) 340-5365
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- 227-228. Fountain County CSEPP Coordinator, Fountain County Emergency Management, 301 Fourth St., Covington, IN 47932, (765) 793-0833
- 229-230. Edgar County CSEPP Coordinator, Edgar County Emergency Services & Disaster

Agency, P.O. Box 1002, Paris, IL 61944

- 231-232. Vermilion County CSEPP Coordinator, Vermilion County Emergency Services & Disaster Agency, Two East South Street, Danville, IL 61832
- 233-234. Clark County CSEPP Coordinator, Clark County Disaster and Emergency Services, 15 South Main Street, Winchester, KY 40391, (606) 745-7415
- 235-236. Estill County CSEPP Coordinator, Estill County Disaster and Emergency Services, P.O. Box 216, Ravenna, KY 40472-0216, (606) 723-6533
- 237-238. Powell County CSEPP Coordinator, Powell County Disaster and Emergency Services, P.O. Box 607, Clay City, KY 4031, (606) 663-2834
- 239-240. Fayette County CSEPP Coordinator, Fayette County Division of Environmental and Emergency Management, Nunn Bldg., 121 N. Martin Luther King Blvd., Lexington, KY 40507, (606) 258-3784
- 241-242. Garrard County CSEPP Coordinator, Garrard County Disaster and Emergency Services, 101 Stanford Street, Lancaster, KY 40444
- 243-244. Rockcastle County CSEPP Coordinator, Rockcastle County Disaster and Emergency Services, c/o Rockcastle County Hospital, Newcomb Ave., Mt. Vernon, KY 40456, (606) 256-2195
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- 247-248. Kent County CSEPP Coordinator, Kent County Emergency Management Agency, 104 Vickers Drive, Unit D, Chestertown, MD 21602, (410) 778-7458
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